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Abstract:  
This thesis explores the meaning of human dignity in law and its potential value 
as a legal concept. It claims that existing methods of analysis are predominantly 
caught up with seeking a fixed and conventional meaning, which has proven 
difficult and has invariably led to claims that the concept is vague or vacuous. In 
this light, the thesis proposes a fresh method of conceptual analysis that 
progresses the current debate on the meaning of the concept in a more fruitful 
and productive direction. It seeks to shift the focus of analysis away from the 
formal search for a clear concept that is simply there to be applied or repeated, 
in favour of constructing the concept to respond to the shifting problems that 
emerge in life, as well as unlocking new pathways to promote more dynamic, 
rich, active and joyful modes of living. In this respect, it is argued that a concept 
of dignity should be assessed not by how well it reflects the past, but how it can 
be constructed to produce change that unlocks new potentialities and creative 
tendencies in the present.   
In deploying this methodology, the author seeks to construct a theoretically 
informed concept of human dignity that progresses beyond the limited focus on 
dignity as autonomy to encompass a more holistic, dynamic and interdependent 
view of human personality. The author explores a notion of dignity that he terms 
an ‘investment concept’. On this account, the value of human life is situated in 
its creative potential that is inherent, which requires investment from the 
community and the individual in order to be nurtured. It depends on a relational 
view of humanity that sees the creative potentiality of an individual as always 
unfolding in relation to others in the community. This potential is promoted 
through increasing the power of acting and rest for both the body and mind that 
is joyful rather than sad. This establishes a multifaceted view of humanity that 
moves beyond the mainstream separation of mind-body, independence-
dependence, emotion-reason, in favour of a more joined up and connected 
perspective on humanity that recognises that humans are vulnerable beings 
whose development depends upon the relationships and connections of which 
they are always a part.  
The thesis explores the implication of this construction for the law in England 
and Wales, considering how the concept can be connected to existing legal 
pathways, as well as extending or unlocking new legal paths to create a better 
future for the most vulnerable. The process of connecting the concept to the 
existing legal framework is also treated as an important foundation for refining 
and enriching the concept by drawing on the complexity of human experience. 
In this sense, connecting human dignity to law is treated as a basis for reflecting 
on the way in which dignity can be refined, adapted or modified to address the 
concrete problems or experiences faced in life. The final part of the thesis 
explores the potential transformative implications of investment dignity for 
concepts that have been connected to human dignity, such as the rule of law 
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and democracy, which affect the relationship between the individual and the 
community.  
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Introduction   
1. Background and Context: The Emergence of Human Dignity in the Law 
of England and Wales 
The past two decades have seen an explosion in references to human dignity in 
the law of England and Wales. It has progressed from an idea on the very 
margins of legal discourse to one that is now deployed in legal argument in 
response to a seemingly endless array of issues. It has been deployed in such 
distinct fields as immigration 1 , social welfare 2 , discrimination 3 , detention 4 , 
defamation5, end-of-life decision making6, harassment7, procedural fairness8, 
and sexual abuse.9 It is perhaps therefore unsurprising that human dignity has 
become of increasing interest to legal scholarship in England and Wales where, 
up until 1999, there were no concentrated studies evaluating the role of the 
concept. 10  These developments represent a widening of the relevance of 
human dignity in England and Wales. At the same time, there has been a 
deepening of significance. A concept that was once described as ‘less 
fundamental’ 11  than values such as security and autonomy, is now being 
described as ‘the core value of our society’ and even a ‘core value of the 
common law.’12  
The deepening of the significance and widening of the relevance of human 
dignity is unquestionably a consequence of the introduction of the Human 
Rights Act (HRA) which in 2000 gave further effect to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). Despite the absence of human dignity anywhere in 
the text of the HRA, or the ECHR, human dignity has been recognised by the 
judiciary as the essence of all the human rights enshrined in those 
                                                          
1
 RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] 1 AC 152. 
2
 R (on the application of McDonald) v Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea [2011] UKSC 
33. 
3
 Hall v Bull [2013] UKSC 73. 
4
 R. (on the application of B) v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] EWHC 2220. 
5
 Charman v Orion Publishing Group Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 972. 
6
 Airedale N.H.S. Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
7
 London School of Economics and Political Science v Lindsay [2013] EWCA Civ 1650   
8
 Osborn v the Parole Board, re Reilly [2013] UKSC 61.  
9
 AT & Ors v Dulghieru & Anor [2009] EWHC 225. 
10
 David Feldman ‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 2’ (2000) PL 61.  
11
 David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (OUP, 2002) 132.  
12
 R (On the Application of A, B, X and Y) v East Sussex County Council (No 2) [2003] EWHC 
167 (East Sussex case) [86].   
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
10 
 
instruments.13 In addition, the HRA has accelerated the development of human 
dignity in the common law of England and Wales, as a result of the obligation 
on domestic courts to act compatibly with Convention rights and, by necessary 
implication, the interests they protect. The extraordinary growth in the use of 
human dignity shows very few signs of abating and, in fact, is very likely to 
increase due to two key developments in European Union Law. Firstly, human 
dignity is being expressly referred to in an increasing number of secondary 
sources of EU law, which impose obligations on Member States to protect 
human dignity in particular contexts. 14  Secondly, human dignity is now an 
important concept in the primary sources of EU law, which imposes an 
obligation on Members States to comply with the duty to respect and protect 
human dignity when implementing Union Law.15  
These developments in the use of human dignity in the law of England and 
Wales have not led to the emergence of a single or complete definition of the 
concept. A number of commentators have therefore described the meaning of 
the concept in the law of England Wales in terms that suggest it is uncertain, 
unclear and unfinished.16 The growth in jurisprudence on human dignity has not 
necessarily therefore been matched by an improvement in its understanding.17       
Domestic developments occur at the same time as the use of the concept 
internationally has been the subject of significant philosophical controversy. The 
judicial use of human dignity in England and Wales is not insulated from such 
controversy. Dignity as a legal concept is often understood to reflect different 
philosophical conceptions.18  In this regard, major controversy surrounds the 
competing legal definitions of human dignity that reflect competing ideas of the 
Good. This has led to a deep-rooted scepticism by those who argue that dignity 
is vacuous, or that the many incompatible senses make it incapable of resolving 
                                                          
13
 Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 427, [65]; RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2012] UKSC 38 [39].  
14
 Art 3(3) Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general 
framework for equal treatment in employment and occupation  OJ L303/16.  
15
 Article 1, Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) OJ 
C326 12.  
16
 Justin Bates, Human Dignity – An Empty Phrase in Search of Meaning? [2005] JR 165; 
Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (OUP, 2004).  
17
 Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (Ibid) 91. 
18
Neomi Rao, ‘Three Concepts of Dignity in Constitutional Law’ (2011) 86 Notre Dame Law 
Review 183, 186; David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales 
(OUP, 2002) 128. 
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difficult disputes.19 The consequence is that recourse to human dignity enables 
a judge to adopt whatever conception of dignity would support their 
convictions.20 This is a criticism that has been directed at judicial uses of human 
dignity in England and Wales, in light of the apparent lack of a singular 
authoritative definition.21  
The controversy surrounding dignity is not only based on the fact that 
disagreement exists about its meaning, but also on the perception that certain 
uses of dignity threaten other legal and ethical concepts, such as autonomy. 
Thus, in some quarters, human dignity has gained a reputation for being a 
potentially paternalistic concept that is used to restrict individual choice and 
impose the value choices of judges or the community.22 Although this has not 
become a prominent feature of the law in England and Wales, some cases have 
suggested that human dignity might be used as a tool of constraint as opposed 
to empowerment.23  Moreover, the vagueness of human dignity, and the risk of 
discretion it affords to judges, has been argued as antagonistic to the rule of law 
and to democracy. 24  Thus, whether human dignity is treated as an empty 
concept, or a paternalistic concept, it is treated (by some) as best left out of the 
legal discourse or, at the very least, out of the hands of judges.25  
The hostility towards the concept of dignity in the literature, whilst prominent, is 
not a universal theme. In a number of recent works dignity is being treated as 
an essential value that supplements, precedes or replaces concepts such as 
autonomy or best interests (values that are familiar to the law in England and 
                                                          
19
  Ruth Macklin, ‘Dignity is a Useless Concept: It Means No More Than Respect for Persons or 
Their Autonomy’ (2003) 327 British Medical Journal 1419-20; Steven Pinker, ‘The Stupidity of 
Dignity’ (2008) The New Republic 28; M Bagaric and J Allan, 'The Vacuous Concept of Dignity' 
(2006) 5 Journal of Human Rights 257.  
20
 David Feldman ‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 1’ (1999) PL 682, 685. Christopher 
McCrudden ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 EJIL 655, 
655.  
21
 Bates (n 10); Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (n 10).  
22
 Neomi Rao (n 18); David Feldman ‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 1’ (n 11); Stephanie 
Hennette-Vauchez, ‘A human dignitas? Remnants of the ancient legal concept in dignitary 
jurisprudence (2011) International Journal of Constitutional Law 32. 
23
 C v A Local Authority [2011] EWHC 1539. See Roger Brownsword, ‘Human Dignity, Human 
Rights, and Simply Trying to do the Right Thing’ in Chrisopher McCrudden (eds), Understanding 
Human Dignity (OUP, 2013); David Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in 
Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP, 2002) Ch 2 and 3.  
24
 Christopher McCrudden ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (n 20) 
721.  
25
 Conor Gearty, Principles of Human Rights Adjudication (n 16) 162. 
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
12 
 
Wales).26 A recurring theme is the claim that human dignity is not subject to the 
same limitations as autonomy on the grounds that the latter concept places 
significant emphasis on rationality and independence, which is incapable of 
addressing the needs of some groups who may not fit the autonomy mould.27 It 
is in this light that commentators are increasingly connecting dignity to issues of 
compassion, care, holism, vulnerability and disadvantage.28  Whilst there is no 
all-encompassing definition of human dignity in England and Wales, the concept 
has, at the very least, been closely connected by judges to the protection of 
marginalised groups whose needs and desires may not be encompassed within 
established social or legal structures. 29 
The use of human dignity to protect marginalised groups has had important 
transformative implications for other core legal values. The principles of 
democracy and the rule of law, for instance, have both been interpreted through 
the prism of human dignity to require that minority groups be treated with equal 
respect, even if the majority do not respect them or designate them as 
unworthy. 30  Some commentators have even suggested that human dignity 
might be an important foundational value of democracy and the rule of law.31  
Perspectives on the utility of human dignity as a legal value therefore 
fundamentally differ. On the one hand, dignity is understood to have a 
potentially key role to play as a concept used to address the issues experienced 
by the most vulnerable. The protection of the dignity of such groups carries 
important implications for concepts like democracy and the rule of law, which 
need to be understood as substantive concepts (as opposed to formal or 
procedural) that require people to be treated with equal respect. On the other 
                                                          
26
 Lord Justice Munby, ‘What Price Dignity?’ (Lag Community Care Conference: Protecting 
Liberties, July 2010); Foster (n 10).  
27
 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’ in Human Dignity and 
Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics (US Independent 
Agencies and Commissions 2008); Catherine Dupré, ‘Unlocking human dignity: towards a 
theory for the 21
st
 century’ (2009) EHRLR 190.  
28
 See David Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 
2002); George Harris, Human Dignity and Vulnerability: Strength and Quality of Character 
(University of California Press 2007); Mary Neal, ‘Not gods but animals: human dignity and 
vulnerable subjecthood’ (2012) 23 Liverpool Law Review 177. 
29
 East Sussex case (n 12) 67; R (on the application of Bernard) v Enfield LBC [2002] EWHC 
2282 [34] [93]; Baroness Hale, ‘What Can the Human Rights Act Do for my Mental Health?’ 
(2005) 17 Child and Family Law Quarterly 295, 305.  
30
 Ghaidan (n 13) 132.  
31
 Catherine Dupré, ‘Dignity, Democracy and Civilisation’ (2012) 33 Liverpool Law Review 263, 
273; Daly, Dignity Rights 132.  
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hand, dignity is understood to be unclear and lacking in definition. It does not 
supplement autonomy, but undermines it. It does not solve disputes, but makes 
them more complicated.  
It seems highly unlikely that such scepticism will mean human dignity 
disappears from legal discourse. 32  The major issue (and perhaps better 
question to ask) is therefore not whether the concept of human dignity should 
be recognised as a legal value, but whether it is possible to carve out a 
legitimate and distinctive role for the concept in the existing legal and theoretical 
framework. One that reflects a more complex image of humanity and provides 
protection for those who are most vulnerable, which more familiar concepts may 
not be able to achieve to the same extent, whilst responding to the complaints 
that it is vague, vacuous or potentially paternalistic.  
2. Research Aims: Protecting the Most Vulnerable in the Law of England 
and Wales 
This thesis seeks to justify and carve out such a distinctive role for human 
dignity in the law of England and Wales. It firstly proposes a philosophically 
informed definition of human dignity that develops the relationship between 
dignity and the concepts of vulnerability, holism and creativity. Although 
connections between these concepts are often made in legal practice, as noted 
above, there is not a great deal by way of theoretical justification that explains 
how, why and in what way the concepts are connected. It argues that existing 
accounts of dignity (particularly autonomy-based models) are not always 
successful in encompassing the rich complexity and diversity of our shared 
humanity. This thesis seeks to develop the connection between dignity and 
vulnerability by firstly positioning dignity within the wider capabilities approach to 
realising justice, which has, at its core, a central concern with promoting and 
protect the development of the most vulnerable. 33  The thesis reorients the 
capabilities approach to dignity around the philosophical thinking of Baruch 
Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze, whose theories are centrally concerned with what 
a person is capable of being and doing, but, at the same time, avoid the 
                                                          
32
 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Introduction’ in Understanding Human Dignity (British Academy, 
2013) 1.  
33
 See Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice (Belknap Press: HUP, 2009); Creating Capabilities: 
The Human Development Approach (Belknap Press: HUP, 2011).   
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perfectionism of Aristotle and the narrow Kantianism of Rawls.34 The purpose is 
to show how, in providing an alternative capabilities model to understanding 
dignity, Spinoza and Deleuze offer convincing insights into the way capabilities 
are necessarily related to respect for diversity, inter-dependency, 
experimentation, emotional needs, rest, becoming, inclusion, community and 
individuality.  
These thinkers situate vulnerability at the core of their conception of human 
capabilities, recognising the radically open and immanent nature of human 
subjectivity, in which people are necessarily open to development and 
composition, as well as decomposition and destruction.35 Vulnerability, on this 
account, is not merely a negative concept, but is also, it will be argued, central 
to the very type of dignity that we possess as human beings. These different 
components of humanity are then used as a framework to construct an 
‘investment’ concept of human dignity.  
The investment concept takes a holistic approach to humanity, providing a 
distinctive role for the concept; it requires investment in to the creative 
potentiality of human life by promoting and protecting activity and rest for the 
mind and body that is joyful rather than sad. This occurs within a network of 
interrelationality, in which people necessarily depend upon making connections 
with other people and bodies in the world to sustain and develop their 
capabilities. Investment, on this account, is prioritised for the most vulnerable, 
who live in the most circumscribed and isolated conditions, restricted in terms of 
making those important connections. It is hoped that this conception, which 
focuses on wider philosophical discussions on the meaning of human dignity, 
will shed new light on the development of human dignity in England and Wales, 
as well as open new vectors for the development of human dignity to respond to 
and address the needs of particularly vulnerable people.  
The second part of the thesis tests the concept of investment dignity by 
considering how it connects to existing judicial uses of human dignity in the law 
of England and Wales. The purpose of this is to consider how the theoretically 
rich concept of investment dignity could be realised in the messy practice of law 
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and, at the same time, potentially shed light on aspects of the use of human 
dignity, including its connection to vulnerability, which are not always fully 
articulated by the judiciary. Moreover, connecting investment dignity to existing 
judicial uses of the concept, as discussed further in the methodology session, 
can draw on existing elements of legal normativity to suggest ways in which the 
law might be developed to create a better future.  Importantly, testing a concept, 
by relating it to a particular factual situation, is not merely about determining 
how a pre-determined abstract concept applies to a set of facts, but is also a 
process of deepening and enriching the concept.36  
In order to test the concept of investment dignity against the current legal 
framework in England and Wales, the thesis considers two major sources of 
legal protection in the form of the common law (defined broadly as causes of 
action and remedies developed through judicial precedent) and the HRA, both 
of which have already been expressly linked to the protection of human 
dignity.37 This thesis does not seek to evaluate the entire range of potential 
mechanisms for the protection of human dignity, neither, of course, does it seek 
to undermine them. There are clearly a wide range of statutory mechanisms 
that may effectively protect human dignity.38 However, unlike the common law 
or HRA, such provisions remain narrowly focused and therefore do not attend to 
wider definitional issues. Moreover, the common law and HRA are treated, to a 
degree, as providing constitutional oversight of existing legislation, or supplying 
the omission of statute.39 Focusing on the common law and HRA will allow for 
indirect consideration of the protection afforded to human dignity in statute, at 
the same time as focusing on the most significant issues and limitations 
concerning the protection of human dignity in England and Wales.  
This thesis does not directly address the protection of human dignity under the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. The central aim of this section is to test the 
investment concept of dignity against the existing protection of human dignity in 
law, whereas the Charter, whilst entailing significant potential, is still only in the 
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very early stages of judicial development. 40  It is hoped, however, that an 
analysis of existing dignity protection can provide an informed basis for a 
discussion on the way that instruments like the Charter may develop. 
The introduction of investment dignity into the legal and theoretical framework is 
unlikely to correspond to all existing aspects of legal discourse in England and 
Wales. Nor necessarily should it, if it is to bring about improved social and living 
conditions for particularly vulnerable people who may be subject to isolation, 
indifference or prejudice. Investment dignity is very likely therefore to have 
important implications for some other core legal concepts. This is particularly 
the case in respect of the rule of law and democracy that have been recognised 
as having their foundation in human dignity (as noted above). The final aim of 
the thesis is therefore to consider the implications of the proposed definition of 
human dignity on democracy, which informs the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty, and the rule of law, which affects the distribution of powers.  
3. Methodology: Constructing Human Dignity  
3.1. Key Issues 
The methodological problem of how to identify the meaning of human dignity is  
one of, if not the most, important issues faced by scholars.41  It is the first 
question that needs to be asked in determining the meaning and function of 
dignity. Each methodological approach to understanding dignity begins with, 
and brings with it, different assumptions or expectations of how to discern the 
meaning of a concept.42 More importantly, different methods conceive of the 
utility and function of concepts in different ways. A deductive approach might, 
for instance, place significant emphasis on the value of concepts as tools to 
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resolve disputes, whereas an inductive approach might places a stronger 
emphasis on dialogue.43 
It is therefore surprising that a number of definitional approaches have 
proceeded to define the concept without a self-reflective or critical attitude to the 
methods that are deployed, or a consideration of the implications of alternative 
methods. Recent studies, however, demonstrate an emerging focus on the 
importance of methodology to understanding human dignity, especially in terms 
of interdisciplinary dialogue.44  One important trend is the recognition of the 
close and symbiotic relationship between philosophical and legal approaches to 
human dignity. Interpreting a legal concept does not take place in a vacuum and 
is likely to be heavily informed by, or at least reflect, a particular vision of the 
good. 45  In turn, philosophical approaches can, as McCrudden has argued, 
benefit from ‘exposure to legal debates because lawyers focus on concrete 
cases’.46 Much might therefore be gained by paying attention to the intersection 
between legal and theoretical approaches.’47  
This section argues that attempts to understand dignity as both a legal and 
theoretical concept predominantly, although not exclusively, conform to a 
leading taxonomy proposed by Dworkin on the different conditions under which 
a concept can arise.48 According to Dworkin, conventionalist, or interpretivist 
methods offer different forms of conceptual analysis. 49  These (sometimes 
implicit) methods of conceptual analysis are, it is argued, applied to dignity as a 
theoretical and legal concept, with the exception that the latter conceptual 
analysis focuses primarily on its formation within a particular institutional 
framework, potentially constrained by notions of fairness, tradition and 
procedural due process. Each of these methods and its assumptions has 
different limitations for understanding a rich and complex concept like dignity.  
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In light of some of the limitations of the leading methods, this section will set out 
an alternative methodology to be used to understand the concept of dignity. 
This section will explain how the thesis uses a constructivist method of 
conceptual analysis developed by Gilles Deleuze. This entails constructing 
dignity by developing, refining and modifying its different components, as well 
as the relationship between them, to respond to the shifting problems and 
differences that invariably emerge in time. This methodology, it is argued, has 
the benefit of moving the current legal and theoretical debate beyond the formal 
search for the fixed meaning of the concept, to construct the concept to unlock 
new possibilities for life-enhancing modes of being that address the needs of 
the disadvantaged or excluded.  
3.2. Existing Methodologies in Philosophy and Law 
3.2.1. Conventionalism 
The conventionalist methodology seeks to uncover existing convergence in the 
criteria by those who use the term dignity. In the context of law, the focus is 
shifted to finding convergence in the use of the term by particular legal actors, 
such as judges.50 This method of analysis is often adopted in such a way that 
leads to one of three outcomes, which all treat dignity as a concept lacking 
practical value. The first is that dignity has a shared meaning, but it is of such a 
high level of generality that it remains vague or vacuous.51 The second is that 
dignity means many different things, representing different concepts that are 
governed by different criteria. In this light, solving practical dilemmas comes 
down to an arbitrary choice between different uses of the term dignity.52  The 
third is that some of the criteria used to identify dignity are identical to the 
criteria used by other concepts, such as autonomy, which makes the concept 
largely superfluous.53  
The first possible limitation of the conventionalist methodology is that it leads 
towards vagueness and contradictory understandings, not only of human 
dignity, but all value concepts. It is notable that the conclusions that dignity is 
vague or contradictory that are reached by some scholars are largely treated 
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either explicitly or implicitly as isolated issues for dignity. 54 These 
characterisations, however, appear to express an unfair bias against dignity, for 
they do not consider how the conventionalist approach would apply to concepts 
such as freedom or equality. Over half a century ago Isaiah Berlin demonstrated 
how there was no consensus on the use of the term freedom and very different 
conventional accounts.55 On a conventional analysis it seems unfair to label 
dignity as exclusively a vague or contradictory, when the same method might 
lead to similar conclusions in relation to other concepts.  
The second possible consequence of applying the conventionalist methodology 
to any value concept, including dignity, is that it can tend towards emphasising 
conflict. Where there are different criteria concepts, no rational standpoint exists 
from which to choose between concepts.56  The conventionalist approach to 
concepts therefore emphasises the disagreement, even conflict, over the choice 
of values underplaying the reality that although there are differences there are 
some shared concerns which are ‘common across the differences, and in spite 
of them.’57  
Conventionalist accounts of dignity therefore place particular emphasis on 
reporting on the way in which the term has been used historically and 
comparatively. Importantly, the method does not address the issue of who has 
used the concept of dignity to their advantage and who has influenced its 
formation. Over time, certain actors may have a more dominant or subordinate 
roles in the influence in the formulation of particular criteria to further particular 
interests. It may thus be the contention of some feminists, or disabled persons, 
that leading conventionalist concepts have largely been formulated with 
masculine ideals, or the able-bodied as the central case.58  
The conventionalist methodology therefore largely detaches the use of the word 
dignity from the context within which it was formed. This is true also in the way 
the conventionalist approach to dignity does not consider the related question of 
why the concept was so formed. In seeking the shared criteria used in the 
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meaning of the concept, criteria methodology detaches concepts from the 
issues and problems they are addressed to solve.  
3.2.2. Interpretivism 
The second type of conceptual analysis that is commonly applied to dignity in is 
what Dworkin terms an interpretive approach.59 The interpretive method largely 
seeks to determine the meaning of a concept, such as dignity, by providing a 
particular characterisation of that value, which best justifies shared paradigms.60 
This methodology therefore begins with proposing paradigm cases in which 
most people share a conviction that a certain treatment is right or wrong and 
then proposes a conception that justifies it. In turn the interpretive methodology 
commonly seeks to explain how the concepts cohere with other concepts that 
correspond to the largest number of paradigms possible.61  
This interpretive model is mirrored in law, according to Dworkin, when judges or 
doctrinal scholars seek to offer the best possible interpretation they can of as 
many paradigm legal cases as possible by proposing principles that explain 
those cases in a way that is at the same time coherent with other principles.62 
This approach is clearly reflected in Dworkin’s attempt to define dignity as 
authenticity and personal responsibility. He does so by trying to provide a 
coherent interpretation of particular legal paradigms, such as the prohibition of 
torture, or the idea that the innocent should not be punished.63 This method is 
also implicit in the work of Susanne Baer who seeks an interpretation of dignity, 
equality and autonomy that inform each other and make sense of paradigm 
human rights violations.64   
The interpretive methodology invariably offers a less sceptical view of dignity 
than a conventionalist methodology, as it suggests there are better and worse 
ways of interpreting paradigm cases. However, it does so through the formation 
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of a grand overarching theory that seeks coherence or equilibrium between 
concepts. It is in the pursuit of such a theory that the interpretive methodology 
fails to explain some central features of the formation of concepts. Firstly, it 
does not explain how existing judgments and concepts change over time. 
Individuals quite regularly change their individual convictions and their 
understanding of concepts, but not only because they find incoherence in their 
thought processes. Most notably, individual judgments are changed by 
experiencing difference or otherness, new encounters with individuals and 
forces in the world, or experiences new problems or issues that were not faced 
in the past..65  
This leads into a second concern with the use of the interpretive methodology 
as it appears to endorse an underlying assumption of isolationism and 
separateness in the formulation of concepts, as it predominately focuses on the 
model of the herculean man66, or hypothetical council of rational individuals 
behind a veil of ignorance.67 This carries an undeniable risk that a concept 
becomes exclusive in its scope, accounting for the convictions (preconceptions 
or prejudices) of the predominant or ideal group in the interpretive community.68  
The third possible limitation with the interpretive methodology is that it often 
leads to abstractness and broad generalisations that become detached from the 
issues faced by persons in particular circumstances.  Dworkin often seeks to 
interpret concepts by appealing to, by his own admission, contrived and bizarre 
cases that are detached from the world that we encounter. 69  This form of 
knowledge is more concerned with orderliness in the way that concepts cohere, 
then with addressing the specific needs and problems faced by persons in real 
cases.70 
3.2.3. Constructivism as a Methodology  
This section proposes a third alternative method for analysing dignity that seeks 
to avoid the limitations of the criteria or interpretivist methods discussed above. 
This is a constructivist methodology that is grounded in the political philosophy 
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of Baruch Spinoza and Gilles Deleuze.71 Their method of conceptual analysis 
can, it is argued, help to take current debate on the meaning of dignity at the 
intersection of law and theory in a more productive and fruitful direction. 
Constructivism, unlike existing approaches to the concept, which has invariably 
led to disappointment in the failure to uncover a singular authoritative definition, 
does not seek to merely repeat or capture the existing meaning of the term 
‘dignity’.  
Constructivism moves beyond the search for the fixed meaning of the term, or 
an abstract interpretive unity, to construct the concept in response to the 
emerging differences and shifting problems that occur in time. The aim of 
constructivism is therefore to create concepts that can extend existing legal 
movements and open new ones in order to unlock enhanced modes of being. 
More importantly, the constructivist methodology treats the ‘openness’ of a 
concept as a key advantage to its ability to respond to the nature of human life, 
which is marked by creativity and difference that emerges in time.72  
Whilst constructivism does emphasis the inevitable need for creative 
adaptation, it is not a completely unrestrained practice. As seen below, any 
construction of the concept will need to bear some resemblance to existing 
concepts and must connect to, as well as advance, existing legal (and social) 
developments.  Moreover, and as noted above, any construction should open 
up pathways that further enhance creativity, activity and life, contributing to a 
better future for the disadvantaged.  
3.2.4. Concepts as Open Multiplicities 
A key strength of the constructivist method of analysis is its ability to explain 
how concepts of dignity may differ, but may, at the same time, share common 
features. The constructivist method treats concepts as a complex body that is 
made up of different component parts, which themselves may be made up of 
other components. 73  According to Deleuze, a concept is always a singular 
multiplicity, a characteristic relationship between its component parts. It is the 
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‘point of coincidence, condensation or accumulation of its own components.’74 
This method unlocks a new way of analysing and understanding dignity by 
being attentive to the manner in which the component concepts or parts of 
dignity are arranged and relate to one another in a particular relationship. 
Where the different components of dignity are arranged in a particular way or a 
particular interpretation is given to a component, or a component is added or 
subtracted, then the characteristic relationship of a concept of dignity changes. 
As a useful comparison, consider the following example of the social contract 
provided by Paul Patton: 
[T]he state of nature, the restless desire for power, 
the natural laws of human reason and the artificial 
person or...[Sovereign] which results from the 
compact.75 
The concept of the social contract is therefore made up of different component 
parts (state of nature, power, natural law, sovereign), but its meaning shifts 
according to a change in one or more of the elements, so that, for instance, a 
difference can be made depending on whether the subject relinquishes or lends 
power to a sovereign authority. 76  This method therefore has the benefit of 
explaining how the meaning attributed to dignity is not static and may vary over 
time. In the following chapters, the key will therefore be to highlight the ways in 
which component parts of the concept of human dignity are creatively changed, 
added to and subtracted from the concept over time, in ways that alter its 
singular meaning by causing it to enter into a new characteristic relationship.  
3.2.5. Responding to Problems 
A constructivist approach to dignity not only provides an understanding of how 
human dignity may vary, but also provides reasons for why the components of 
dignity are sometimes assembled in a particular way. In this regard, and 
according to Deleuze, the key to the formation of a concept is the recognition of 
the creative genesis of the problem. This means, for Deleuze, that a ‘concept 
lacks meaning to the extent that it is not…linked to a problem that it resolves or 
helps to resolve’.77 This provides the advantage of methodologically being able 
to explain the history of variations in the concept of dignity, as concepts will vary 
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when they undergo ‘migration from one problem to another’.78  Again, as an 
example, Patton suggests that the concept of a contract is ‘transformed in part 
by virtue of the specific problem to which it relates in each case, whether this is 
the constitution and legitimation of civil authority, of morality, or the distinctive 
political relations between rulers and ruled’.79 On this account, there is no single 
concept of the contract that stays the same, only a concept that is transformed 
whilst retaining a family resemblance in each horizon, a concept that has a 
‘distinct character and serves a specific end’.80  
Deploying the Deleuzian model of the relationship between concept creation 
and problem determination will provide beneficial insights into the manner in 
which dignity is formed. Firstly, it will enable a critique of the ways in which 
those concepts address the problems and needs of today. Secondly, it opens 
up the possibility for the creation of a new concept of dignity, which provides a 
more effective tool for addressing the problems or issues faced by individuals in 
society. Finally, a constructivist method entails a democratic dimension to 
concept-creation in which concepts are constructed in light of the problems and 
needs that are defined by persons who are most directly affected by 
decisions.81  In this respect, law is a particularly suitable and valuable site for 
considering the construction of human dignity, as it is typically law that deals 
with concrete and specific problems that emerge in time.  
3.2.6. The Becoming of Concepts 
As noted above, the constructive methodology recognises that concepts are not 
rigid or inflexible but are an open multiplicity. The open nature of concepts 
means they are amenable to change, which Deleuze defines as the state of 
becoming.82 Concepts are thus in a state of change, as they become different in 
the way they transition through new problems or issues in different horizons.83 
The becoming of concepts is fundamentally tied to a central notion that Deleuze 
has termed the encounter. An encounter represents the situation in which a 
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person meets something else in the world that forces them to think. On this 
account, thinking is not merely recalling past categories or knowledge, but 
entails a recognition that ‘clichés, habits, categories and propositional certitudes 
are no longer sufficient to account for, think, and react within a situation’.84 
Thought requires openness to thinking anew by formulating problems in respect 
of how to respond to situations between persons that are not mere repetitions of 
past events, but are in some sense different.85  Dignity may therefore need to 
be responsive to differences and otherness, perhaps, and better still, even 
encompassing or embracing those dimensions of life. 
This aspect of a constructivist approach requires the shedding of the image that 
dignity should somehow have a fixed and clear content, which is simply there to 
be applied. This is because the process of understanding is not merely a matter 
of applying a fixed concept of dignity to specific issues, but involves a genuinely 
creative process whereby the encounter is truly productive in deepening, 
refining, modifying and clarifying the meaning of dignity. In this respect, law, it is 
suggested, not only offers the potential to give theoretical concepts a more 
specific concept, as McCrudden suggests, but also provides an opportunity to 
enrich and develop those concepts in response to the differing experiences of 
people encountered in cases over time.   
3.2.7. Connecting Concepts 
One of the important repercussions of adopting a Deleuzian image of the 
concept is that it provides new tools for explaining connections between the 
concept of dignity and other concepts. Interpretivists often take a monistic view, 
in which dignity is seen as part of a coherent body of mutually supporting 
values.86 In contrast, conventionalists focus on the idea of pluralism, so that 
concepts like dignity will conflict with the meaning of liberty and equality.87 
Deleuze’s image of the concept provides a distinct way of comprehending the 
connections between concepts, which transcends the monist/pluralist dispute. 
According to Deleuze, any concept – 
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[H]as a becoming that involves its relations with 
concepts situated on the same plane…In fact, having 
a finite number of components, every concept will 
branch off towards other concepts that are differently 
composed but that constitute other regions of the 
same plane, answer to problems that can be 
connected to each other, and participate in a co-
creation. A concept requires not only a problem 
through which it recasts or replaces earlier concepts 
but a junction of problems where it combines with 
other existing concepts.88 
  
Each concept is therefore always made of component parts, usually ‘bits or 
components that come from other concepts, which correspond to other 
problems and pre-suppose other planes’. 89  Establishing bridges to other 
concepts may therefore be important in order to address a specific problem. 
However, the establishment of these connections will be truly creative in terms 
of formulating a concept that exists in a distinctive relationship.90  Concepts 
neither definitely cohere, nor conflict, but are instead ‘centers of vibrations, each 
in itself and every one in relation to all the others. That is why all resonate rather 
than cohere or correspond with each other.’91  
Constructivism provides a way of explaining the connections between dignity 
and other concepts in a unique way. It is possible to explain how connections 
might arise in the way that component parts of concepts, such as autonomy, 
might migrate and be connected to other component parts of the concept of 
dignity. This may be because each concept answers problems that might be 
connected, or it might be that connecting them together provides a better way to 
address a new problem, which neither could achieve alone.  
3.2.8. Improving the Future 
The use of the Deleuzian image of a concept to construct dignity presupposes 
what Deleuze has called the idea of immanence.92 This entails thinking new 
problems, developing new possibilities and ultimately creating ‘a new earth, a 
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new people’.93  Importantly, this image of thought fundamentally rejects any 
appeal to transcendental ideals outside of human experience as a basis of 
knowledge. Instead, there are only immanent possibilities for life, possibilities 
that are capable of being evaluated ‘through itself in the movements it lays out 
and the intensities it creates on a plane of immanence’.94 Modes of thinking that 
create concepts by reference to transcendental ideas.  
This does not lead to scepticism. Instead, the immanent nature of thought 
means that a concept is ‘good or bad, noble or vulgar, complete or empty, 
independently of Good and Evil or any transcendent value: there are never any 
criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life’.95 Dignity 
cannot therefore be a fixed transcendental concept, but it can be a more or less 
adequate concept to the extent that it enhances the immanent modes of being, 
those that are active and excessive, leading to new possibilities. 96  In this 
respect, the strength of a particular notion of human dignity is to be assessed 
not by how accurately it represents the past, but how it acts on present legal 
arrangements to create possibilities for more active and dynamic forms of life. In 
order for the realisation of a concept to be an immanent possibility, it is 
necessary for an account of human dignity to draw on ‘elements of present 
political [and legal] normativity to suggest ways in which the injustice or 
intolerability of existing institutional forms of life can be removed.’97   
4. Structure of Thesis  
4.1. Section One: Constructing an Investment Concept of Dignity 
The thesis deploys the above methodology to construct the concept of dignity. 
The first chapter - Dignity a Triadic Concept - analyses existing concepts of 
dignity and proposes that each retain a family resemblance in that they make 
use of three important components value, respect and humanity. Drawing on an 
extensive philosophical and legal literature review, it is argued that there are 
three main concepts of dignity, namely deontological, teleological and rank, 
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which all make use of the core components, but each have different sub-
components. In addition, each connects the components of dignity in a 
distinctive relationship in a way that addresses particular historical and 
contextual problems. It argues that some of the concepts exclude those that 
deviate from a paradigmatic image of humanity as male, able-bodied, 
economically productive and fully rational.  
Deploying the constructivist model of conceptual analysis, chapter two proposes 
an alternative concept of dignity that moves beyond the narrow focus on 
singular facets of human personality, or the prioritisation of a norm that leads to 
marginalisation. It establishes a more holistic concept, which protects a number 
of facets of humanity, as well as encompasses and responds to otherness and 
difference. Moreover, it requires action on the part of the community to support 
the positive development of human personality for the most vulnerable.  
The thesis argues that dignity requires investment into the inherent potential of 
human life, but not in a teleological sense of being directed towards an ideal 
end. In light of the limitations of some of the existing concepts of dignity, chapter 
two - Constructing an Investment Concept - proposes to connect the different 
component parts of dignity in a distinct relationship. It adopts a concept of 
potentiality inherent in the work of Baruch Spinoza, particularly the reading of 
his work proposed by Gilles Deleuze. 98  Spinoza subverts teleological 
perfectionism in favour of creativity, experimentation and diversity.   
This chapter connects these thinkers in a novel way to the capabilities approach 
to dignity of Martha Nussbaum. The approach claims that a life worthy of human 
dignity requires the development of human capabilities (emotions, practical 
reason, health) in order realise a range of human functioning. This theory has 
grown in prominence and significance in the field of human development.  
However, it is suggested that the existing literature on the capabilities approach 
is premised on a difficult and uncomfortable combination of theoretical sources.  
Spinoza provides, it is argued, an alternative theoretical framework for a 
capabilities approach to human dignity, which is based on the concept of 
                                                          
98
 G Deleuze and F Guattari, What is Philosophy? (n 71). Commentators have stated that the 
“thought of Spinoza permeates all his works [Deleuze]” Keneth Surin, ‘Spinoza, Baruch’ in 
Adrian Parr, The Deleuze Dictionary (Columbia University Press, 2005) 261. 
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
29 
 
potentiality as creativity, difference and experimentation, which subverts the 
perfectionism of teleological dignity, whilst maintaining a focus on the 
development of personality. It is argued that this creative potentiality, which is at 
the heart of dignity, is enhanced whenever a person is rendered more capable 
of affecting or being affected in an increased number of ways, whereas what 
diminishes it depends on that which renders a person less capable. It is further 
argued, drawing on the theoretical insights of Spinoza, that human dignity is a 
thoroughly holistic concept that connects physical, psychological, recreational 
and social dimensions as equally significant aspects of human personality. 
Impact on any one of these dimensions in turn impacts and affects the others.  
4.2. Section Two: Testing the Investment Concept of Dignity 
Having constructed a new concept of human dignity, the thesis then proceeds in 
its second section to test the concept of investment dignity in the legal system 
of England and Wales. It evaluates the extent to which the existing judicial uses 
of human dignity in England and Wales can be connected to the investment 
concept in order to, as mentioned earlier, provide a basis for demonstrating the 
practical usefulness of the concept and, potentially, enrich that concept by 
reflecting on the experience of applying it to a real life circumstances. Chapter 
three - Potential Protection in the Common Law - therefore tests the investment 
concept of dignity in the common law of England and Wales.99  
The chapter begins by setting out the current understanding of the role of 
human dignity in the common law and evolution of the concept from an 
incidentally protected interest to an intentionally protected and integral concept 
of the common law. It then argues that many of the judicial uses of human 
dignity appear to support the holistic nature of investment dignity, which 
embraces different interconnecting dimensions of humanity (social, emotional, 
recreational and physical) and encompasses the protection of the unfolding of 
human personality. Moreover, the concept of investment dignity, originally 
described in chapter two, is enriched by relating it to the experiences and a 
problem faced in particular cases. Although the protection of investment dignity 
does not perfectly connect to the common law, it is argued that, due to the 
inherent capacity of the common law to adapt to the changing needs of 
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individuals, it is able to protect an ‘open’ concept of human dignity based on 
potentiality, otherness and difference.  
Chapter five - Potential Protection under the HRA - proceeds to test the concept 
of human dignity in the context of the HRA. Although not expressly mentioned in 
the text, human dignity has been recognised as an essential value underpinning 
and justifying the rights protected by the Act. 100  Of particular relevance to 
testing investment dignity is the potential connection between that concept and 
the existence of positive obligations established under the HRA to provide for 
the welfare needs of marginalised and vulnerable groups.101  
The chapter specifically focuses on prohibition of torture, inhuman and 
degrading treatment (Art 3 Sch 1, Part 1 HRA) and the right to private life (Art 8 
Sch 1, Part 1 HRA) which have been used to promote the mobility and quality of 
life of vulnerable people, such as the disabled and have both been closely 
connected to human dignity.102 It contrasts cases in this field where human 
dignity had a central role in the majority reasoning with cases where human 
dignity has been largely neglected. It argues that a number of themes emerge, 
which can be explained through the prism of investment dignity. Most notably, 
where human dignity does plays a central role in majority reasoning, in contrast 
to where it does not, the decision is responsive to the context-specific needs of 
an individual, rendering human rights practice more ‘open’ through inclusivity, 
responsiveness, dialogue and multifaceted humanity.   
4.3. Section Three: Implications of Investment Dignity  
Once an evaluation of the existing content of the law in England and Wales 
against core dimensions of an investment concept of dignity has been 
completed, and the concept has been refined, the thesis progresses to consider 
the transformative implications of an investment concept. It considers the 
implications for concepts that govern the relationship between the individual and 
the wider social or political community, such as democracy and the rule of law. 
These are concepts that have, as discussed above, been treated as having 
dignity as their foundation or dignity as, potentially, their antithesis. 
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Chapter six - The Rule of Law as a Productive Encounter - begins by 
considering the existing connections that are made between the concept of the 
rule of law and different concepts of human dignity. It is argued that direct 
connections exist, which is demonstrated by accounts of the rule of law that 
focus on the stability of rules and those that focus on principled justification. 
This chapter argues that the concept of dignity proposed in this thesis would 
entail resonating effects impacting on the meaning of the rule of law. It is argued 
that, inherent in an investment concept of dignity, is the image that persons are 
developing or becoming in experimental encounters over time, as well as active 
beings who are capable of contributing to the formulation and understanding of 
the interests that affect them. This requires the law to be responsive to change 
and capable of justifying the imposition of force. At the same time, it is argued 
that the experimental nature of becoming requires careful development of the 
law in order to avoid destructive interactions.  
Chapter seven - Dialogic Democracy and Investment Dignity - argues that 
democracy is closely connected to dignity and changes according to the 
meaning attributed to the latter concept. This is established by considering three 
main models of democracy (majoritarian, partnership and communicative). It is 
suggested that inherent in the investment concept is an idea of dialogue. This 
dialogue requires a continual expansion of the potential experimental and 
creative connections between persons in a way that provides protection of 
difference or otherness, as well as the disruption of oppression and 
subordination. Dialogue is, in this regard, conceived as an ongoing process of 
democratisation that entails a number of potential productive developments in 
human personality.  
Ultimately this thesis seeks to develop a new construction of dignity that draws 
the experience of those who are on the margins of law into the mainstream, at 
the same time as challenging the legal norm, as a poor reflection of human 
experience. It is hoped that this construction will contribute towards a 
reimagining of human personality, which extends beyond a narrow focus on 
autonomy, to encapsulate some of the different dimensions of human life, as 
well as connect them through a rich notion of holism.  
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Chapter One: Human Dignity as an Essentially Triadic Concept  
1. Introduction  
Human dignity is an ancient concept with connections to many different disciplines, 
including philosophy, law, politics, history, theology and psychology.1 Perhaps the 
oldest and deepest roots are in the field of philosophy where discussions on dignity 
extend as far back as Aristotle in antiquity.2 Dignity has continued to play a role in 
the ethical theories of leading scholars, including Cicero and Seneca in Stoicism3, 
Hobbes and Kant in the Enlightenment4, Dworkin and Habermas in contemporary 
philosophy.5  Many philosophers from different schools of thought have therefore 
given used the concept of dignity as a central organising idea to ground and shape 
the content of normative claims in their theories of political morality.6   
 
Dignity has had a much shorter history in law. Although some references to dignity 
appear in national constitutional documents as early as the 18th and 19th Century,7 
dignity did not reach true prominence in law until after World War II and the signing 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Since then there has been a 
proliferation of national and international legal instruments that have codified the 
concept as a right, or recognised it as the foundation of fundamental rights.8 Even 
where human dignity has not expressly referred to, judges from different jurisdictions 
have treated the concept as a core interpretive value.9 The increasing prominence of 
                                                          
1
 See Chrisopher McCrudden, Understanding Human Dignity (OUP 2013), Robert Brownsword (eds), 
The Cambridge Handbook of Human Dignity: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (CUP 2014).  
2
  Lukman Harees, The Mirage of Dignity on the Highways of Human ‘Progress’ (Authorhouse, 2012) 
51.  
3
Martha Nussbaum, ‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’ in Human Dignity and Bioethics: 
Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics (US Independent Agencies and 
Commissions, 2008) 357.  
4
 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (A.P Martinich and Brian Battiste ed, Broadview, 2010) 95; Immanuel 
Kant, Lectures on Ethics (Peter Heath trs, CUP, 1997) 157.  
5
 Jürgen Habermas, ‘The Concept of Human Dignity and The Realistic Utopia of Human Rights’ 
(2010) 41 Metaphysics 464; Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) 
265.  
6
 Contrast Jeremy Waldron, “Introduction” in Jeremy Waldron, Theories of Rights (OUP 1984) 20. 
Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rank, and Rights (OUP 2012). 
7
 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 1789, Art. 6; Decree of 27 Apr 1848 of the 
French Republic.  
8
 The following states have enshrined human dignity within their constitutions or within documents that 
exist to protect basic rights: Germany, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, Greece, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, 
Lithuania, Slovak Republic, Czech Republic, Belgium, Poland, Finland and South Africa.  
9
 See Erin Daly, Dignity Rights: Courts, Constitutions, and the Worth of the Human Person 
(Pennsylvania Press 2012) 54-71. 
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
33 
 
human dignity has raised a number of significant and challenging questions, in terms 
of its meaning, necessity and value.10  
  
It is widely accepted amongst legal commentators that different legal concepts of 
dignity express or reflect different philosophical visions of the concept.11 In order to 
understand the possible meanings of the legal concept of dignity at a deeper level; it 
appears necessary to attend to the philosophical underpinnings of the concept. 
Based on the assumption that legal concepts of human dignity reflect, or express 
different philosophical visions of human dignity, this chapter firstly considers the 
meaning of the concept of dignity in different theories and law.  
  
Deploying the constructivist approach to concepts, explained in the introduction, the 
chapter considers the core components of the concept of human dignity as a basis 
for determining its existing meanings and the differences that arise when changes 
are made to the different core components. The chapter demonstrates that human 
dignity is essentially a triadic concept, made up of three components that include the 
concept of humanity, value and respect. It is argued that dignity is concerned with 
ontological issues about the nature of being and the place of humanity within the 
world, as well as how humans should relate to each other. At its core, dignity is 
about defining the state of being human that is deserving of recognition and 
respect.12   
2. Different Constructions of Dignity 
2.1. Introduction 
This section does not attempt to replicate the wealth of existing studies that outline 
the historical development of human dignity. Instead, this section concentrates on 
some key historical and contemporary themes in the understanding of human dignity 
that remain relevant and prominent today. This entails an analysis of some of the 
core components used in three significant constructions of human dignity. It is 
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argued that dignity can largely be interpreted as either a teleological, deontological 
or status based concept. It will then be possible, in the next section, to pose 
problems to existing constructions of dignity to consider how well they address 
contemporary issues and concerns.  
2.2. Teleological Dignity  
The first major contemporary construction of human dignity considered is the 
concept of teleological dignity, according to which dignity treats humans as beings 
who are directed towards a particular ideal end state, or telos. Human beings are, on 
this account, treated as purposive beings that are orientated towards a substantive 
version of human flourishing and the good life.13 Teleological dignity is therefore 
concerned with the realisation of a particular type of existence that leads to a certain 
level of flourishing that is distinctly human.14 
Teleological dignity would therefore appear to suggest that humans do not possess 
an inherent value, but are instead capable of attaining a worthwhile existence. 
However, it would be incorrect to suggest that all forms of teleological dignity lack a 
construction of intrinsic worth. In some accounts of teleological dignity the capability 
to realise completion may be treated as a form of inherent potential that exists within 
a person, which is capable of being perfected and fully realised.15 A person, in order 
to show sufficient respect for their own potential, may need to train their individual 
capacities towards the state of an ideal human existence. 
2.2.1. Imago Dei 
The first exemplar of teleological dignity relates to a particular interpretation of the 
Christian understanding of the Imago Dei, according to which humans are endowed 
with a sense of value in light of God’s divine work in creating humankind.16 God is 
understood to have endowed the human species with a particular purpose in its 
creation, such as procreation, love, worship and guardianship of nature. In addition, 
God has created man in His image and endowed it with the practical reason 
necessary to realise those purposes.17  This capacity entails the ability of humanity 
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to ‘apprehend something of God Himself and His order and purpose in the world.;18 
As Janet Soskice puts it, God has brought every human ‘into being and is working 
his purpose out in their life.’19 
This form of reason is teleological in the sense that it is a capacity that is orientated 
towards discerning the particular order and purpose of humans in nature that has 
been created by God. It is a capacity that ‘exists for excellence, and thus it serves 
and expresses our human dignity’.20 The mind, as James Harvey argues, is only 
‘fully expressive of the imago Trinitatis when it is seeking or ordered to God, who is 
goodness and truth.’ 21  Harvey goes on to argue that the ‘human person has 
teleology: the final consummation of human dignity consists in the beatific vision’ and 
in which a person is ‘becoming through the realisation of their dignity.’22 An example 
of this might be the institution of marriage, where a man and woman ‘find their 
friendship and devotion to each other fulfilled in their procreation, nurture, protection, 
education and moral formation of their children as a basic human good’.23  
Dignity as imago dei, at least in the Christian sense outlined, is therefore dependent 
upon the idea that a divine being has invested humanity with a particular purpose. 
This form of dignity clearly pays a great deal of attention, as Dworkin once put it, to 
the investment of some purpose to humanity by a divine being.24 It is a construction 
of dignity that places less emphasis on the human investment of individuals in 
creating their own lives.25  The narrower the form of perfectionism required by a 
teleological concept of dignity, the more limited is the space for individuals to 
develop their own personalities in creative and unique ways.26   
 
This is, of course, far from the only interpretation of the Imago Dei as a basis for 
grounding human dignity, with different ontologies of the human person, some of 
which are not necessarily bound up with teleological approaches. The Christian 
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concept of Imago Trinitatis, for instance, has been used by thinkers such as 
LaCugna and Ratzinger to ground the dignity of the human person in the ‘relational 
dynamics of equality, mutuality, and reciprocity…of the Trinity’.27 Whilst some Jewish 
approaches begin with the telos of Imago Dei, such as Maimonides, who claimed 
only those who attain intellectual perfection through vita contemplativa are in the 
image of God, others have argued that it primarily acts as a limit doctrine and not 
prescriptive of certain ends.28 In this respect, there may be restraints on certain 
actions that show disrespect for the image of God, but a person is also an 
autonomous being capable of freedom of will who is empowered to determine their 
own conception of the good.29 
 
Whilst the image of God still figures within discussion on human dignity, and may 
contribute to debates on what it means to be human, too great a focus on noumenal 
entities provides a very unstable viewpoint from which to ground human rights 
jurisprudence and practice. This is evident in the way that the idea of a divine creator 
was excluded from the final draft of the UDHR on the basis that it would not garner 
broad support.30  
2.2.2. Naturalism   
Naturalism is a different account of teleological dignity that is based on an internal 
essentialist form of inductive methodology that requires an analysis of human 
experience for understanding the concrete dimensions of the dignified life.31 This 
construction of dignity is particularly prominent in the Aristotelian philosophical 
tradition, which is effectively an ‘essentialist teleological construction of the human 
person as realising their ends or destiny’.32 Humans are therefore defined by their 
telos, whereby they seek to perfect themselves in a virtuous character.33 Human 
dignity is uncovered from human experience and history by determining the universal 
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‘naturalist teleology of ends and functioning (of humanity) culminating in 
eudaimonia’.34  Eudaimonia is therefore at the core of this concept of human dignity 
and is synonymous with human flourishing.  
2.2.2.1. Developmental and Directed Capacities 
One of the prominent features of the naturalist teleological concept of dignity is the 
treatment of human capacities as developmental in form. This means that human 
capacities should be trained and nurtured in a particular direction towards a specific 
end. A particularly good example of this treatment of human capacities can be seen 
in the political theory known as the capabilities approach to dignity developed by 
Nussbaum.35 Using Aristotelian ideas to define the content of dignity by discerning 
from experience what constitutes truly human functioning, Nussbaum argues that:36     
The Aristotelian view sees capacities worthy of respect, 
but as yet unfulfilled, incomplete. They are dynamic, not 
static: they tend toward development and toward 
exercise, or at least the opportunity for exercise. They are 
preparations for something further; they demand space 
within which to unfold themselves.37 
The naturalist teleological view therefore emphasises the idea that human 
capabilities are incomplete, tending towards development and are preparations for 
some form of further functioning. This raises the further question as to what those 
capacities consist of that need to be fostered and developed. In this regard, 
Nussbaum proposes a number of capacities that define humanity, including 
emotions, practical reason, senses, thought, affiliation, health, bodily integrity, play 
and control over one’s environment.38 Importantly, in line with Aristotelian naturalism, 
these capacities need to be developed and fostered in a particular direction. As an 
example, the development of the capability for emotion entails the positive 
development of particular emotions, such as compassion, but it also the rejection 
and suppression of some emotions, such as disgust or envy. 39  The distinction 
centrally turns on capabilities that appear to be ‘eudaimonistic, that is, concerned 
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with the person’s flourishing’.40 Human capabilities are, therefore, to be developed in 
a way that promotes ‘human flourishing, a complete human life’.41  
The naturalist teleological construction of dignity would therefore appear to 
emphasise a certain level of perfectionism in the development of human capacities. 
The perfectionist nature of this concept of dignity has been criticised on the basis 
that it leads to elitism and paternalism in raising individuals up to a certain threshold 
of functioning.42  The perceived problem is that a teleological concept of dignity is 
directed towards the realisation of ideal ends will not preserve sufficient space for 
human freedom.43 In order to avoid this consequence, capability theorists who rely 
upon Aristotle to define dignity, have attempted to preserve space for human 
freedom by focusing on the capabilities of individuals and not the actual functioning 
of human beings.44  
In order to achieve this, the capabilities theorists have tended to construct human 
dignity by counterbalancing Aristotelian theory with liberal philosophy.45 Nussbaum, 
for instance, deploys both Aristotle and Rawls as grounds for justifying the 
capabilities approach to dignity.46 Nussbaum therefore employs Rawls liberalism to 
establish an overlapping consensus on human dignity in a way that she argues does 
not accept any “metaphysical view of the world, any particular comprehensive ethical 
or religious view, or even any particular view of the person or of human nature.”47 It 
is not entirely clear, however, that these two alternatives to understanding dignity are 
entirely compatible.48 The Aristotelian approach clearly focuses on objective human 
ends, requiring a particular view of the human person, whilst the deontological 
approach of Rawls prioritises the right of the individual over the realisation of a 
substantive version of the good life. In the liberalism of Rawls, capabilities do not 
tend towards development, as they lack any orientation point or ideal towards which 
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they are directed.49 Mark Olssen has argued that Nussbaum ‘relies on fundamentally 
incompatible ontological and epistemological assumptions’.50 
2.2.2.2. Virtue 
A second common element of the naturalism-based teleological concept of dignity is 
the view that virtue is central to a fully flourishing life.51 This aspect of teleological 
dignity entails the idea that an individual is directed towards the realisation and 
perfection of a morally excellent character. 52   The importance of virtue to a 
teleological dignity is particularly prominent in the recent writing of Charles Foster. 
Foster proposes a concept of dignity that is defined by a ’of neo-Aristotelian virtue 
ethic’53 that is based upon a ‘scientifically informed Aristotelian naturalism’.54 Foster 
alludes to a number of virtues that are essential for objective human flourishing. 
Foster therefore argues that courage is a virtue essential to human flourishing  and a 
cancer victim can therefore be flourishing, even though her body is crumbling, 
because she possesses a particular excellence of character that includes the 
exercise of fortitude, courage, acceptance, consideration and appreciation of others 
in the face of vicissitudes.55  
Virtue may be considered only one aspect of the overall flourishing of the human 
being. Aristotle, for instance, is well known for arguing that the flourishing of a person 
did not consist solely in the attainment of moral excellence. 56  Aristotle therefore 
includes the possession of particular material conditions of life as central dimensions 
of flourishing.57 The different constructions of flourishing reflect a division in terms of 
the significance that is attached to, on one hand, the finite, fragile and material nature 
of being, against excellence as an aspect of the ‘sublime, the awe-inspiring, and the 
transcendent’.58 Certain conceptions of human flourishing therefore appear to place 
                                                          
49
 Mark Olssen, ‘Why Martha Nussbaum Should become a Foucauldian’ in Hans-Uwe Oto (eds), 
Education, Welfare and the Capabilities Approach: A European Perspective (Barbara Burdich, 2010) 
23. 
50
 Ibid 27. 
51
 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach’ in James Sterba, Ethics: The 
Big Questions (Wiley  2009) 349. 
52
 Charles Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Hart, 2011) 1.  
53
 Ibid 9. 
54
 Ibid 22.  
55
 Ibid 5. 
56
 Hollenbach (n 31) 130; Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (n 39) 315; Nussbaum, The fragility of 
goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy (CUP, 2001) 340. 
57
 Hollenbach (n 31) 131.  
58
 Mary Neal, ““Not Gods but Animals”: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood” (2012) 33 
Liverpool Law Review 177, 194. 
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
40 
 
far more, or exclusive weight, on the realisation of the virtuous life over the material 
conditions of being. This entails an important area of disagreement concerning the 
way in which different accounts of dignity accommodate vulnerability.  
2.2.2.3. Fragility 
The first strategy for encompassing human vulnerability as an aspect of the telos of 
humanity is by treating it as ‘a necessary background condition of certain genuine 
human goods’.59 Human fragility and need is considered as pre-requisite for the 
existence and attainment of certain human virtues and dignity.60 A useful example of 
this strategy is given by Nussbaum, who treats compassion as a human good, which 
fundamentally depends on the idea that we are universally fragile beings capable of 
suffering, which is a common trait of humanity.61 Nussbaum recognises that many of 
the capabilities that humans have reason to value are developmental precisely 
because they are fragile and dependent. In this regard, Nussbaum argues that the 
dignity possessed by humanity, in terms of its need for active striving, is the ‘very 
sort of dignity [that] could not be possessed by a being who was not mortal and 
vulnerable’.62  
A second strategy that can be used to accommodate fragility as an aspect of 
flourishing is the more ‘romantic position that vulnerability and fragility are to be 
prized in their own right’.63 An example of this strategy can be seen in Mary Neal’s 
discussion of human dignity.. 64  Neal, drawing on Deryck Beyleveld and  Roger 
Brownsword, argues that human dignity is concerned with an appropriate 
‘balance…between the “finite” and “transcendent” aspects of human existence’.65 
According to Neal, the finite entails a particularly important connection with 
materiality, as an aspect of existence.66  Humans are to hold in equilibrium the “fear 
of personal extinction and hope of immortality.”67 The ultimate goal of humanity is to 
                                                          
59
 Martha Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness: Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and philosophy 
(CUP, 2001) XXX. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (n 39) 319. 
62
 Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership (Belknap 
Press: Harvard University 2006) 132. 
63
 Nussbaum, The fragility of goodness (n 599) 319.  
64
 Neal (n 58). 
65
 Ibid 193. 
66
 “We do not magnify our dignity by fetishizing the transcendent at the expense of the material…” Ibid 
194. 
67
 David Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Biolaw (OUP 2002) 114-
116.  
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
41 
 
keep in balance the ‘fragile/material/finite and the transcendent/sublime/immortal.’68 
Humans can fall short of realising that aim in one of two ways, either by substantially 
ignoring, or having their physical needs ignored, or by being dominated by a concern 
for the material over transcendent pursuits.69  
The model of balance itself does not definitively explain where the balance is to be 
drawn, how it is to be drawn and who should draw it. This is related to the question 
of the relative weight of the finite and transcendent, as well as the precise content of 
each of these components. Neal shows how the concept of dignity as balancing 
could apply to intrinsic worth, praiseworthy conduct, excellence of character and as 
an ethical principle.70 This ultimately means that the balancing strategy can only be 
fully realised in the context of a particular moral or political philosophy that 
establishes the content of each element of dignity, the relative importance of the 
individual and collective, as well as the appropriate balance as a basis for realising 
human flourishing. 
The two different strategies that are used to accommodate vulnerability as an aspect 
of dignity appear to primarily focus on a kind of bodily weakness inherent in the 
human condition. This includes such things as ‘old age, illness...physical weakness, 
disfigurement [and] immobility.’71 It is at least arguable that vulnerability is a more 
expansive concept that also includes the vulnerabilities created by particular social 
or institutional structures.  
2.2.3. Conclusion  
The teleological concept of dignity is primarily concerned with the realisation of a 
particular ideal end state, in which humans are objectively flourishing. Importantly, it 
recognises that human capacities are to be developed and trained in a particular 
direction. The natural capacities of persons are treated as if they possessed a 
purpose that is to be achieved, developed or perfected. That is not to say that there 
aren’t disagreements, or variances, in terms of determining what exactly those 
purposes are. However, it is possible to see in this brief discussion the emergence of 
the sorts of significant questions that scholars using the concept of dignity are trying 
to address. These include questions about what it means to exist as a human being, 
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reflecting on the past, and the direction in which we ought to be headed, looking to 
the future. It is no wonder, therefore, that dignity is a challenging and complex 
concept, for it is a concept that addresses the big and intractable questions.  
2.3. Deontological Dignity  
A different model of dignity attempting to address similar questions about human 
beings nature and the connections between persons is the deontological concept of 
dignity. This approach to dignity sees or treats human beings as an end in 
themselves, rather than as a being invariably directed towards some further end. 
Humans are not therefore beings that possess a pre-determined or intrinsic purpose. 
This account of dignity often recognises an intrinsic value or worth in the capacity of 
humans to assert moral or rational agency.72  
2.3.1. Moral Autonomy 
2.3.1.1. Self-Control  
One the most important and influential forms of deontological dignity is that of moral 
autonomy, which entails the rational part of the self, controlling the irrational 
dimensions of the self. It is the capacity of individuals to reason and act morally, 
which is autonomous or free in the sense that the individual, through reason, gives to 
themselves the moral duties by which they should direct their conduct.73 In contrast, 
the irrational part of the self can concern such things as desires, impulses, emotional 
states or personal tastes.74 The truly dignified person is one who can control those 
desires in favour of morality.  
The most prominent version of dignity as moral autonomy was established by 
Immanuel Kant. Kant is often attributed with being the main source of liberal 
deontological accounts of dignity that prioritise autonomy.75 However, Kant had a 
much narrower view of autonomy than many modern liberal deontological accounts 
would accept.76 Kant proposed a moral autonomy construction of dignity based on a 
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pre-social notion of man as an independent rational being, capable of reasoning the 
moral law that they apply to themselves in a way that is prior to human experience.77  
According to Kant, a person only acts out of their autonomous will when they are 
acting in accordance with their moral duty.78 Therefore, a failure to act out of a 
universal moral duty would not be a free and rational choice, for it would entail 
treating the humanity in your own person as a means only, rather than an end.79 As 
an example, Kant argues that prostitution is incompatible with human dignity.80 The 
prostitute compromises their own humanity by treating themselves as an object for 
profit to satisfy the sexual impulse of another, which is not directed at universal moral 
principles.81 Kant, like the Stoics, appears to favour a kind of dignity as self-mastery, 
whereby a person acts out of calm reflection on universal moral principles, even in 
the face of inclination, vulnerability, misfortune and emotional upheaval.  
 
A concept of dignity that is based on the mastery of the rational part of selfhood 
entails a very narrow view of the capacities of persons that are valuable and 
important. Such a concept of dignity often entails the exclusion of certain human 
capacities from being recognised as deserving of enhancement or protection. As an 
example, Kant excluded emotional capacities from the rational part of the self, as 
they consist of impulses that lack “moral worth”. 82  This extends even to those 
emotions that entail altruistic elements, such as the capacity for compassion and 
sympathy.83 Kant argues that the impulse-based nature of such emotions should be 
suppressed in favour of a cold and detached form of moral duty.84 Dignity therefore 
becomes a matter of controlling some of even the most admirable, other-seeking 
dimensions of selfhood.  
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2.3.1.2. Moral Principle 
The moral autonomy based concept of dignity clearly requires the control of the 
irrational self, by the rational self. This ultimately entails that the content of the 
concept of dignity is equivalent to rationally derived moral principles. Thus, as Kant 
argues, respect for the humanity in your own person means acting in accordance 
with universal moral duties, such as the duty to be honest. This, as Charles Foster 
has recognised, makes Kantian dignity a limited guide to correct or appropriate 
action. This is because one cannot both use ethically appropriate behaviour to 
determine the content of dignity, and use the content of dignity to determine ethically 
appropriate behaviour.85 The criticism that dignity is often used as a loose equivalent 
for more concrete moral principles receives no real defence from Kant.86 
2.3.2. Personal Autonomy 
2.3.2.1. Individualism 
The moral autonomy construction of dignity is quite distinct from the construction of 
dignity as personal autonomy, although the two are sometimes treated as 
continuous.87 Whilst moral autonomy focuses on the self-legislation of a universal 
moral law, personal autonomy prioritises the rational capacity of individuals to pursue 
their individual conception of the good. It is this inherent rationality that is treated as 
the core of human worth and it is this capacity that must be treated with respect by 
others.88  
 
This account places strong emphasis on the individual, as an independent, separate 
and self-sufficient entity.89 Humans are treated as beings that possess the ability to 
make independent and rational choices about their own plan of life, without 
interference from others in the community. This means that the rational independent 
being exists prior to the relationships upon which they depend.  
2.3.2.2. Personal Responsibility 
Responsibility for one’s own choices is a usual corollary of dignity as autonomous 
agency. Each person should be held individually responsible for the consequences 
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that flow from their rational choices.90 Indeed, to compensate persons for losses 
flowing from rational choice would be to treat such persons as if they lacked the 
dignity that comes with an autonomous will.91  
 
This concept of personal responsibility depends on the presumption that a clear 
division can be said to exist between the dependent and the independent. 
Independence is treated as the central case of dignity in which individuals who do 
benefit from fortunate social circumstances are treated as responsible for their 
particular state of affairs92 In contrast, those who do not fully possess the capacity to 
take responsibility for their own life plans or well-being deviate from the model of 
humanity. This latter category of ‘dependent’ people can be further sub-divided in 
terms of those who are responsible for their situation on the basis of fault or on a 
non-fault.93 This means that a person, who is disabled through a careless lapse of 
attention, has no claim on the basis of dignity to the provision of welfare support.94 
However, some liberals do try to avoid these harsh consequences by allowing some 
safety net ‘to save the imprudent from the worst consequences of their choices’.95 
However, the provision of welfare support to such persons is premised on 
paternalism, rather than respect for human dignity. In contrast, those who are 
sufferers of misfortune are compensated as ‘unlucky’ beings on the basis that they 
are supposedly envious of the innate abilities of others.96  
  
The strong focus on individuals as a pre-social rational subject can often draw 
attention away from the complex social structures within which the decisions of 
individuals are formed. Decisions are often affected by different social, psychological 
and physiological factors that may make it inappropriate to treat the victim of loss as 
solely responsible for the consequences of their decisions.97  
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2.3.2.3. Human Capacities 
One of the common themes in the liberal deontological account of dignity is a shared 
concern with access to, and control over, certain resources in making choices about 
the good life. Importantly, this includes an image of human abilities and capacities as 
resources. 98  Human capacities or physical powers are compared to material 
resources as tools that a person can use to develop their own conception of what is 
valuable in life.99 This appears, at its core, to be an expression of the basic mind-
body dualism view of the human being, whereby the mind of the human is separate 
from the body and entails that the ‘person as mind-should retain control of its object 
body’.100  
 
To some degree, the conception of human capacities as resources represents them 
as having a property like quality. 101   The most radical versions of this form of 
deontological dignity, such as appear in the work of Nozick, treat individuals as 
possessive beings owning their abilities and ‘owing nothing to society for them’.102 
Such an image of the human being obscures the importance of community 
structures and social systems within which capacities are nurtured and developed.103   
2.3.3. Conclusion 
The deontological concept of dignity seeks to address similar questions to the 
teleological concept of dignity. It proposes answers to questions about what it means 
to exist as a human being, including explanations of the nature and importance of 
human capacities. It is clear that deontological dignity places significant emphasis on 
rationality, which determines the central case of humanity and its value. This 
capacity is prioritised over the realisation of a particular conception of objective 
flourishing. It appears that both concepts depend on a division of the self, a 
separation between the rational mind and irrational body. The moral autonomy-
based construction of dignity depends on the rational moral self-controlling the 
irrational aspects of selfhood. The personal autonomy-based construction treats 
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human capacities as instruments to be used to construct a conception of the good. 
Dignity is not only concerned with how we relate to one another, but also how we 
relate to ourselves.  
 
2.4. Status Dignity 
The third key model of dignity after the teleological and deontological models is what 
can be called dignity as status. This construction of dignity is closely related to the 
ancient concept of dignitas. 104  Dignitas embodies the ‘idea of the honour, the 
privileges and the deference due to rank or office’.105 Originally, this construction was 
related to the variations in rank between different persons in society. This original 
construction of dignity as status is exemplified in the work of Thomas Hobbes.106 
Dignity was concerned with the different statuses held by individuals in society that 
were determined by the perceived worth of human powers and how much another 
person was willing to pay for them.107 However, in light of the fact that persons may 
value themselves differently, Hobbes argued that men are always in competition for 
honour and dignity.108 A sovereign was therefore required to determine the relative 
worth of particular human features or capacities as a basis for differentiating rank.109  
 
Modern day constructions of dignity as status tend to avoid the inegalitarian effects 
of variations in rank between humans in society, by treating humanity itself as a 
universal status.110 Dignity is not a matter of comparing different humans in terms of 
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rank, but designating an equally high status for all. 111  Thus, within the rank of 
humanity, everything is equal.112 This rank is, according to Waldron, higher than 
‘other creatures’ because ‘with reason and free will, they have God’s special favour 
and are created in his image; this is a rank in which each of us shares, without 
distinction or discrimination.’113  As Katherine Franke comments, on this account, a 
human being possesses a higher rank to animals; they have the highest status within 
an existential ranking.114 It is clear to Franke that Waldron preserves a hierarchy 
between humans and animals, that treat ‘humans of the highest moral order’ based 
on having a ‘certain sort of presence; uprightness of bearing; self-possession and 
self-control; self-presentation.’115  This is borne out in the way that scholars, such as 
Waldron, defend a conception of rank that prohibits treatment that violates the 
‘higher than the animals’ sense of dignity as rank.116 
Dignity as a high-ranking status, a status attached to human beings, can allow for a 
consideration of the dignity of both the species and the individual. George Kateb, for 
instance, argues for a rank attached to the human species, in light of its qualities and 
achievements, which every human being partakes in qua their membership of the 
species. Each individual as a result of this membership has an equal status, which is 
violated where the ‘intention of inflicting suffering is to re-identify groups of people as 
subhuman.’ 117  Waldron also connects the idea of humanity as a high-rank with 
individual status -   
[T]he idea of general human dignity associated itself 
with the notion that humans as such were a high-
ranking species, called to a special vocation in the 
world, and that in a sense each of us was to be 
regarded as endued with a certain nobility or royalty, 
each of us was to be regarded as a creature of a high 
rank.118 
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Each human being has a high rank as a member of the human species, which not 
only encompasses rights, but also ‘carries with it an obligation to maintain the 
elevated status to which one is called as a human being.’119 That is the high status of 
humanity itself.  
2.4.1. Source of Status  
The differences in the status form of dignity largely relate to ways in which a high 
rank can be attributed to the human species. The first way in which such a rank can 
be attributed to the human species is through a consideration of those capacities of 
particular significance that separate humanity from other species in nature. Jeremy 
Waldron, for instance, draws on Locke to claim that humans are of significant 
importance in the created world because of their rationality.120 A more expansive 
account of human capacities that entitles humanity to a particular status has been 
proposed by George Kateb. Kateb argues that humans possess a particular status 
not only because the capacity for reason, but also the capacity for language, 
imagination and emotion. 121  Although Kateb recognises that other species may 
possess some of these capacities, he argues that such beings do not possess a 
‘developed inwardness...made of images and dreams’.122   
The second way in which status can be attached to humanity as a species is by 
considering the achievements of the species in contrast to other species. George 
Kateb, for instance, argues that the status of the human species can in part be 
imputed ‘on the basis of the record of its achievements.’123 This requires humans to 
deploy their unique human capabilities towards the stewardship of nature.124  
The third way in which a high status may be attached to humanity is by the 
establishment of behavioural norms that separate humans from other species.125 
This construction of dignity is dependent on the existence of a conventional morality 
that is treated as a key way of preserving a group or species stature, which prohibits 
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acts that are associated with the status of the animal.126 Disgust or revulsion thus 
becomes a metric for determining what behaviour risks a loss of humanity.127  This 
approach is implicit in the work of Leon Kass on human dignity who argues that 
repugnance may, on some occasions, be the ‘only voice left that speaks up to 
defend the central core of our humanity.’128  It thus may be the only voice that 
protects against degradation.129  
The use of repugnance as a basis for determining a difference in the status between 
humanity and other species can be criticised for the negative and false nature of the 
thought underlying the sentiment. In this regard Martha Nussbaum offers a 
convincing critique of repugnance on the basis that it is premised on an attempt of 
humans to shrink from ‘contamination that is associated with the human desire to be 
nonanimal.’ 130  Repugnance ‘expresses a refusal...to be contaminated by potent 
reminder of one’s own mortality and decay-prone animality’. 131  The emotion 
therefore entails an attempt to hide from the reality that humans are vulnerable and 
mortal beings.132  
Disgust becomes particularly dangerous when it is projected outwards so that certain 
people are perceived as themselves debasing and a site of potential contamination. 
Thus, male homosexual groups may be the object of repugnance on the grounds that 
the idea of “semen and faeces mixing together inside the body of a male is one of the 
most disgusting ideas imaginable – to males, for whom the idea of nonpenetrability is 
a sacred boundary against stickiness, ooze, and death.133 The consequence is the 
potential persecution and oppression of certain groups.  
2.4.2. Determining Honour  
The concept of dignity as status, as has just been seen, depends on the existence of 
some standard that can be used to distinguish the rank of humanity. This high 
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position is often associated with the idea of honour.134 Each member of the species 
is expected to show sufficient honour for the high position of each other member of 
the species..135 Waldron argues that there has been a levelling up process whereby 
the honours and privileges of the nobility are universalised and applied to all 
humans.136  
It is clear that not all rights and privileges of the nobility can be universalised. 
Waldron, for instance, argues that the right to be heard first in a public forum would 
be impossible to universalise. 137  In addition, not all rights and privileges of the 
nobility should be universalised where they are associated with a ‘sort of mentality 
that was arrogant, condescending, abusive, lawless, irresponsible, wilful, and 
violent.;138 To determine which privileges need be extended, and which need to be 
removed, it is essential to have some kind of independent metric. This will invariably 
entail a value-based judgment concerning those privileges that in some sense 
contribute to human flourishing and those which do not. It may be unnecessary to 
equalise the right of the nobility to exquisite food on the basis that the right of access 
to basic food is sufficient for human well-being.139 A judgment is therefore made in 
reference to some criterion other than honour. Once, however, an independent 
criterion enters the framework, it is not entirely clear why it is necessary to appeal to 
the privileges of the nobility at all. The concept of dignity that is based on nobility 
requires an appeal to other forms of dignity, which are sufficient in themselves to 
determine those privileges that should be granted to individuals.   
2.4.3. Acting Honourably 
The concept of dignity as rank not only requires the honouring of individuals by 
others, but also that individuals act honourably, showing sufficient respect for their 
office, title or status.140 In this regard, there are certain offices a person may hold in 
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humanity that entail responsibilities, as well as privileges. A modern day example is 
that parents have responsibilities in respect of raising a child.141  
The responsibility on individuals to act honourably may prohibit certain roles on the 
ground that they are dishonourable activities unworthy of the high status of humanity. 
In the past the nobility could lose their status because they ‘engaged in occupations 
thought to be unfitting to a gentleman.’ 142  Stephanie Hennette-Vauchez has 
suggested that this sort of reasoning could be universalised today. 143  Thus, for 
instance, dwarf throwing or prostitution may be considered a dishonourable 
profession that undermines the status of humanity. Such constructions of honour are 
culturally determined.144 
2.4.4. Conclusion 
The concept of dignity as human status compares humanity with other beings in 
order to determine their rank within nature. The different bases for attributing 
humanity with a high rank represent very different ethical outlooks. Some grounds for 
attributing a high status to humanity, such as those proposed by Kateb can be caring 
in outlook, establishing a high status on the basis of humans deploying their special 
capacities to cultivate nature. This status stands in stark contrast to the construction 
that seeks to create boundaries against objects that remind humans of their fragility. 
This construction of dignity as status is most problematic due to its ability to come 
into conflict with other models of dignity.  
The purpose of the chapter so far has been to provide taxonomy of human dignity as 
a springboard to considering whether there are any shared or common components 
to the concept that cut across the different traditions. In light of the grandeur of the 
concept of dignity, it has simply not been possible to provide an exhaustive account 
of the concept. However, the aim so far has been to focus on key themes as a basis 
for considering the issues the concept of dignity seeks to address. It has been 
demonstrated that dignity is concerned with ontological questions about the very 
nature of existence that any serious political or legal philosophy will attempt to 
grapple with. These include elements that address the nature of the relationship of 
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humans to themselves, the interaction between humans, as well as the connection of 
humans to other beings.   
3. Common Components: The Triadic Nature of Human Dignity  
3.1. A Triadic Concept 
This section suggests that the deontological, status and teleological based-concepts 
of human dignity, despite their differences, share some core components, namely 
the concepts of humanity, respect and value. In this regard, human dignity is a triadic 
concept, a point of coincidence between these three common components.145 The 
concept of dignity varies in the way these shared components are interpreted 
differently or arranged in a particular relationship.  In this light, constructivism, which 
treats concepts as complex multiplicities composed of different components, can 
explain how there is a common concept of dignity, which nonetheless differs 
according to how the components are arranged and interpreted.146    
3.1.1. Discerning the Nature of Humanity  
The first major component of the dignity triad is the concept of humanity, which 
permeates different traditions. The  teleological conception, for instance, defines 
humanity in terms of certain functioning essential to a ‘truly human life’.147 Capacities 
are dynamic properties, requiring development towards a particular end. The 
deontological concept of dignity places significant emphasis on those faculties that 
are unique and valuable to humanity, most notably human reason. These 
constructions often entail a split in dimensions of personality, which may be treated 
as irrational aspects of the self. 
Some deontological constructions of dignity are noteworthy for their attempt to avoid 
a comprehensive account of the nature of the human person. The preferred 
approach is to account for dignity according to widespread convictions, rather than 
human nature. Nonetheless, such accounts of dignity inevitably presuppose certain 
things about the human person, such as a concept of humans as owning property in 
the person or as controllers of human resources. It may also presuppose a central 
case of humanity for defining other components, such as respect. John Rawls, for 
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instance, defines respect through a hypothetical contract established by parties who 
are ‘normal and fully cooperating member over a complete life.’148  
Some theories begin with another component concept of dignity, such as respect, 
but inevitably end up attaching it to humanity. Thus, for instance, Waldron’s concept 
of dignity as rank derives its meaning from the respect owed to others by appealing 
to a thought experiment whereby law makers discern what past noble privileges and 
duties can be universalised by claiming that humanity is itself a status and rank. An 
understanding of the human condition is therefore at the core of human dignity, 
whether it is a comprehensive account or a presupposition that is essential for 
grounding other claims.   
3.1.2. Seeking the Value of Humanity 
The second important component concept of the dignity triad is the concept of value. 
There is a general recognition in the different theories that in some sense humanity 
possesses a special value or worth. 149  The deontological autonomy-based 
constructions of dignity clearly prioritise the view that the value of human life is 
grounded in the rationality of humanity. In direct contrast, teleological dignity appear 
to prioritise the view that value is to be found in the ends that humanity is directed 
towards.  
The concept of dignity as status does not attach quite the same level of significance 
to value as a dimension of dignity. 150  However, it is quite clear that in ranking 
humans above other beings, it is necessary to provide a justification of why humans 
should be accorded a status that is higher than other beings in nature. This 
invariably entails a comparative value judgment, even if implicit, in which certain 
capacities, features or behaviours are considered distinctive to humanity.  
3.1.3. Defining Respect for the Value of Humanity  
The third and final component of dignity that is common to the different traditions is 
the idea of respect. This has been recognised by David Feldman who has explicitly 
stated that “respect (for oneself and for others) is an important element in dignity.”151 
Neomi Rao similarly explains, following Kant, that humanity and personhood require 
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a ‘certain degree of respect.’152 The concept of respect appears to be a fundamental 
mediating force in terms of what treatment is permissible and in determining what 
actions are demanded in reference to the value of humanity. Thus, for instance, the 
deontological concept of dignity requires respect for the humanity of others.  
The deontological concept of dignity can also encompass an obligation on 
individuals to respect their own rational capacity in the self. In the moral autonomy 
construction of dignity, this may include respecting the rationally willed universal 
moral law. Although the personal autonomy construction is more closely connected 
to liberalism, it does not deny the responsibility of individuals to respect themselves. 
It entails a responsibility to respect the rational capacity in oneself by making 
‘something valuable of…life.’ 153  Developing a conception of the good is a 
responsibility that is essential to self-respect.154  
Respect is also a key component in the teleological construction of dignity, although 
it requires respect in the sense of developing the potential of humanity. This can 
include respecting humanity by developing human capacities or a particular 
character in a direction which may require certain social conditioning. In the very 
different tradition of dignity as status, respect is still a key feature that establishes a 
family resemblance to other accounts of dignity. Jeremy Waldron argues that dignity 
is understood by considering the respect that was historically owed to nobles and 
dignitaries.  
3.2. Assembling Human Dignity in Response to Problems 
The concept of dignity has been constructed by appealing to three component 
concepts. This follows the Deleuzian methodology outlined in the introductory 
chapter. Where the different components are arranged in a particular way or a 
particular interpretation is given to a component, then the whole meaning of the 
overall concept of dignity shifts. Thus, as an example, where emphasis is given to 
humanity as defined by reference to its ends, the whole concept of dignity 
transforms, with the notion of value being placed in the achievement of the 
flourishing life, which humans must respectfully seek to realise. Such teleological 
constructions contrast with deontological constructions that connect dignity by 
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reference to the rationality of humanity prior to its ends, which has value and must be 
respected.  
The concept of dignity also shifts and mutates according to the manner in which sub-
components are added to or abstracted from the core components of the dignity 
triad. It will be recalled from the introductory chapter on Deleuze that the meaning of 
a concept depends on connecting components in a particular relation. Concepts can 
be added to or subtracted from in ways that change the overall meaning of a 
concept.155  
In relation to dignity, it is arguable that each core component of dignity entails a 
number of important sub-components that exist in a particular relationship. 
Teleological dignity can be composed of a number of sub-components, including 
“flourishing”, “excellence”, “capabilities”, “virtue”, “fragility”, “emotion”, “purpose”, 
“perfection” and “development”. These sub-components can be added to or 
subtracted from the overall concept of teleological dignity in a way that creates new 
shades of meaning. For instance, as was discussed above, some teleological 
concepts of dignity may abstract the idea of fragility from their construction and place 
greater focus on excellence of character.  
Deontological and status dignity similarly are made of different sub-components. 
Deontological dignity can include the following sub-components; “resources”, 
“independence”, “personal responsibility”, “autonomy”, “rationality”, “luck”, 
“separateness” and “property”. Status dignity, in contrast, can include the following 
sub-components; “nobility”, “rank”, “rationality”, “animal”, “disgust”, “stewardship”, 
“achievement”, “honour” and “conflict”. The concept of dignity therefore possesses 
different meanings to the extent that relationship between concepts mutate, as well 
as when sub-components are added to or abstracted from the core components of 
human dignity.  
An important factor that affects the connections between the components of dignity 
concerns the particular social problems that dignity is directed towards.156  As was 
argued in the introduction, in reference to Deleuze, all concepts are ‘connected to 
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problems without which they would have no meaning’. 157  Attentiveness to the 
problems to which concepts of dignity are connected can thereby enable an 
explanation of why the concept may vary, as opposed to just reporting of how they 
differ.158  
3.2.1. Conflict 
One of the problems that dignity has been used to address is the existence of 
conflict between humans. This is particularly noticeable in the historic model of 
dignity as rank. Dignity was used to justify and denote a system of privilege and 
power of the nobleman over the commoner.159 Thomas Hobbes explicitly connected 
this concept of dignity to the problem of how to resolve conflict between persons in 
the state of nature who are naturally inclined to overestimate their own worth.160 
Dignity as rank is therefore a proposed solution to this problem, for it creates a stable 
system by which the worth of a man is authoritatively determined by rules of honour 
established by the sovereign.  
This construction of dignity has since been developed in a way that establishes 
humanity as itself a rank. The problems to which this concept of dignity may be 
directed can vary. It may, for instance, be directed towards the problem of how to 
protect humanity as a species from perceived sources of contamination or 
disintegration.161 This to some degree overlaps with the idea of conflict, in the sense 
that the natural is perceived as a potential threat.  
3.2.2. Loss of Control 
Dignity as self-control has in the past been deployed to respond to turbulent 
circumstances that are beyond the individual’s control. As an example, the Stoic 
concept of dignity as self-control, which was an important precursor to Kantian 
dignity, was originally developed as a response to the problem of how to realise 
happiness when people lack power to control and influence the material world 
around them. 162   
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In discussing the role of vulnerability in dignity, George Harris notes the similar 
problems that Kant appeared to be addressing in his construction of human dignity. 
Harris argues that, for Kant, emotions such as grief result from ‘pathological 
attachments to others that render us vulnerable to integral stress.’163 Kant appeared 
to be addressing the Stoic problem of how to ‘regulate our emotions and 
attachments in a way that makes us invulnerable to integral stress.’ 164  Dignity 
becomes concerned with ensuring the realisation of moral duty in a world that cannot 
be controlled and ‘threatens our rational capacities for being agents of pure practical 
reason’.165  
3.2.3. Resistance to Oppression 
At other points in time the concept of human dignity has been deployed to address 
the rather distinctive problems of authorities deploying tools of subjugation and 
oppression in order to control parts of the population. 166  Dignity was a tool of 
resistance as opposed to acceptance that nothing could be done. At the time of the 
Enlightenment autonomy was a predominant value that was developed to address 
widespread ‘discontent with despotic rulers and church leaders.’167 Thus a problem 
that was being addressed was how to control the excesses of political power, which 
may be a core reason for constructing dignity as autonomy. This pattern is perhaps 
repeated at a number of points in history where dignity has been used to respond to 
oppression. Catherine Dupré, for instance, argues that treating 1949 as a starting 
date for dignity has ‘led to a construction of dignity as a negative concept, this is, a 
“never again” response to the systematic denial and destruction of humanity, which 
leaves out its arguably much-needed positive and complementary dimensions.’168 
Despotism leads to the image of the state as a potential threat, which requires 
resistance to power in the shape of autonomy.  
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3.2.4. Marginalisation and Subordination 
Over time particular problems or priorities may be transplanted with new concerns. 
Thus, the priority of freeing people from oppression may be supplanted with new 
priorities, including addressing poverty, vulnerability, subordination and exclusion. 
These different social problems may require the different components of dignity to 
shift again, transforming into a new singularity. Dignity would therefore require the 
‘State...to do more than refrain from interfering or oppressing.’169 It will be essential 
to have a clear idea of the sorts of social concerns that need to be addressed in the 
current horizon as a basis for constructing dignity.  
4. A Problematic Concept 
4.1. Introduction  
This concluding section attempts to consolidate and expand on some of the 
criticisms that were raised in discussing historical and contemporary constructions of 
dignity. Criticism partially entails, as Deleuze argues, the process of posing 
problems, through which existing constructions of human dignity can be 
evaluated.170 The first problem which some constructions face is that although they 
purport to define universal humanity, they exclude the experiences of many groups, 
leading to asymmetries of power.  
 
The second criticism will be that some constructions of dignity obscure lived 
experience. This means that certain human relations are rendered hidden by 
particular constructions of dignity in favour of concepts that are never realised. 
These constructions create privileged dominant groups and disadvantaged 
subordinate groups.  
 
The final criticism is based on the idea that some constructions do not attempt to 
‘move beyond established perspectives and suggest new perspectives in keeping 
with the unfolding of human life.’171 As Tamsin Lorrain argues, concepts need to be 
attuned to ‘the world around us in way that unfold[s] our capacities for joyful living.’ 
172  Some concepts of dignity obstruct and enclose creative movements towards 
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enhanced modes of joyful living that unlock new potentialities, relationships and 
capacities. 
 
4.2. Exclusion of the ‘Other’  
This section critiques some of the uses of the concept of human dignity in respect of 
the treatment of the ‘other.’ This entails criticism of some accounts of human dignity 
that do not fall within a particular paradigm of what it means to experience life as a 
human.173 The paradigm image that is adopted here, which is implicit and sometimes 
explicit within particular constructions of dignity is that of the independent, able 
bodied, rational man. This paradigm image marginalises many groups, thereby 
making some definitions of human dignity exclusive or incomplete by design.  
4.2.1. Gender Bias  
A significant line of attack that can be directed towards certain constructions of 
dignity is the emphasis on a male paradigm, privileging them as the locus for the 
demands of human dignity. This is particularly prevalent in the early conceptions of 
dignity that demonstrate a view of women as inferior in status and subordinate to 
man. 174 The privileging of men in the construction of the concept of dignity is far 
more subtle today, but still remains. Rawls, for instance, constructs dignity through a 
thought experiment whereby heads of households agree on political principles 
behind a veil of ignorance. As Susan Okin argues, it depends on the acceptance of 
the idea that families with heads of households, usually men, are just institutions.175  
Arguments also continue to be made that suggest the faculties of females have a 
particular telos that differentiate their dignity from men. 176  Dignity should be 
constructed without these assumptions and instead recognise that some of the 
natural constraints placed on women are in fact systems of power that enable 
subordination. 
In order to address the problem of exclusion of groups there can be a tendency to 
resolve the problem by drawing persons into an existing dignity archetype by arguing 
that excluded groups do possess the same characteristics. It has previously been 
                                                          
173
 Catherine Dupré, ‘Dignity, Democracy and Civilisation’ (2012) 33 Liverpool Law Review 263, 273, 
277. 
174
 Carole Pateman, ‘Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and the Tale of 
Two Concepts’ (2002) 10 The Journal of Political Philosophy 20, 52.  
175
 Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gender and the Family (Basic Books 2008) 96. 
176
 McFarlane v Tayside Health Authority (2002) 2 AC 114, See Christian Witting, ‘Physical Damage 
in Negligence” 61(1) The Cambridge Law Journal 189.  
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
61 
 
argued that women possess the same dignity as that of men, as they are capable of 
possessing the same characteristics of the rational man, or they have finally 
achieved an enlightened state equivalent to that of the rational man.177 Women are 
subject to the same dualisms as men, whose rational capacity (masculine) is the 
source of value and not, for instance, the emotional dimensions of personality 
(feminine). 
The difficulty with assimilation is that it fails to assess whether the archetype in the 
first place is actually always supportive of the needs of the excluded groups. As an 
example, women may be treated as clearly capable of being rational creatures that 
are personally responsible for their choices. At the same time, in incorporating 
women into such a framework, a dependent carer, often a woman, will be treated as 
if they have chosen as a matter of choice to make that decision and should not 
therefore be afforded support.178 In this way, concerns need to be expressed about 
the extent to which encompassing excluded groups into a framework of individualism 
captures their actual experiences.  
Constructing dignity by the incorporation into the existing dignity paradigm also 
requires persons to adapt themselves to social structures designed around the 
existing paradigm, only laying claim to compensation for their deviations from the 
‘norm’.179  Compensatory regimes are thus created, for instance, in order to benefit 
women for their differences from the paradigm, rather than considering whether the 
social framework can be redefined ‘to accommodate biological differences and 
whether gender as a social construct can be redefined to make those differences 
less…relevant.’180  
4.2.2. Excluding the Physically Disabled  
The notion of subordination and marginalisation extends to those persons who suffer 
from physical disabilities. Some writers on human dignity focus on a fully functioning 
human being, or, if they incorporate disabled individuals, such people are to be 
recognised as suffering from ‘bad luck.’181 Envy felt by the unlucky group is given as 
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a potential ground for compensation.182  The problem with these approaches is that 
they mainly start from what it means to be different from the paradigm and 
compensate people for their shortfalls. What disabled people arguably desire is not 
to be treated as inferior because they have natural impairments, but rather for 
individuals to recognise that society is constructed around the paradigm of the able 
bodied, which is to their disadvantage.183  
4.2.3. Excluding the Irrational  
The exclusion of particular groups from the paradigm image of humanity also applies 
to those concepts of dignity that predominantly focus on rationality. This construction 
can lead to the exclusion of those deemed to lack rationality because of a mental 
disorder, such as a mental illness, disorder of consciousness, or disability of the 
mind.  More concerning is the largely unjustified perception that, as a deviation from 
the norm, an incapacitous person is a particular source of danger to autonomous 
rational beings.184 This perception has underlined recent legislation governing the 
detention of mentally-ill persons.185 A mental illness includes a clinically significant 
disturbance or disorder in cognition, emotion regulation, or behaviour that indicate a 
dysfunction in mental functioning usually associated with significant distress. 
Particularly severe mental illness can undermine the ability of a person to 
understand, evaluate and reason as aspects of a rational decision-making. 
 
In contrast, mental disability includes arrested or incomplete development of the 
mind, including significant and long-term impairment of cognitive ability, as well as 
day-to-day social and adaptive functioning or self-management. 186   A person 
suffering from a mental disability need not be recognised as suffering from a mental 
illness, nor does a person suffering from a mental illness necessarily have their day-
to-day functioning impaired. A person suffering from a mental disability may, 
however, be deemed to lack rationality due to a limitation in their cognitive ability to 
process and withhold information, which may show little prospect of being 
developed. Disorders of consciousness differ in that they concern injuries to the 
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brain that significantly impair awareness, such as in the case of permanent 
vegetative state, which may render people incapable of rational decision-making.  
Undoubtedly these different disorders pose different problems and will require 
different responses. Nonetheless, all of these disorders pose difficulties for accounts 
of dignity that emphasise the rational capacities of individuals as the primary locus of 
moral worth.   
  
In early accounts of human dignity, those lacking rationality were treated as beings 
that may be more akin to beasts in nature, than man.187 The negative treatment of 
the irrational is far less prevalent in contemporary concepts of dignity, but it still 
underlies some concepts. The irrational can be excluded from the protection of 
dignity in a number of ways, some of which may be particularly pertinent to the 
different forms of mental disorder. First, concerns the treatment of the irrational 
person as a deviation from the paradigm in need of special treatment through the 
concepts of beneficence, charity or pity. They do not lay claim support on the basis 
of the value of the humanity in their person. Second, protection of dignity is extended 
to people lacking a capacity for rationality, who may have once possessed it, on the 
basis that the critical interests of the prior autonomous person bind the latter 
irrational person who only has experiential interests.188 A powerful objection to this 
approach is that it can fail to attach weight to the views of the currently incapacitated 
person, which might, if ignored, lead to great distress and humiliation, treating the 
irrational person as if they were ‘no longer fully human’.189 Third, where a person 
may in the future regain capacity, which is most likely in respect of those suffering 
from mental illness, a person may be a potential citizen capable of acquiring the 
capacity necessary for dignity.  
 
Focusing almost exclusively on rationality is problematic on the basis that it does 
value many other dimensions of humanity that can be manifested in the lives of 
those lacking mental capacity. Feder Kittay, for instance, has argued that a focus on 
rationality fails to appreciate that those with severe mental disability are still capable 
of a ‘very good life’ that is ‘full of joy, of love, of laughter’ and is thereby ‘richly human 
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and full of dignity’.190 It has even been suggested that many of the most fulfilling 
aspects of life, including deeply meaningful experiences, may be manifested more 
fully in the lives of those lacking rational capacities.  
 
It is not only constructions of dignity that focus on rational thought to the exclusion of 
other human dimensions that can disadvantage those deemed to lack rationality. 
The status-based constructions of dignity that focus on community norms of 
acceptable conduct is highly likely to be prejudicial to the experiences of certain 
persons, particularly those suffering from mental illness. In some circumstances they 
may engage in unconventional behaviour that might be classified as undermining the 
status of humanity.191 
4.3. Obscuring Lived Experience  
This section critiques some of the uses of the concept of human dignity on the 
grounds that they make little sense of lived experience. This includes a criticism of 
those accounts that obscure universal interdependence and the failure of some 
autonomy accounts to recognise the importance of realising a wider range of human 
needs. This highlights the ways in which construction of dignity that obscure lived 
experience tend to create asymmetries of power that benefit dominant groups over 
subordinate groups. 
4.3.1. Recognising Human Vulnerability and Interdependency  
Obscuring lived experience is a criticism that has already been noted in addressing 
existing accounts of human dignity. The main problem was the focus of existing 
constructions on an image of the autonomous man as independent and separate, as 
underlined many of the deontological accounts of dignity. What this does is obscure: 
...[T]he sense of interdependency between people; their 
reliance on each other at critical times, and on structures of 
social support…Although we might aspire to some form of 
independence, such a state of being is always relative to 
social structure, and usually highly exaggerated by those in 
fortunate social circumstances.192 
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This means that each person is reliant on others in respect of inputs produced by 
other people that enable them to continue and excel in life. 193 It is notable that some 
constructions of dignity as autonomy do recognise the importance of the social to life, 
but these accounts tend to begin from the premise that humans are separate entities 
who enter into society for particular reasons. The question being asked is therefore 
‘how to connect to the world around us’.194 This entails the wrong sort of question 
and the usual answer comes in the form of the consent principle.195 The question 
should not be how to connect to the world, but what ‘kind of connections [do] we want 
to foster and sustain’. 196  This entails a vital difference, in so far as the latter 
recognises that individual actions, capacities and personalities are always already 
being developed in relation to other beings.  
It is not only autonomy constructions that can obscure human experience, but also 
status-based constructions of dignity based on community standards of appropriate 
behaviour. The person who engages in unconventional behaviour may be expected 
to experience that behaviour as others do in terms of being shameful.. 197  This 
construction can be instrumental in the creation of marginalised and vulnerable 
groups by treating certain persons as abnormal, existing outside of the confines of 
human acceptability.  
4.3.2. Creating Systems of Subordination 
One of the notable consequences of the formation of particular paradigms of 
humanity as a basis for defining dignity is the creation of systems of subordination. 
This is particularly the case when it comes to the concept of dignity that is premised 
on the idea of autonomy. Autonomy is often associated with ideas of independence, 
separateness and self-sufficiency.198 This is a normalised image that obscures the 
reality of universal interdependence and interconnectedness creating inequalities of 
power to the benefit of particular groups. As an example, the image of the 
autonomous person may benefit workers over dependent carers -  
[T]he dependency of carers [is treated as] a voluntary 
deviance from a falsely universalized androcentric norm 
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[that] ends up justifying the subordination of women to 
male wage earners and the stigmatization of dependent 
caretaking relative to self-sufficient wage earning.199 
 
The idea of independence and separateness benefits the wage-earner in terms of 
creating an asymmetry of power based on subordination, obscuring the reality that 
they are always dependent to a degree. At the same time it perpetuates the 
vulnerability of the carer as she becomes acutely dependent on a wage earner, 
increasing the risk of subordination and domination.200  
4.4. Connecting to Change 
This section critiques some of the uses of the concept of human dignity on the 
grounds that they do not link up to present day conditions and developments. These 
concepts therefore do not represent immanent possibilities for life, which means that 
they are incapable of actualisation through a ‘process that is ongoing in the 
present.’201 It also entails criticism of accounts that obstruct creative modes of being 
that are capable of enhancing life. This includes a discussion of the extent to which 
existing concepts of dignity are capable of opening up ‘paths to the invention of new 
forms of individual and collective life’.202  
4.4.1. Obstructing Creativity 
The introduction argued that a concept can be evaluated to determine whether 
adequate or inadequate according to whether or not the concept enhances immanent 
modes of being, those that are active and excessive, leading to new creative 
possibilities for life. The focus is on increasing joyful experiences in the realisation 
and discovery of the new.203  
It is the case that some constructions of dignity are obstructive of the creative 
process of unlocking new capacities and intensities for life. The most notable 
example is the conception of dignity as status that demands self-controlled, upright 
behaviour, which is correlated to a perceived absence of animal characteristics and 
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the natural.204 This particular conception is premised on the conservation of existing 
societal norms of appropriate conduct that signify self-possessed and elevated 
behaviour.205 This conservation process is hostile towards expressions of life that 
entail new and creative relationships. Repugnance often entails a shrinking from that 
which is unfamiliar. Consider, for instance, the use of repugnance in the discussion of 
legalisation of homosexual marriage.206 It establishes a protective boundary against 
the perceived contamination of the institution of marriage by those that are perceived 
to be engaging in debasing acts. This particular conception of dignity as status 
thereby prevents the creative reimagining of marriage as an institution. The 
possibility of centralising mutual support and companionship as the core aspect of 
marriage is obstructed. Moreover, it treats the ‘other’ as a possible threat, as 
opposed to a possible source of transformative power that can change existing 
paradigms in order to inform more dynamic forms of life.  
The teleological construction of dignity is also obstructive of pathways to the 
realisation and discovery of the new. This is because teleological dignity is premised 
on finality which consists of human beings realising their purpose through the 
completion of their nature. The result is a construction of dignity that suggests that 
life is the perfection of the essential and defining potential proper to humanity. It 
might deny the possibility for experimental engagement with others that can lead to 
discovery of new powers and affections.207  
5. Conclusion  
Human dignity is a complex multiplicity that entails the interaction of at least three 
core components. The components of humanity, value and respect are therefore 
three parts of a triadic whole. These components are no doubt very expansive, 
covering issues concerned with the nature and purpose of human existence. The 
concept of dignity is frustratingly wide, whilst being exceptionally important. The 
importance of this concept is supported, rather than undermined, by the creative 
ways it has been constructed differently over time. Indeed, alterations in the 
connections and interpretations of the core components of dignity to address 
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developing social conditions demonstrates its ability to be reconstructed in order to 
ensure better futures for those in need. As Dupré argues, rather than being an 
obstacle to understanding, the ‘unfinished nature of human dignity is a crucial sign of 
its dynamism and usefulness’.208 Treating dignity as a developing concept entails a 
constant recognition that time is not a closed idea and humans can themselves by 
active in the transformation of dignity.  
This does not mean criticisms cannot be directed at existing concepts of dignity. 
However, these criticisms do not concern the reality that dignity has been 
constructed differently over time, but rather that some constructions of dignity do not 
always capture the needs of certain persons in present day conditions. Some 
constructions isolate and subordinate vulnerable persons. This is not to say that all 
concepts of dignity exclude a consideration of the needs of the marginalised or 
vulnerable. The capabilities approach to the concept of dignity at least attempts to 
tackle these issues. However, it suffers from the problem of being underpinned by 
two contradictory philosophical traditions. It is therefore the aim of the next chapter to 
consider how the core components of dignity can be more convincingly combined to 
address the experiences of marginalised, subordinate and vulnerable persons.  
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Chapter Two: An Investment Construction of Human Dignity  
1. Introduction  
Human dignity requires respect for the value of humanity. This chapter seeks to 
avoid the difficulties of the constructions of dignity analysed in the previous chapter 
by assembling and defining these different components in a distinct way. The 
concept of dignity that is constructed entails investment into the value of human life 
as creative potential, which is promoted to the extent that a person is capable of 
affecting and being affected in an increasing number of ways, enabling possibilities 
for different, experimental and creative modes of being.   
This construction of dignity does not attempt to redefine the concept in a way that 
has no affinities to existing conceptions. Nor does it aim to replace all existing 
conceptions, which may be of particular relevance in addressing specific problems 
within a certain temporal context. 1  The concept that is proposed complements 
existing approaches by refining the capabilities construction of human dignity, which 
is concerned with the developmental process, including the ‘affective and material 
engagement that grounds the person in context.’2 The capabilities construction of 
human dignity has some important insights into the human condition that extends 
beyond a narrow focus on rationality and autonomy.3 However, as was argued in the 
previous chapter, the present capabilities construction of human dignity is 
underpinned by competing ethical theories.4  
The capabilities construction of human dignity that is developed in this chapter is 
connected to the idea that humanity has value as creative potentiality. This is not a 
teleological conception of ‘potential’, which underpins existing capabilities-based 
approaches, but one that focuses on diversity and creativity, rather than an ideal or 
model of human nature. This construction is realised by reorienting the capabilities 
approach to dignity around the political philosophy of Baruch Spinoza and Gilles 
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Deleuze. Their focus on what the body is capable of doing and being closely 
connects it to the capabilities approach and they share a number of important goals.5 
At the same time, they deny the idea of an exemplary state of being human or 
natural end. They thus differ from teleological perfectionism, which entails becoming 
perfect through attaining an end, purpose or vocation inherent in being human. A 
view of human striving that is concerned with existence in the ‘fullest and most real 
sense’.6 Their account of human life is of a dynamic, diverging, open and creative 
force that unfolds new capacities in interaction with other forces and persons in the 
world.  As will be seen, they are not directly concerned with the shape a life should 
take, a model of what sorts of lives are worthwhile or complete, or telos to human 
becoming, but with exploring new possibilities of existence and discovering what a 
person is capable of doing through experimentation. There is no becoming towards a 
preconceived end or to a state of completion, so that we become in order to be more 
fully human, but rather a creative tendency to unfold new possibilities for life and that 
each person is free to unfold their striving in their own distinctive way.  
Elements of their thinking can, it will be argued, enrich an understanding of a 
capabilities approach to dignity. In particular, their thinking will be used to emphasise 
the close relationship between different aspects of human functioning in a way that 
supports a strongly holistic approach to humanity. They suggest that every change in 
the capability of the body to affect and be affected is also a change in the mental 
capability of the person to affect and be affected (and vice versa). Moreover, their 
approach identifies the mechanisms by which capabilities are cultivated, focusing 
specifically on the relational context in which the capability of a person to affect and 
be affected develops in interaction with the surrounding flows and forces of life that 
sustain us. Their approach is not obstructive of creative change, but rather embraces 
it as an ‘approach to being-human [that] entails a more active, joyous, flexible and 
creative subjectivity able to unfold new capacities in changing circumstances.’7   
On this account, each person is in a state of dynamic becoming through continuous 
variation in their activity and passivity in interaction with others. Increases in the 
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power of acting of the person are tracked by joyful affections, whereas decreases in 
that power are tracked by sad affections. Deleuze and Spinoza, it will be argued, 
provide an important basis for valuing emotion as an aspect of a holistic concept of 
humanity, treating them as cognitive and physiological phenomenon that indicate a 
bodily and mental transition to a lesser or greater activity, an increase or reduction in 
the power to bring about certain affects and to be affected. It will also be argued that 
Deleuze and Spinoza recognise vulnerability as a core of their conception of human 
subjectivity, and, more importantly, offer a way of conceiving of vulnerability as 
entailing both negative and positive possibilities for life. Vulnerability, it will be 
argued, entails openness, porosity and receptivity to what can affect us in ways that 
it is not possible to fully predict, control or know in advance. Such openness is the 
condition of human experience that ‘makes possible love, affection, learning, and 
self-transformation just as much as it makes possible suffering and harm.’8  
Individuals become less passive, and more active, increasing their power of acting, 
to the extent that they can understand and select those encounters, or relationships, 
with others and surrounding forces that creatively extend the capability of the person 
to affect and be affected.9 It will be argued that this entails the power or potential for 
multiple becomings, with a capability of both mind and body to affect and be affected 
in an increasing number of ways. There is no ideal or end, only a continuous 
endeavour to expand our power of action and perception through creativity and 
transformation, which enables us to vary and change in as ‘many ways as possible, 
through a maximum of encounters.’10 It is, on this account, not possible to determine 
in advance a ‘reliable blueprint’ for development, but instead must depend on an 
‘experimental ethos’ through ongoing ‘exploration and experimentation with the 
bodily activity that living things are capable of undertaking’.11  Therefore, what is 
good, in terms of what increases our power of acting, always remains to be 
discovered in the ‘experimental relations that we have of the world.’12 At the same 
time, as no one knows ahead of time the affects one is capable of, or how certain 
developments might unfold, respect for dignity requires a lasting prudence, patience 
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and care, lest such experimentation become dangerously destructive. It may not be 
clear how something will affect us, whether it will enhance or decrease our activity, 
and whether it will contribute to the positive or negative aspects of human 
vulnerability. Becoming must not, on this account, be ‘haphazard or uncontrolled’ but 
cautious, otherwise it can itself seriously threaten the openness, creativity and 
diversity of human becoming.13   
These different elements are used in this chapter as a basis for developing a refined 
capability approach to dignity. Human dignity is understood to by a richly holistic 
concept that requires a consideration of the different aspects of the person in light of 
the whole and to reflect on the complex relations between the dimensions of 
humanity (bodily, mental, social and recreational) that dynamically unfold in time and 
within a complex network of relationships. It will be argued that it encompasses 
collective and personal investment (respect) into conditions, relationships and 
structures that promote the creative potentiality (value) of each person by protecting 
and promoting the capability of the mind-body to affect and be affected in an 
increasing number of ways. The community has an obligation to invest in conditions 
that support those who face the most circumscribed and isolated conditions, and are 
therefore particularly limited in terms of making connections that enable them to 
extend and develop their capacities.  
Individuals are entitled, in light of the open nature of vulnerability, and the 
experimental nature of development, to explore the affects of which they are capable 
and invest in novel forms of collective engagement, although this must be 
counterbalanced with a lasting prudence, patience and care. Dignity requires a 
person to be open to developing new affections, capabilities and forms of 
engagement that will increase their activity, whilst trying to avoid forms of becoming 
that become destructive of the subject and may limit future openness. Moreover, it 
will be argued that individuals are expected to recognise that their own process of 
development is dependent upon and invested in the development of others, and 
should seek to promote the striving of others as part of their own striving. The final 
section of the chapter assesses the investment concept against the concerns 
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expressed in relation to some of the existing concepts discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
2. The Substance of an Investment Concept  
2.1. Positioning Value in the Inherent Potential of Human Life  
The value of human life is one of the key elements of understanding human dignity. 
It is clear from the previous chapter that different constructions of dignity define value 
in different ways. Teleological dignity, for instance, looks to valuable human ends, a 
predetermined direction towards an ideal state of flourishing, whilst deontological 
dignity posits a pre-social rational subject that has value in respect of the capacity for 
reason.14  As was seen in the previous chapter, there are difficulties with these 
approaches in the way they can marginalise and subordinate some groups.   
The value of humanity exists neither as being prior to the ends of the subject, or as 
defining the ends of the subject, but exists rather as an unfolding of the ‘creative 
potential within us.’15 Creative potentiality denotes, importantly, as Kateb states, the 
idea ‘of the unrealised, of the not-yet.’16 Human life is marked by ’tendencies and 
potentials that could unfold in many more ways than actually occur.’ 17  On this 
account, the value of humanity is not a completed or fixed property of being. Instead, 
the value of humanity has a dynamic quality in which there is always the immanent 
possibility of discovering new capacities, intensities, relationships and modes of 
living that are capable of being unfolded from the potential inherent in the present 
forms of human existence. There are, thus, always potentials in actual bodies and 
situations waiting to be further developed and extended.18 
It is important here to uncouple the concept of potentiality from a teleological 
ideology, which also deploys potentiality. Teleology entails a predetermined ideal or 
purpose as the essence of a being, which a person has the potential to realise. This 
conception of potentiality is concerned with the realisation of an ideal state of 
existence that can be extrapolated from past forms of living. The potentiality of a 
person is stated within the ‘definition of the thing as the potential proper to that 
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thing.’19 The essence of the human being is ‘grounded in some idea of the purposes 
and destiny of human life.’20  Thus, for instance, it is the essential and defining 
potential of the human to be virtuous, which is a potential already present in the 
person to realise. The virtuous is treated as, in some sense, more real – people are 
‘striving to not only become better but to be – that is to exist in the fullest and most 
real sense – [through] excellence or virtue’.21 A person becomes more fully human 
through the realisation of their potential to achieve their proper end. A different 
conception of potentiality could negate such idealism in favour of creativity, difference 
and experimentation. In this regard, human life is characterised not be a single end 
point of perfectionism, which ‘functions as a focal point or terminus’22, but rather it is 
characterised by an unpredictability, which entails:  
The will to break with what has gone before, to try what 
has not been tried before, to turn aside from what is 
already good enough…out of boredom or a spirit of 
adventure or some other passion that is not easy to 
identify or name – is a tribute to the unknown potentialities 
that people suspect, if only dimly, lie hidden in them.23  
Human potential is therefore marked by its unpredictability and dynamic nature. It is 
the ‘latent capacity to say or do or make or perceive or understand something new’.24  
On this basis, human life can never achieve completion as there are always 
‘tendencies and potentials that could unfold in many more ways than actually occur’ 
and is valued precisely because of the creative process of differentiation and 
transformation in its process of becoming.25 Humanity is not a completed or fixed 
state of being. Instead, it has a dynamic quality in which there is always the 
immanent possibility of discovering new capacities, intensities, relationships and 
modes of living that are capable of being unfolded from the potential inherent in the 
present forms of human existence. This entails an ethics of experimentation in order 
to make new connections that break with routine and open up new perceptions, new 
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thoughts and new ways of becoming that extend the capacity to affect and be 
affected. Human beings are able to intuit the ‘present and skilfully unfold the creative 
possibilities of life’ and ‘participate in unfolding the incipient tendencies of our present 
towards future we can affirm.’26 This does not denote the idea of a fixed essence to 
being that then becomes, which simply unfolds itself through time, but rather that the 
human subject is a process of becoming that ‘changes with each new encounter’.27 
The essence of humanity is the dynamic ‘power that singularises each individual, 
conferring upon [them] a unique destiny.’28 
This account of potential must be assessed against the problematic aspects of 
exclusion that were recognised in the previous chapter. It might be thought that 
emphasising potentiality excludes groups who have impaired cognitive faculties, as it 
could be argued that they possess no potential.29 This sort of prejudice can be firstly 
challenged on the basis that it really doesn’t correlate to what is known from 
experience, as even education of the most psychologically disabled child can 
enhance the individual’s experiences. 30  The precise problem with the historical 
prejudice was that it was based on an assumption that all potential is known and it is 
nothing. What is needed is a wide, rather than narrow view of creative experiences, 
treating personality in a holistic fashion, as well as recognition that a person is never 
fully known as a prediction.31 Moreover, such creative experiences should not be 
confused or equated with the idea of human greatness or genius. 32  It is the 
‘ordinariness’ of creative potentiality that should be valued most, as part of the 
dynamic and joyful aspects of human life, not necessarily great achievements.33  
 
Those that are temporarily incapacitated are a more difficult category as they may 
lack experiences, but they may have potential in the sense of any current lack of 
capacity being a merely temporary interruption to future creative experiences. In 
contrast, the permanently incapacitated may have very limited experiences or none 
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at all. However, they can be included on the basis that the value of life as potentiality 
encompasses also the existing actualised potential. It is possible therefore to make 
judgements about how a certain type of death or treatment will fold back into the past 
character of the lives lived and affect the future becoming. 34  The treatment of 
incapacitated persons has the possibility of shaping the potentiality of the individual 
in terms of what the story of that life will become, as well as its potential effects of 
that story on those in relationship with the subject.35 
2.2. The Multifaceted Nature of Humanity  
2.2.1. Powers of Acting and Capability 
As a result of a focus on potentiality as unpredictable, creative and experimental, the 
second component concept of dignity as humanity cannot be defined solely by 
reference to a transcendental ideal or by reference to an ahistorical subject. 
Humanity is an ‘evolving force of life that is always diverging from its manifest forms 
and whose capacities are always changing’.36 There is thus no being prior to the play 
of forces, nor becoming towards an ideal end. There is only becoming as potential 
for creation, variation and production. The essence of a person is coextensive with 
its capability to affect and be affected, which is dynamic, shifting and evolving, rather 
than a rigid set of characteristics or functions. Human development does not 
therefore entail the specification of a set of valuable functioning’s that are 
established a priori. It is not possible to determine fully beforehand the affects of 
what a body or mind is capable. A person can only understand the affects of which 
they are capable through exploring ways of being, forms of relationality, and 
encounters with others.  
This is a very Spinozian and Deluezian conception of the human subject. 37 
According to both, the human subject is defined by its degree of power to act, which 
entails a capability to affect and be affected through dynamic relation with others. 
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What is good are those relations which compound with my own to sustain the power 
to act, and increase the capability of a person to affect and be affected, so that a 
person is capable of multiple becomings. In contrast, what are bad are those 
modifications in our power that lead to greater passivity and thus a decreased 
capability to affect and be affected in varied ways.38 A human being is therefore 
defined by ‘its power or what it can do.’39  The question posed by both philosophers 
is not - 
What must I do?” (which is the question of morality) but rather 
“What can I do, what am I capable of doing (which is the proper 
question of an ethics without morality). Given my degree of 
power, what are my capabilities and capacities? How can I 
come into active possession of my power? How can I go to the 
limit of what I “can do”?40   
 
This treats the human person as a dynamic, affirmative and active force, a power 
that ‘unfolds out of what it can do rather than what it can dominate – a force that 
extends to its limit rather than being separated from what it can do’. 41  This 
conception of power is quite distinct from a conception that focuses on the idea of 
‘authority, domination of exploitation’.42  Liberal deontological theories of dignity often 
conceptualise power as something that is ‘principally manifested in the regulation 
and control of politico-economic relations.’ 43  In contrast, Spinoza and Deleuze 
promote the productive nature of power in which humans can actively develop their 
capacities in relationships that are mutually enhancing by composing relations with 
other bodies to form a more powerful collective.  
This conception of power entails recognition that the capacities and abilities of a 
person are constantly unfolding in the interactions with the dynamic and developing 
forces of life.  Thus, a person is always in a state of becoming because their powers 
of acting and their level of ability to affect and be affected are always changing in 
relation to ‘surrounding forces of which we are an integral part.’ 44  A person is 
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therefore constantly interacting with ‘other things which change and affect it.’45 A 
paraplegic who combines with a wheelchair is affected in terms of changes to their 
capability for acting in a way that is not necessarily lesser to the ‘normal’ man, but 
‘more complex than that of an able-bodied walker.’46 Human life in this framework 
exists as a dynamic force in a relation that will shift and alter, depending on 
encounters with other powers that increase or decrease our activity.  
  
In light of the clear focus of Spinoza and Deleuze on what the body is actually 
capable of doing and becoming, it is surprising that few connections have been 
made by the leading thinkers on the capabilities approach.47 This is especially the 
case when they offer an alternative framework to the teleological perfectionism of 
Aristotle or the deontological liberalism of Rawls. Their approach differs from an 
Aristotelian approach in that the question occupying Aristotle what shape a life 
should take, specifically the telos to which human life should conform. 48  This 
includes striving to fully realise the destiny of human life, which is the essence of its 
being, and the potential it has itself to be, reaching a state of excellence and 
completion.49 The focus of Aristotle is therefore on the proper human function, which 
predetermines in advance the appropriate direction of development and the 
exemplary state of being human.50  
It is true that, on some readings, Spinoza is treated as supporting such a teleological 
approach to human nature.51 However, other readings have emphasised that for 
both Spinoza and Deleuze, there is no end, or particular model of the human that we 
should strive to instantiate.  Development is enhanced through the expansion of our 
capability to affect and be affected, which opens us up to be multiple becomings, and 
the ability to vary and alter in as ‘many ways as is possible, through a maximum of 
encounters.’52 There is no pre-given end to life to which the subject is directed, and it 
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is not possible to determine beforehand what a person can do in a given encounter. 
The good is simply that which disposes the human body to be capable of doing 
many things at once, or being acted on in many ways at once, so the mind also is 
more capable of perceiving many things at once.53 This is not a comprehensive 
account of the functioning proper to the individual, nor is it predetermined direction 
for development. Development requires, instead, an ongoing process of 
experimentation with the relationships, connections and interactions that a person 
has with the world.  It is through such experimentation, and the context of a concrete 
encounter, that the subject discovers the affects of which it is capable, as well as that 
which expands those affects.  
The exploration of different modes of existence, in turn, leads to the expansion of 
possibility, in the form of the ‘creation of ever divergent ends, creating more and 
more series of becoming.’54 As certain lines of becoming are unfolded differently, 
there is an ‘expansion of possibility’, with new opportunities for creation, 
transformation and invention becoming possible, as well as the release of new 
potentialities for the future.55 With each change and modification in becoming, new 
possibilities for becoming are produced.56 In this way, development becomes an 
open process, which entails an ongoing endeavour to explore the affects of which 
one is capable, without limiting potentiality in terms of what it is already determined 
to achieve. The ethical question therefore addressed by Deleuze and Spinoza is not 
how should one live (teleology), or how should one act (deontology) but how might 
one live, and how might one go to the limits of what one is capable of doing, which is 
addressed only through exploring the affects of which one is capable. 57  In this 
respect, they share much in common with postmodern approaches to dignity focused 
on ethical experimentation, localised responses to concretely experienced situations, 
and are addressed to the issue of what we might make of ourselves, as opposed to 
what is our essential nature.58 
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If there is any connection to teleology, it is, as Bergson argues, situated in the ‘origin 
and not at the end (contra traditional finalism) of life’.59 Like Bergson, both Spinoza 
and Deleuze argue that there is a striving to life, a drive, creative tendency, and 
impulse to sustain and expand our capability to affect and be affected. Such a view 
of striving, however, does not depend, as traditional models of teleology do, on a 
conception of an ideal model against which the development of a person can be 
measured. Instead, it is creative of new potentialities and possibilities for life, 
requiring exploration and experimentation. 60  Much greater emphasis is therefore 
placed on the ongoing process or project of development then on the realisation of a 
determinate level of functioning. Striving does not ‘imply that all individuals are driven 
by identical needs and desires.’61 Instead, it requires people to be ‘free to realise 
their own essence in their own way’ and that they should desire the same for 
others.62 
Striving is not therefore an endeavour that assumes a presupposed idea of the 
perfect, a movement towards the achievement or fulfilment of the essential, defining 
and particular ideal of human life, and what is good is not found in the maturation of 
our being. As Claire Colebrook puts it, there is ‘no goal to which life is striving. But 
there is an internal or effective striving to life – to enhance its power, to maximise 
what it can do...[which] is achieved not by events leading up to an end, but by the 
creation of ever divergent ends, creating more and more series of lines of 
becoming.’63 Striving is the drive or tendency to persevere in existence and the 
extension of our power of action. What is good is that which enables the extension of 
potentiality for affection through creative engagement and the joyous increase of our 
power for action, which always remain to be discovered and produced through 
continuous experimentation in particular encounters in time. What is important is not 
the attainment of an ideal, but the ongoing and persistent process of striving to 
increase our capacity to affect and be affected, so that a person is capable of being 
affected in an increased number of ways, or affecting external bodies in an increased 
number of ways.  
                                                          
59
 Valentine Moulard-Leonard, Bergson-Deleuze Encounters: Transcendental Experience and the 
Thought of the Virtual (Suny, 2008) 59.  
60
 Duff (n 47) 84. 
61
 Moira Gatens, Feminist Interpretations of Benedict Spinoza (Penn State Press, 2009) 19. 
62
 Ibid 113.  
63
 Colebrook, Gilles Deleuze (n79) 57. 
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
81 
 
This does not mean that it is impossible to, with a degree of certainty, account for 
that which increases the power or capabilities of the body. However, any such 
account cannot be perceived as a rigid set of conditions directed towards some end 
state, but rather as ‘knowledge gained through experimentation with different 
conjunctions and combinations.’64 This knowledge ‘allows for an art of organising 
‘good encounters’, or of constructing assemblages (social, political, artistic) in which 
powers of acting and the affective affects that follow from them are increased.’65 
However, such knowledge is always open to ‘recurrent negotiation and 
experimentation’ taking into consideration the specific relational context.’66 It must 
also be open to refinement in relation to the continuous modification of life in time, 
and the emergence of new possibilities and potentialities.  
2.2.2. Mind and Body 
One of the most important implications of reorienting the capabilities approach to 
dignity around the political philosophy of Spinoza and Deleuze is the establishment 
of a parallel relationship between mind and body. Existing capabilities theorists, such 
as Nussbaum, appear to treat the capabilities of the mind as necessarily separate 
aspects of flourishing from that of the capabilities of the body and many of the 
autonomy-based concepts of dignity depend upon a mind-body dualism. 67  In 
contrast, Spinoza and Deleuze treat both the mind and body as different modes, 
which express the same substance.68 The mind is treated as the idea of the body, so 
that it corresponds to its object, which means that the mind comprehends and 
develops ideas about the affections or capabilities of the body.69 Thus, humans are 
‘initially informed about the world by informing images of our bodies and the ways in 
which other bodies impinge upon us.’70 The mind does not necessarily control, or 
dominate the passive body, but moves from a relative degree of passivity to activity 
to the extent that it develops more adequate ideas of what enhances the body. In 
turn, the body moves from a relative degree of passivity to activity to the extent that 
the mind understands more adequately what kinds of interactions, relationships and 
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combinations that enhance its characteristic relation. The result is the doctrine of 
parallelism, which establishes that -    
Whatever increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our 
body’s power of acting, the idea of that same thing 
increases or diminishes, helps or hinders, our mind’s 
power of thinking.71  
This essentially means that the more the mind understands about what increases the 
activity of the body, the more active the mind becomes in terms of understanding. It 
develops more adequate ideas of those combinations and interactions that affect the 
body, in a way that increase the activity of thinking and perception. In turn, the more 
the mind truly understands about what enhances the body, the more active and less 
passive a person can become in having the necessary knowledge to actively seek 
out productive encounters, relationships or interactions.72  
This view of the mind entails a conception of embodied and social reason that 
‘instead of remaining at the mercy of chance encounters, endeavours to join us to 
things and beings whose relations compound directly with our own.’73  Reason is 
therefore, in direct contrast to Kant, not an abstract process formed in isolation, but 
develops in encounters with other forces in the world, so that ‘knowledge and the 
theory of sociability are closely intertwined.’74 
The importance of parallelism is that it requires an assessment of the simultaneous 
impact of living conditions, relationships and interactions on both mind and body. It 
means that whatever is ‘an action in the mind is necessarily an action in the body as 
well, and what is a passion in the body is necessarily a passion in the mind.’75 Thus, 
it is important to consider how an encounter affects ‘simultaneously both the soul 
(mind) and the body.’76  Consider, for example, an individual who has limited access 
to food with very little nutrition. The effects of malnutrition might be tiredness, delayed 
healing, irritability, poor concentration, anxiety and depression. Insecure access to 
nutrition has parallel effects on both the body and mind, as it reduces the minds 
ability for perception, which in turn limits human activity. Certain channels of activity 
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will be cut off because the body is simply too weak to engage in it, whilst others, such 
as affiliation may be diminished because of depression. The person is therefore 
rendered less capable of being affected in diverse and creative ways.77   
2.2.3. Emotion and Reason 
 An important consequence of the rejection of mind-body dualism is the erosion of 
the emotion-reason dichotomy that characterises deontological models of dignity that 
treat the mind as necessarily dominant over emotions, which are irrational and 
resigned to the body. Spinoza rejects this traditional division in favour of an 
opposition between passive emotion and active emotion.78 His account of emotions, 
which has gained support by some leading neuroscientists, is subtle, complex and 
nuanced.79  It provides a means by which to construct a concept of dignity that 
maximises positive emotions, such as joy, whilst working to minimise negative 
emotions, such as sadness and, at the same time, connect those emotions to other 
dimensions of humanity.80 This theory of emotion, it is argued, can draw dignity away 
from ideas of self-denial, control, dejection, towards ideas of affirmation, activity and 
joy.81     
An emotion for Spinoza is a modification of the body, whereby the power of the 
person is increased or diminished, helped or hindered, together with the idea of 
those modifications. An emotion is at the same time cognitive and affective. It entails 
both a bodily transition and a mental equivalent, which pertains to those ‘ideas of 
things that increase or diminish the body’s power of acting’.82 Spinoza thus adopts a 
complex cognitive approach to emotions, encompassing an idea of the mind, which 
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is a mental act entailing affirmation or denial of a bodily modification.83 An emotion 
has: 
A physical and mental aspect – The physical aspect is the 
physiological changes in the body that constitute an 
increase or decrease in our power – the mental aspect is 
the idea or mind of that change, which idea or mind 
constitutes the corresponding increase or decrease in the 
imaginative portion of the minds power of action.84 
As such, something like anxiety can be understood as one and the same time a 
‘psychological nexus of feelings and moods’ and a ‘physiological state of the body 
that accompanies the psychological state’.85 This is an emotion which is based on 
the idea that some aspect of bodily existence is insecure.86 It may have negative 
physiological symptoms that reduce the activity of the body, such as muscle aches, 
palpitations and tiredness. This account of emotion therefore contributes to a holistic 
construction of human dignity that will require a consideration of the parallel affect of 
transition in the bodily state of a person on their mental state (and vice versa).  
Emotions are of evaluative import in the determination of that which is useful for the 
individual. An idea of the mind will encompass an affirmation or denial of any 
external things that aid or diminish our body’s power of acting, which, once formed, 
may aid or restrain our power of thinking. They are ‘ideational indicants of bodily 
thriving or declining’.87 This is not to say that some emotional states cannot be based 
on confused ideas. The mind, although it develops ideas of the modifications of the 
body, may form confused ideas of those modifications and the causes of those 
modifications. However, unlike some approaches to dignity, which focus on control 
and suppression of the emotions, Spinoza argues that a passive affect can only be 
displaced by a more powerful and lasting active affect. The aim is not to remove 
emotions from an ethical life, but to understand them, and to seek to displace 
passive emotions with more active emotions that depend upon true knowledge of the 
affects, and how external causes contribute to our striving.  
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Passive emotions, for Spinoza, are those that are based on inadequate ideas, in that 
a person does not fully understand how other bodies affect their own or that they 
have confused beliefs about how other bodies affect them. 88  Not all passive 
emotions are in themselves negative, they can be negative or positive depending on 
their affect. In this regard, whilst all passive emotions are based on inadequate 
ideas, some experiences of passive emotions are an important and necessary 
precursor to the formation of active emotion. Passive emotions provide the ‘material 
for adequate ideas, the forming of which makes us more active than before’.89 Thus, 
a person can experience a passive joy because they may not fully understand or 
comprehend the effect or the causes behind the feeling of joy. However, these 
emotional encounters provide the opportunity for reflection on the reasons why the 
encounter was joyous - they are the ‘very source of our power of activity [because] 
particular emotional reactions provide the occasion for thinking about ourselves in a 
certain way.’90 
Active emotions can, in contrast, be distinguished from passive emotions only by 
their cause.91 The difference between a joyful passive emotion and joyful active 
emotion is that ‘a joyful passion arises from an external cause, whilst a joyful action 
arises from an internal cause.’92 This is because an active emotion is one that is 
based on adequate and clear ideas of the causes of our emotions entailing a ‘deeper 
understanding of the whole in which our particular individuality is realised.’93 The 
development of adequate ideas of our emotions has an internalising effect, as the 
‘extent that we understand something it ceases to be outside us.;94 It is therefore 
possible to cause our emotions through an idea that becomes internal to us and from 
these ideas we can become more active in seeking out joyful encounters, whilst 
avoiding those that are sad. Dignity, on this account, would not require the 
suppression of emotions through pure reason, or give effect to negative emotions 
such as disgust. Instead, dignity would require the emergence from a state of 
passive emotion in which a person can experience joy (or sadness) through chance 
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encounters that may be ‘erratic and unreliable’ to a state of active joy, where 
understanding provides greater security and enables us to become the source of our 
emotional states.95   
2.2.4. Joy and Sadness  
The two most basic emotions, which entail bodily and mental transitions, are the 
emotions of joy and sadness. In light of the role of emotions in the evaluation of the 
environment, joy and sadness ‘indicate or track whether our power is increasing or 
decreasing’.96 Such emotions are vital to human striving as they enable a person to 
determine the affects of external things and provide information on whether 
something has a good influence on the power of the individual.97 A joyful affect 
expresses a transition from a lesser to a greater power, combined with an idea of 
that modification.98 In light of the rejection of mind-body dualism, a joyous affect 
registers an increase in the power of the body, and, as the power of the body 
increases, so does the mind in terms of developing adequate ideas affirming those 
transitions. As one develops more adequate ideas, and a better understanding of the 
affects, a person can become more active in terms of being the cause of their joyous 
states.  
In contrast, sadness is a bodily and mental transition to a lesser activity, a reduction 
in the power to bring about certain affects and to be affected. Depression, for 
instance, refers to the physiological state of the person concerned with lethargy and 
disturbed sleep, accompanied by a ‘psychological nexus of feelings and moods’. 
However, the ability to develop a clear idea of sad emotions is itself an active affect 
because the attainment of knowledge as an intellectual effort is itself emotionally 
rewarding. That is, true understanding of certain passive emotions can help to reveal 
the ideas on which they are based, reducing their power. In turn, gaining an 
adequate understanding of a negative emotion, including its causes, entails a greater 
activity of the mind and an associated joy of that increase in the power of 
understanding.  
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Spinoza treats joy and sadness as the most basic, and primitive emotions, which are 
subject to ideation complexification. Complex emotions, such as love, shame, and 
self-esteem, are variants of joy or sadness accompanied with a particular idea of any 
modifications and any purported cause of the emotional states. Thus, for instance, 
Spinoza argues that love is a form of joy associated with an idea of an external 
cause. 99  Whilst joyful affects are generally positive, it is notable that Spinoza 
recognises that such emotions can be excessive. This is especially the case in 
relation to pleasurable excitement, love, or desire, which can, when excessive, 
render the body less capable of being affected in many ways. Such excessive 
emotions ‘hold the mind down to the contemplation of one object alone that it can 
think of nothing else’.100 Moreover, certain desires, in so far as they are related to 
only one aspect of the person, and become excessive, fail to have ‘regard to the 
whole man’.101 Such unbalanced desires can be so powerful that they ‘surpass the 
other activities of the body’.102 Kisner gives as the example a person whose joy at 
eating becomes excessive to the point that it is damaging to human health and 
thereby decreases the power to act.103 On this account, excessive joy ‘reliably tracks 
a localised increase in one’s power of activity, for instance, the power of a particular 
region or system of the body’.104  However, such excessive joy entails a disruption to 
‘proportion of motion-and-rest for the entire body, thereby decreasing the net power 
of the entire bodily system.’105 Ethical deliberation requires discernment of those joys 
associated with the striving of the entire person and those which are not. It entails 
taking pleasure in things in moderation to ‘meet all of the needs of his body or 
mind’.106  
The previous chapter highlighted the importance of our relationship to emotions for 
existing accounts of dignity. Dignity would appear to be related to how we develop, 
manage, and act on our emotions. The account of emotions offered here, particularly 
joy and sadness, offer a new perspective on how that relationship should be 
structured. First, joy and sadness, as they inform our understanding of the value of 
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external things, and register changes in our power, are not worthless, but can 
provide guidance as to what is most useful to us and provide insights into the 
cognitive and physical functioning of the person. Emotions are not to be defined in 
opposition to principled decision-making. 
Second, rather than seeking to subdue emotions through pure reason, as is the 
approach of some Kantian accounts of dignity, it is necessary to set an affect against 
an affect. Thus, according to Spinoza, it is ‘recommended that we fight a negative 
emotion with an even stronger positive emotion brought about by intellectual 
effort’.107 It is thus, in part, an individual and personal task to seek to live in such a 
manner that a person can enhance their joy. Moreover, it entails a degree of 
practical discernment in taking pleasure in those external things, so that the ‘whole 
body may be equally capable of performing all the actions, which follow from the 
necessity of its own nature; and, consequently, so that the mind may also be equally 
capable of understanding many things simultaneously’.108 Although partly a personal 
effort, it is also clear that the prospect of developing more active emotions will 
depend upon a particular sort of social environment.   
Law may have a role to play in terms of deterring the infliction of certain negative 
social emotions, such as shame, humiliation, disgust, or contempt. Such social 
emotions entail certain dangerous, and false, ideas that register certain personal 
affects which are then projected outwards on others. It may also be the role of law to 
promote certain positive emotions, such as love, self-esteem, and care. Such 
emotional states are undoubtedly aspirational in nature, and cannot be guaranteed 
or enforced by law. However, law may have a role to play in terms of protecting and 
structuring those relationships conducive to those affects.    
Thirdly, emotions are related to our embodied existence, and so connected with our 
vulnerability, which, it is suggested later, entails a radical openness to our 
surroundings. This vulnerability is both the source of our joy and also the condition of 
our sadness. On this account, suffering and harm, as well as affection and creativity, 
are not inseparable, but are possibilities that both arise from our ‘same basic 
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corporeal openness’.109 An openness to that which can lead to increased passivity 
may be inseparably bound up with an openness to that which might (sustain or) lead 
to activity. As an example, living at home may be important to the realisation of self-
esteem, comfort and even happiness for a dementia patient, albeit potentially tinged 
with moments of distress and anxiety as unavoidable features of human existence 
that are inextricably bound up with the pursuit of the former. Law may need to avoid 
trying to reduce the risk of emotions related to a decrease in our power of acting 
(sadness), precisely because they render impossible the realisation of joyful 
emotions associated with an increase in our power.  
Finally, as discussed further below, whilst affects of joy and sadness are related to 
personal striving, this personal striving is attached to the striving of others. The 
capability of a person to affect and be affected is related to the capability of others to 
affect and be affected, so a person augments their power of acting by combining with 
others and through the social structures of which they are a part. The more active, 
and the greater the capability of others to affect and be affected, the greater will be 
the power of the individual. On this account, seeking to harm others on the basis of 
sad emotions, such as contempt, disgust, or humiliation is neither conducive to the 
striving of the individual or the collective. It is therefore necessary to attend to both 
the emotional states of an individual, but also the states of all those who exist within 
a particular social structure or nexus, recognising that the striving of the individual to 
have more active emotions is enhanced when the striving of the community is also 
advanced. 
2.2.5. Motion and Rest 
The primary focus has so far been on considering the importance of increasing or 
enhancing the active dimension of human personality. This appears to give the 
impression of a predominantly motion based perspective of human personality, 
whereby people are constantly engaged in creative activities. Whilst activity is an 
important facet of dignity, it should not obscure the equally important place of rest, as 
another dimension of a holistic account of humanity. Humans are marked by a ‘ratio 
of motion and rest.’110 These are not in tension, but inseparable elements of each 
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other. A life in which a person is forced to barely subsist by engaging in intensive 
work, over long hours, every day of the week, carries a serious risk of anxiety, stress 
and physical exhaustion. This can diminish the unfolding of human potential into the 
future.  
2.2.6. Becoming and Unfolding  
One of the most notable consequences for a capabilities construction of dignity by 
focusing on potential as creative unpredictability is that identity formation is a 
continuing, rather than a fixed process. To respect the value of human life, one must 
respect the emerging quality of the self as a matter of becoming. The body and mind, 
including powers, affects and ideas, will adapt over time in encounters with other 
forces in the world. As Catherine Dupré puts it, the idea of dignity as becoming is 
‘time-inclusive...[that] acknowledge[s] the fact that an individual's personality is never 
finished and keeps evolving throughout their life.’111 A person does not at some point 
in the coming of adulthood establish a fixed bodily existence, or a fixed idea of the 
self, in correlation to the body, out of which they act for all time. 
Human personality is therefore marked by a dynamic fluidity. This process of 
becoming through the unfolding of potential is not characterised either as 
corresponding to an ideal or majoritarian norm. 112  The process of becoming, 
according to Deleuze, is a pure process of ‘becoming different.’113  A person is 
uniquely constituted, although constantly adapting, through particular encounters. On 
this account there are no pre-given forms, so we could not clone Shakespeare and 
expect a ‘Renaissance bard who would then write Hamlet.’ 114  This would not 
reproduce the very different affections, connections and life experiences that 
contributed to the formation of Shakespeare.115 The result is that the only repetition 
in life is in fact difference.116 Human life is valued, in part, because of the fact that all 
humans are uniquely forming subjects, which are irreducible to any other.   
One important consequence of this focus on unfolding personality is that it points 
towards the future development of a person. Theories that focus on being are 
predominantly concerned with interferences with an existing state of affairs. The 
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process of becoming, in contrast, additionally looks forward to the future, so as to 
consider the potential effects of encounters on an individual..   
2.2.7. Inter-Dependency and Connectedness 
The creative potential that is unfolding and which is at the core of the account of 
human dignity that has been proposed is not self-realising. It is also never actualised 
by the singular investment of the individual, but is dependent on the investment of 
the community. This is a necessary result of the fact that individuals do not become 
active in isolation or at a pre-social level, but rather through productive encounters 
with other bodies. People are already always in ‘dynamic interaction with a world 
from which we cannot extract ourselves.’117  Even the most ‘autonomous’ man is 
dependent on interconnections, relationships and encounters with various fortuitous 
forces that promote or sustain their powers of acting. There is in this regard no given 
individual prior to the community, but a person becomes a self by affirming 
‘individuality against other men (and against other non-human individuals: animals, 
physical forces, and so on), [whilst] at the very same time [being] more or less 
completely dependent on them.’ 118  The process of becoming-active is therefore 
realised not in isolation, but in relying on and combining with other beings and forces 
in the world.119  
There is no doubt that dependency does vary over the course of human life and 
manifests itself in different ways, but this should not be set up to denote discontinuity 
between the dependent and independent. Rather, there will be degrees to which a 
person is dependent on others over the course of their life. Human beings are best 
understood as existing within a spectrum of dependency, across which persons vary 
in their reliance on others.120 The fact that human life is variably dependent is a truth 
that is based on human vulnerability. Humanity is vulnerable, in so far as creative 
potential is never fully actualised and not self-realising, but depends on a variety of 
social factors and structures.  
2.2.8. Recognising Human Vulnerability  
Measuring dependency by considering the factors determining human vulnerability is 
particularly important if a theory is going to justify the prioritisation of particular 
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persons. Humans are universally vulnerable because they depend on the co-
operation of others for the opportunity to channel potential to diverse ends, as well 
as being open to the destruction of these opportunities through various forces, such 
as natural and human causes.121 It is therefore the case that our ‘receptivity, or 
openness to what can affect us, both leaves us vulnerable...and increases our power 
of acting.’122 The human body can only therefore be composed and recomposed 
through ‘radical openness’ to its surroundings but it is also through this openness 
that it is vulnerable to decomposition and destruction.123  
Humans are vulnerable in the sense that they may be obstructed from developing 
and enhancing their capacities to affect others or be affected by them. This closely 
connects vulnerability with the interrelationality of life and is not solely concerned 
with the idea of an inherent weakness. It is the case that the most vulnerable on this 
account are those whose unfolding of potential is blocked due to the inability to make 
connections to those things that compose and enhance the mind-body and/or are 
continually exposed to agents that decompose or destroy the mind-body. This idea 
of blocking or obstruction of development is therefore concerned with the way in 
which a person is cut off from ‘making the connections that extends its capacities’.124  
The most disadvantaged and vulnerable on this account of dignity are those that 
face the most isolated and circumscribed conditions, who suffer from multiple 
obstructions to different channels of activity and rest.  The potentiality of a person is 
more limited where multiple channels of human activity are cut off by certain living 
conditions, interactions or relationships and where a person’s ‘vital powers have 
been blocked – her productive desire has been prevented from making the 
connections that extend its capacities.’125  
Exclusion Vulnerability  
It is not necessarily natural impairment that renders people vulnerable. Certain social 
structures can be designed not to take account of difference. Tailoring the system 
around a particular norm disadvantages those who fall outside of it in a plurality of 
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ways. It is therefore unsurprising that many of the groups who are particularly 
vulnerable are those whose experiences do not fit the norm.126  The task is to value 
diversity, not as an expression of weakness, but of unique difference and to 
eradicate disadvantage by improving the social conditions that enable them to 
channel their potential in an increasing number of ways.  
Power Vulnerability and Unequal Relations 
Closely related to exclusion vulnerability is power vulnerability, whereby certain 
groups are in an unequal position in respect of relations of power. This is where there 
is a relation of dominance and subordination, which must be contrasted with the 
affirmative sense of power, which entails composing relations with other bodies in a 
way that entails mutual enhancement of capabilities. A power relation based on 
domination and subordination is structured in such a way that a privileged person is 
in a position of political, economic or social control or influence over another person, 
who is thereby rendered particularly susceptible to abuse, insecurity and loss. 
Jennifer Nedelsky, in discussing the relational nature of humanity, gives a number of 
examples of how vulnerability may arise due to the way in which relations of power 
may be structured. These include incarceration, slavery and hierarchies of gender, 
alongside the welfare regimes which can ‘create relations of domination and 
subordination.’127 Such as, for instance, the use of caseworkers who have the ‘ability 
to withhold information about eligibility [in a way that] puts recipients in a subordinate 
position.’128 Such policies promote unequal relations of power structured by conflict, 
suspicion and disrespect. 129  
The subordination that exists in certain relations is not always capable of being 
eradicated, and it is not always possible to equalise a power relationship. This is 
clear in the example Nedelsky gives of a hierarchy of power between student and 
teacher or doctor and patient.130 There always exist in these relationships ‘hierarchies 
of knowledge.’131 The fact that it is impossible to eradicate some hierarchies does not 
prevent measures being taken to mitigate its effects and put in place measures or 
safeguards to protect against abuse. In addition, such relationships can be structured 
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in such a way that they are intended to enhance the activity of the subordinate and 
minimise passivity. A classroom, for instance, can be structured in such a way that 
class discussion encourages ‘respectful disagreement among students and with the 
professor.’ 132  The relationships therefore, although hierarchical and entailing 
subordination is oriented towards promoting the capabilities and activity of the person 
involved.  
The aim is to avoid relationships that give rise to power as negatively defined and 
related to control, appropriation, exploitation and domination. Positive becoming 
entails relations in which one ‘expresses, augments and transforms the capabilities of 
one’s body through relation to those of another body’.133 Those relations are formed 
without ‘involving the appropriation of those powers or hindering the other’s ability to 
express itself.’134 A responsible form of becoming thus entails composing relations of 
interdependence with others that enhance and augment the capabilities of both to 
affect and be affected, rather than diminishing their powers. Relations of power are 
thus not defined in reference purely to a conflict of interests. Indeed, our interests 
become intermingled and the interests of the one become bound up with the other. 
This is not to suggest that conflict cannot arise in relationships. This is inevitable 
where individuals can be driven by passive desires. In constructive relationships, 
however, driven by reason and active emotion, power is not concerned with 
domination or control of the one party over the other, but with mutually enhancing 
relations in which the good of one is the good of all. 
Insecurity Vulnerability 
One of the aspects that render people vulnerable is a lack of security. People in such 
a situation may take risks where they ‘cannot be reasonably avoided because there 
is no reasonable alternative.’135 A person with no steady access to nutrition might 
therefore take the risk of doing a job that puts them in danger.136 The decision to do 
this is not a genuine opportunity in so far as it ‘involve[s] undue cost or risk to other 
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functions.’137  Potential is no longer capable of being channelled across diverse lines 
in creative ways.  
A person who is in a position of insecurity may therefore take undue risks where no 
genuine opportunities are available. In addition, individuals who face risks may be 
required to invest their powers in defending themselves against those risks. As 
Tamsin Lorraine argues, individuals who are in a state of insecurity may not be able 
to develop their ‘capacities to perceive, feel, create and act.’138 This is because their 
capacities are ‘so invested in defending [themselves]...against someone intent 
on...[their] psychic and physical destruction that...[they are] on the verge of 
paralysis.’139 The result of such insecurity is that multiple channels of potential and 
creative becoming are blocked, as individuals invest themselves in trying to avoid 
encounters that give rise to trauma. 
Good Intention Vulnerability 
Vulnerability has thus far been considered as a reason for taking action for those in 
particular need. This is not, however, the limit to vulnerability, as once the community 
has chosen to act people remain vulnerable to the extent that it might use the wrong 
methods to address need. This puts the individual at further risk. For instance, it is 
common to institutionalise elderly people or remove them to alternative 
accommodation.140 It has been recognised in a number of reports that relocating 
elderly people to new residence can have a ‘dramatic effect on their mental health 
and life expectancy.’141 The decision to institutionalise the elderly may be aimed at 
achieving the purpose of realising the physical needs of such a person, but may 
have potential negative implication on other dimensions of humanity.  
It is necessary to be concerned not only with dignified ends, but also with dignified 
means, in terms of how the exercise of power deployed to enhance the capabilities 
of the individual can itself end up being harmful. In light of the notion of mutual 
becoming, and the interconnectedness of human life, such action can negatively 
affect not only the interests of the individuals, but also affect, as a consequence of 
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the reflexive sense of dignity, the interests of the whole. However, and as will be 
discussed later in the thesis, an individual can be expected to cooperate with others 
in terms of reasonable compromise, taking into consideration that their interests are 
also connected to the interests of others. In this way, the relationship is envisaged 
not as conflict of interests, although it may arise, but as one that pays attention to the 
viewpoint of those affected by a potential decision as cooperative participants in a 
dialogic relationship. 
2.2.9. Mutual Becoming and Reflexivity 
The investment construction of dignity is premised on the universality of 
interdependence arising from vulnerability. Crucial to this is the idea that the 
community is necessary and key to the development of our own capabilities. As 
Balibar argues:  
What is most useful to any man is other men, whose 
strength, when combined with his own, will provide him with 
greater security, prosperity and knowledge. The desire for 
self-preservation therefore rationally implies, for each man, 
that he should desire what is good for others and want to 
form a stable association with them.142  
On this account, according to Balibar, to desire the good of others is treated ‘as a 
function of my own good.’ 143  That is, to desire that others should develop their 
capabilities in creative and diverse ways enhances our own creative capabilities. This 
is because:  
Insofar as I attend to what enhances my own joy and 
power, I also attend to what will foster empowerment of 
those most like myself – that is other human beings – 
around me. If those with whom I interact become less able 
to sustain themselves, shut down, or cut off from their 
capacity to affect and be affected, then I will encounter 
others who are unable to affect me or be affected by my, 
thus impeding my own power 
It is therefore the case that the more cut off and blocked is the potential development 
of the capabilities of other individuals to affect and be affected, the more blocked will 
by my own capabilities to affect and be affected. 144  In contrast, the greater the 
capabilities of others to affect and be affected, the greater the possibility of future 
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productive and experimental encounters with those people. On this account, in what 
is reminiscent of what has been called the ‘Janus face’ of dignity, and the reflexive 
nature of dignity, it is not only in the interest of the dignity of the one in need to 
receive care and support, but it is also in the interests of the dignity of others who are 
capable of providing that support.145  
2.3. Respecting Inherent Potential through Sufficient Investment  
2.3.1. Collective Investment into Conditions that Promote Inherent Potential 
The final component concept of dignity is respect, the contents of which determine 
what action or inaction is required by people in their interactions with others. The 
nature of respect will reflect the structure of the value being respected. As an 
example, treating the value of human life as an intrinsic inviolable worth that is 
attached to rationality will entail the prohibition of anything that shows disrespect for 
that capacity, such as, for instance, dictating ethical choices. The value of creative 
potentiality, in contrast, has a structure which entails elements of the actualised and 
unrealised. The unrealised is never self-fulfilling, but is dependent on positive action. 
It requires investment in order to be realised.  In contrast, that which has already 
been actualised through investment may need protection from destruction. Respect 
may therefore denote both promoting potential via investment and respecting existing 
investment through protection.  
 
It was clear from the discussion on the concept of humanity that individual potential is 
never realised in isolation, but takes place in a complex framework of inter-
dependence. The rationale of the community is therefore to be an enabling force –  
It is not…the purpose of the state to transform men from 
rational beings into beasts or puppets, but rather to enable 
them to develop their mental and physical faculties in 
safety, to use their reason without restraint and to refrain 
from the strife and the vicious mutual abuse that are 
prompted by hatred, anger or deceit.146 
This entails a form of collective responsibility to invest in the conditions that promote 
the capabilities of all. Notably, because the potential is creative, the investment of 
the community is not about expecting to achieve an ideal end.  
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As capabilities are a matter of degree, so that a person can have greater or lesser 
powers of acting, it is necessary to deny a threshold approach to capability. Such a 
model has been criticised for being both perfectionist and for not being able to 
provide a principled justification for the point at which the threshold level should be 
set.147 This model also stands uncomfortably alongside a Spinozist construction of 
capabilities that does not depend on an ideal end point, but on experimentation, 
creativity and difference. The alternative approach to a perfectionist construction of 
dignity is to focus on prioritising investment.148 In this regard, one can appeal to the 
concept of vulnerability as an important basis for a heightening of dependency, 
requiring a greater level of investment. 
 
The heightening of dependency is particular pertinent where, as has been seen, 
groups are vulnerable due to being particularly circumscribed and isolated, so 
multiple channels of activity and becoming are blocked. The creative potentiality of 
such a person is severely  limited. This creates what Wolff and De-Shallit call a 
‘clustering of disadvantage’ in the sense that ‘there is a group, or several groups, that 
suffer from a combination of disadvantages’.149 The first possible means by which to 
reduce clustering is by adapting  relationships, living conditions, or social structures 
that disrupt multiple lines of human becoming or activity. The second possible means 
by which to de-cluster disadvantage is by prioritising basic activities, needs or 
functioning that may be a necessary precondition for any forms of further activity or 
functioning.150 Certain basic necessities of life, such as nourishment, for instance, 
may be vital so that the whole body capable of doing a great many things, as well as 
the ‘mind also…equally capable of understanding many things at once.’151  
 
Investing in activities or functioning that may be an important precondition for 
enabling a person to capable of doing many things and of being affected in many 
ways does not exhaust the responsibility of the community. As has been argued, 
vulnerable persons may live highly circumscribed and isolated lives, whereby multiple 
channels of human activity are cut off or blocked. In certain cases, it will not be 
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possible to enable the person to vary in many ways due, for instance, to illness or 
frailty. In fact, deterioration in our capability to affect and be affected may only 
intensify and multiply over time in a manner that cannot be prevented. Whilst it may 
not be possible to prevent the harm from occurring, it is possible to take measures to 
preserve, as far as possible, the remaining access and control over those activities a 
person can engage in.152 Where a person must live a highly circumscribed or isolated 
life, anything which further impacts upon remaining activity is of equal importance.  
2.3.2. Active Investment, Reason and Productive Encounters 
The investment of the community into the conditions necessary for the promotion of 
different channels of human potential, enabling space in which individuals are 
capable of realising ever divergent ends and can actively realise their striving in their 
own distinctive way. Moreover, it provides the foundation for the protection of the 
whole person, so that it may be equally capable of performing all the actions which 
necessarily follow from its striving, and the mind equally capable of understanding 
many things simultaneously.153 This, as discussed in more detail below, provides 
space for individuals to creatively unfold their potential, experiment with new 
connections and forms of engagement, and develop more life-enhancing styles of 
living. People become more active, and less passive, to the extent that they develop 
more adequate ideas that enable them to distinguish between those ‘affects, 
relations, ways of thinking, and, ultimately, ways of living that are life - affirming, 
joyous, and active and those that are life-negating, sad, and reactive.’154 Reason is 
conceived as having ideas that are as adequate as humanly possible, and which are 
to the greatest degree ‘caused by our own essential power or conatus’.155 Such 
ideas guide our actions by helping to determine as clearly as possible the value of 
various external goods, in terms of understanding that which contributes to and 
enhances our power, so that ‘we may plan our lives accordingly.’156 A person is most 
active, and thus free, on this account, when they act from, and are guided by, such 
reasons.  
Notably, in a Spinozist and Deleuzian framework, reason takes on a very different 
form from the Kantian model of deontological dignity. Reason is not a capacity that 
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exists in an isolated subject, but is developed through encounters with external 
powers and it is developed through the process of becoming active. A person over 
the course of life will encounter bodies that ‘agree with ours, [although] we do not yet 
have the adequate idea of these other bodies or of ourselves, but we experience 
joyful passions (an increase of our power of acting)’.157 These passive encounters 
represent random or experimental experiences and desires, which can be gradually 
replaced with active encounters; once a person forms an ‘adequate idea of what is 
common to these bodies and our own’. 158   A person becomes active and the 
adequate cause of actions, when he understands the reasons why an encounter was 
productive, forming common notions that explain the composition with external 
powers.159  Individuals are able, though the comprehension of the common notions, 
to actively deduce from the existing composition ‘other relations (reasoning) and on 
this basis of which one experiences new feelings, active ones this time.’160 
Respect for an individual therefore entails the protection and encouragement of this 
process of movement from passivity to activity, although it is never entirely possible 
or desirable to remove all passivity from life. Initial passivity is the condition of our 
activity, and can aid our becoming active. Reason consists in adequately 
understanding how our power depends on and needs the power of other things. The 
development of such reason exists largely in having ‘certain sorts of interactions and 
relationships with others.’ 161  Gaining adequate reason does not consist in 
overcoming our dependence, but rather in enabling an individual to more skilfully, 
and actively, invest in establishing productive encounters, comprehending the 
reasons why some are positive. In this respect, becoming more reasonable, and 
therefore more active, provides greater stability and security to the striving of the 
individual, as they know with a greater degree of certainty what enhances their 
power.   
It is important as this stage to note that, unlike some deontological accounts, a 
capacity for reason, which is treated as an essential property of moral agents and 
the ground for moral obligation, is not the sole foundation of the dignity of the human 
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person in the investment concept. It is undoubtedly the case that the investment 
concept treats reason, and the capacity to exercise it, as an important component in 
the realisation of our striving, as it enables a person to act from their own power and 
to select those encounters that will increase their power. This provides a different 
basis for valuing reason, and therefore freedom, then one that focuses on treating it 
as a condition of moral agency.162 Reason is not the only aspect of dignity, for it also 
consists in the joyous increase in our power or activity, in our vulnerability, 
particularly being dependent on other things that sustain or enhance our power, and 
those relations that compound with our own to increase our capacity to affect and be 
affected. Reason is connected to these elements. It is formed through being affected 
by the experience of external things, and through the development of knowledge as 
to why certain encounters are joyful. In this respect, reason does not play a 
foundational role, but is rather part of a holistic assessment of the dignity of the 
individual, which entails different dimensions of human personality in an integrated 
framework.    
2.3.3. Individual Responsibility and Active Agency 
The capacity for reason has sometimes been connected to human agency, which, in 
turn, has been treated as the condition for individual responsibility, at least in some 
deontological accounts of human dignity. The ability of an agent to take responsibility 
for their actions that flow from their ‘free will’ has been considered a necessary 
aspect of respect for human dignity. However, it was noted in the previous chapter 
that such approaches are not without their problems, particularly in terms of 
abandoning negligent victims, adding to the vulnerability of dependent caretakers, 
and leaving unaddressed the broader social and political conditions that structure 
human interactions. A Spinozist framework, it is suggested, provides a means to 
address resolve some of these problems, whilst, at the same time, providing an 
alternative grounds for holding people accountable for their actions.   
According to Spinoza, a person acts rationally, and thus autonomously, when their 
desires and passions are not at the mercy of inadequate ideas.163 This entails a 
substantive account of rationality, which means that a person acts freely when they 
have ‘reasons, which implies that freedom also requires having the knowledge that 
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serves as and justifies reasons’. 164  It thus follows the freedom of a person is 
‘promoted by having knowledge.’165 Such reason is not ‘an alien power, forcing us to 
act in accordance with its demands, but rather, our essential nature’ which is our 
striving to sustain and increase our activity.166 As discussed further below, such 
reason does not entail identical modes of living, for people are free to realise their 
essence in their own way, realising those desires and needs which enhance its 
striving, and the development of adequate ideas of those things. 
A person is an inadequate cause, and irrational, when they are at the mercy of 
inadequate ideas, which includes acting in contravention of their power. These 
include, for instance, the cases of drug addicts, compulsive gamblers and 
kleptomaniacs. They are partially caused by forces and causes external to the 
striving of the individual, so the person is not the fully adequate cause of their 
actions.167 The consequence is that no one can fully be the adequate cause of their 
destructive passions, but someone can be the adequate cause of their productive 
actions.  
The substantive approach to rational decision-making consists in using reason, 
which means having adequate ideas. One of the potential implications of this 
approach is that it might promote autonomy to prevent a person from irrational 
preferences or to force them to behave rationally. This issue is addressed further 
below. It is sufficient at this stage to note that a number of aspects of Spinoza’s 
thought limit the possibility of paternalism, which is sometimes a criticism directed at 
dignity. First, and as Mathew Kizner argues, for Spinoza ‘force and manipulation’ 
cannot promote our activity or striving.168  Spinoza is clear that it is not possible to 
‘force one to be autonomous by providing her with the adequate ideas required to 
recognise the right course of action.’169 In this respect, manipulation and coercion of 
the body may not entail a corresponding increase in the activity of the mind. Indeed, 
such coercion may render the mind, and in turn the body, more passive because it 
can lead a person to suffer humiliation, or mental distress.  
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Spinoza distinguishes paternalism from domination. In order to be permissible 
paternalism, rather than unacceptable domination, it must have the ‘good of the 
[person] as its chief aim and, furthermore, it must succeed in this aim’.170 This may 
well be unachievable if such action leads to loss of self-respect and greater passivity 
in the form of distress and humiliation. Moreover, in order to succeed in the aim, it 
must be possible to ‘objectively know the right course of action’ in relation to what 
enhance the striving of the other, which may not be possible as it is unclear as to 
how it might affect the unique striving of the person.171  The final way in which 
Spinoza limits recourse to paternalism is through the argument that rationality is 
equivalent to knowledge. In this respect, allowing someone to ‘learn their own 
lessons, which mean making their own choices, even if mistaken’ can enable 
someone to gain knowledge and see the ‘error of their ways’.172  
Spinoza develops an ‘asymmetrical’ conception of agency, which suggests that a 
person can be the adequate cause of their positive affects, but not the fully adequate 
cause of their passive and destructive affects. Such a model may be considered 
antagonistic to notions of individual responsibility which, as noted above, has been 
treated as a central aspect of some deontological concepts of dignity.  However, 
Spinoza does argue that people can be held responsible for their destructive actions, 
even though they are not the fully adequate cause of those actions, and thus not 
completely free. First, Spinoza argues that blame and praise can be useful by 
providing more powerful affects that prevent people from harming one another and 
as a means of promoting social harmony.173 Punishment may also be useful as a 
means of self-protection against those prone to act on certain passive affects.174  
A number of scholars have argued that a form of moral responsibility is inherent in 
Spinoza’s theory.175  Kizner argues that Spinoza’s ethics ‘directs us to a better life, 
which presupposes that we can be responsible to ourselves’ in terms of 
understanding our passions and seeking to cultivate more adequate ideas and 
knowledge, so that one can attain a higher degree of activity and freedom. 
Consciousness of our ideas makes possibility reflexivity, so that a person can reflect 
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on their nature and environment, and positively act to affect them both.  In this 
respect, a person can be responsible in terms of developing and realising adequate 
ideas, which are related to personal character and beliefs. This personal character 
will determine the affect of external causes on the psychological processes of the 
individual. Thus, even though the decisions of a person may be causally determined, 
how they unfold is ‘determined by us, our particular beliefs, character and thought 
processes.’176  A failure to cultivate adequate ideas and engage in self-reflection can 
leave a person prone to being pushed around and easily swayed by negative 
emotions.  
To see people as only a partial cause of their destructive activity enables us to 
undermine resentment and ensure a more productive encounter. This includes 
attending to the social and political forces that may have contributed to the formation 
of destructive affects upon which a person is prone to act. Such knowledge can be 
useful for the purposes of allowing the individual to deconstruct those forces and 
enable them to reconstruct a more productive future becoming. Understanding the 
potential factors affecting historical events, leads to ‘reworking these events in the 
direction of positive relations.’177 Such knowledge is also useful to the collective, as it 
enables it to address those frameworks that may contribute to the formation of 
destructive behaviour.  
   
This perspective on moral responsibility can also lead to a more positive response to 
the suffering of those who might be considered negligent victims. Rather than 
abandoning them on the basis that they are responsible for their destructive acts 
which have led them to personal harm, a Spinozist approach can recognise that a 
person may not be the fully adequate cause of that harm. A person, for instance, 
who loses their job as a consequence of undisciplined and unreliable behaviour, may 
not have developed the capability to respond effectively to discipline because they 
were previously subjected to ‘generally horrible treatment as a child and [a lack] of 
proper early training.’ 178  Such a person should not simply be ‘left to bear the 
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consequences’ without welfare assistance or social responsibility.179 This does not 
mean that the community owes responsibility to citizens to enable lives solely 
dedicated leisure and personal pleasure. Such a form of functioning would not be 
reasonable on a Spinozist view, and would not contribute to the striving of the whole 
person or the striving of others.  
2.4. Conclusion 
It is now possible to bring together the three components of dignity, as an investment 
concept. Dignity has been constructed by emphasising the value of human life as 
inherent potential, which is realised by the interdependency of humanity seeking a 
diverse set of powers of action and rest. The concept of respect requires collective 
investment into the conditions that promote those powers of acting, whilst reason 
allows individuals to engage in a process of self-creation by selecting and organising 
good encounters, working out why such encounters are significant to the particular 
individual. This enables the channelling of potential in diverse and creative 
directions.   
3. Testing the Investment Construction of Human Dignity  
3.1. Test I: A Defence  
The concluding section of this chapter assesses this investment conception against 
some of the concerns expressed about the concept of dignity, which were introduced 
in the introduction and further discussed in chapter one. These include concerns that 
dignity, and its conceptions, are vague, perfectionist, exclusionary and indistinct. 
This section argues that the investment construction of dignity avoids these 
problems, or provides alternative perspectives on the criticisms. 
3.1.1. Inclusion of the ‘Other’  
A criticism directed at conceptions of dignity highlighted in the previous chapter was 
the exclusionary effect of approaches that situate the value of humanity in a singular 
dimension of human personality. This includes approaches that treat as the ‘norm’ 
the able bodied, rational, self-reliant and independent person. Many of the existing 
accounts of dignity emphasise the importance of rationality and autonomy. The 
implication of this is that certain groups are treated as a deviation because they are, 
for instance, disabled, lacking capacity, and dependent on others for care. Other 
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dimensions of humanity are lost and find no place within such a theory. The 
investment conception of dignity avoids the negative implications of this by adopting 
a holistic approach to humanity, which recognises the value of a broader range of 
human dimensions. This includes, as an example, treating emotions as ethically 
significant aspects of humanity and the relationships between persons.180 Valuing 
dimensions of humanity beyond a limited range of rational thought thereby entails a 
more inclusive conception of dignity.  
    
The investment construction draws the experiences of those at the boundaries of 
existing conceptions of human dignity into the centre. Thus, for instance, 
dependence, care and vulnerability are treated as universal (and valued) aspects of 
the human condition. This replaces the dualistic approach to humanity that prioritises 
certain dominant traits that define the paradigm over an inferior subordinate trait that 
defines the deviation from the paradigm. This includes the dualisms of independent 
(norm) - dependent (deviation), invulnerable (norm) - vulnerable (deviation), and 
rational (norm) – emotional (deviation). Investment dignity replaces the idea that 
there is a binary distinction, for instance, between the independent and dependent, 
in favour of recognising a continuous difference in degree across a spectrum of 
mutual dependence.  
3.1.2. Addressing Vagueness 
The charge that dignity is useless because it is vague or vacuous is not rebutted by 
providing an abstract account of dignity that deterministically resolves problems in 
advance of a particular situation. This criticism commonly approaches the concept 
from the expectation that it should have a clear and consistent meaning that is 
capable of being applied. This criticism is addressed by reframing the nature of the 
debate so that what might be perceived as vagueness is actually positively valued 
and understood as enabling openness. A concept like dignity is not amenable to a 
dictionary style definition. Its power lies in being dynamic, open and expansive. 
‘Openness’ is used here in the sense deployed by Henri Bergson to denote 
responsiveness to the other, receptiveness to singularity, acceptance of creativity 
and is the opposite of a closed ethics based on preference, exclusion, and 
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immobility.181 The ‘openness’ of a concept is potentially a key advantage to its ability 
to respond to the nature of human life, which is marked by its specificity, creativity 
and difference that emerges in time. Responsiveness to the ‘other’ entails 
addressing the concerns and needs of those whose interests are not adequately 
recognised or protected because of their difference, which means they fall outside 
the existing protection afforded by the norm. Conceptual openness enables those 
marginalised because of their difference to actively participate in the formation of the 
content of the concept in the way that can adequately further their interests.  
It is not enough to observe that the overall concept of dignity is dynamic, mobile, and 
open, as demonstrated through the way different conceptions of dignity have been 
developed to address different problems. It is important, according to Deleuze, to 
also formulate intellectually mobile concepts that are themselves capable of being 
continuously renewed and adapted in relation to the creative unfolding of time.182 
Such a conception is more likely to endure then others, precisely because it is 
dynamic and capable of continued variation as a perpetual work-in-progress.183 In 
this respect, a certain conception of dignity will persist because it is constructed in a 
way that positively requires responsiveness to the other, receptiveness to singularity, 
and acceptance of creative movement. Whilst conceptual openness can enable 
these things, it does not ultimately require them. To say that a concept has an open 
texture is not the same as saying that it will necessarily be used, although it has the 
capacity be used, to that end. It is therefore necessary to construct a concept that 
directs us to be open to singularity, otherness, creativity and difference. Such a 
concept will not provide a resolution to each case, as if it could be deployed in 
advance to determine clearly each situation in the same manner. In this way it does 
not resolve the ‘vagueness’ criticism, precisely because it does not understand the 
value of a concept as being exclusively defined by its ability to recognise or 
determine instances. Rather, it will require that the concept to be given further 
meaning through continued reflection on the demands of each new situation.  
The investment construct positively requires openness in this sense. It does so 
through, for instance, recognising that an adequate idea of those connections that 
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might enhance the capability of a person to affect and be affected may only be 
understood in a context-specific fashion and will only gain concrete content through 
reflection on the experiences of those in a particular relationship. Respecting the 
concept of investment dignity therefore entails being open to understanding what will 
enhance the capabilities of another person through responsiveness and continued 
dynamic engagement in each new encounter. A number of the different component 
concepts of investment dignity are intellectually mobile in this way. Such concepts 
undoubtedly help to set out some of the factors that are relevant in a consideration of 
a situation, and help to constitute the context to be considered, but they also direct 
us to be open to the changing dynamics of life, which require singular and 
personalised responses.184 Vulnerability, for instance, has been defined, in part, as 
our porosity, receptivity, impressionability, affectivity and permeability, which is the 
condition of both our activity and passivity. It is impossible as part of this shared 
vulnerability ‘to predict, control, and fully know that to which we are open and how it 
will affect us.’185 On this account, knowledge of what will promote or diminish the 
activity of a person cannot be known or determined entirely in advance, but can only 
be understood through experience and being open to developing various forms of 
connections and combinations with our surroundings. Such a concept is not pinned 
down with a static meaning, but is one that moves us to experiment and reflect on 
our different interactions or connections.  
3.1.3. Responding to Lived Experience  
The separate criticism that certain conceptions of dignity, through abstraction, or 
distortion, do not reflect the experiences of particular groups is addressed through 
the openness of the investment concept. As noted above, an understanding of what 
will enhance the capability of a person to affect and be affected is not determined on 
the basis of abstraction, through a process of reasoning independent of the 
interactions and encounters between persons in their concrete context, and without 
dwelling on the singularity and specificity of that engagement.  
An understanding of what a person is capable of doing and what they are 
undergoing in grounded is practice rather than in the adherence to abstract rules, 
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and is evaluated from ‘within the experience of affecting and being affected’.186 This 
thereby focuses attention on ‘concrete individuals in their singularity and in relations 
with other unique individuals’.187 Investment dignity is dependent upon a Deleuzian 
ethology, which is ‘rooted in and grows out of experience rather than being purified 
of experiential elements’.188 It is only through experience and experimentation that it 
is possible to ‘discern the differences between those things that can be said to be 
good for us and those that are bad for us, and devise for oneself such a typology of 
ways of living.’189 The implication of this is an account of dignity that is ‘more alert to 
the ‘real experience’ of bodies in their everyday encounters’.190  
3.1.4. Enabling Freedom 
One of the key criticisms of the concept of dignity that was highlighted in the 
previous chapter was that dignity is used to override autonomy and freedom. A 
Spinozist based construction of human dignity does enable space for human 
freedom, although this is not an individualistic conception of negative freedom that 
entails merely the absence of government interference. Freedom encompasses 
‘acting from one’s own power’, which entails striving to be active as the adequate 
cause of one’s own affects, rather than being passively controlled by external 
causes. Spinoza is concerned with a conception of freedom that entails the ‘greatest 
degree of activity and self-determination achievable by us’.191 The good, as noted 
above, is understood as that which promotes that activity and power, which opens up 
multiple lines of becoming and ever divergent ends, and increases what a person 
can do or become.  
 
Spinoza recognises that the ability to develop reason and, thereby become an active 
agent, depends on having ‘sorts of interactions and relationships with others and, 
consequently, on the broader social and political conditions that structure and 
determine these interactions.’ 192  It depends on a particular relational nexus that 
provides a fertile environment for the growth and development of individual 
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identity.193 This conception of freedom entails more than a purely psychological or 
mind-based view of personal autonomy concerned with ‘requiring that we choose our 
actions’ or interactions.194 It also encompasses the embodied nature of the self, so 
that a person becomes more rational, and hence autonomous, to the extent that they 
develop adequate ideas about that which increases the activity of the body. The 
conception of self is thus embodied and relational, but also affective. Acting from the 
emotion of joy provides an invaluable ‘guide to action’ and a barometer that indicates 
whether their power has increased.195 Emotions are thus not so much opposed to 
freedom, but are rather necessary ‘conditions for our activity…[and] help to promote 
our activity’.196 
 
The investment construction further avoids the criticism that it is paternalistic by 
adopting a Spinozist conception of human striving that supports space for creativity, 
experimentation and difference. Investment dignity values human life by reference to 
creative potentiality, which is the capacity for ‘new engagement, breaking or 
transforming received patterns, giving rise to and acting on one’s own distinctive 
perceptions, insights, and forms of engagement’. 197  These forms of new 
engagement, as noted earlier, lead to an expansion of possibility, creating ever more 
series of becoming, which, when unfolded, entail new unexplored possibilities of 
transformation, perception and engagement.198  This is closely aligned with some 
relational accounts of autonomy, which emphasises the capacity for creative 
interaction as an important component of that concept.199  
 
Investment dignity, as noted above, does not depend on being able to determine in 
advance a reliable blueprint for human development, but depends on an 
experimental ethos. This entails ongoing exploration of the affects of which one is 
capable through experimental relations with the world and others. Such a conception 
therefore requires an ‘open-ended process that explores what’s new and what’s 
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coming into being rather than something already experienced and known, 
experimentation is inseparable from innovation and discovery.’ 200  Freedom is 
supported on this model through the ability of each to unfold their potentiality in 
different ways, and with creative exploration of that which enhances our activity and 
development.  
3.1.5. Endorsing Creativity 
The final criticism directed at existing accounts of dignity in the previous chapter was 
the way in which they were obstructive of the realisation, creation and discovery of 
the new. Some conceptions obstruct the unfolding of the creative tendencies and 
potential in the present in ways that may lead to more active, joyous, intensive and 
divergent forms of human existence. Such approaches restrict understanding to a 
process of recognition, which is concerned with correct identification of relatively 
stable configurations and existing manifest forms.201 This strips situations, forms and 
encounters of their dynamic and creative tendencies in favour of their stable or 
already given forms.202 
The investment construction, in contrast, understands persons in their interactions 
with others not just in terms of what is overtly manifest to them or as a set of static 
properties or characteristics. It takes into account the idea that humanity is ‘replete 
with virtual tendencies as well as actual components’.203 Humanity is a creative and 
dynamic force that plays our and through its interactions with the surrounding 
processes and forces of life, as well as the environment that sustain and affect us. 
What are real are not only the forms of human life that have actually emerged, but 
the dynamic tendencies and creative potentials that could unfold in many more ways 
than actually do occur enabling new connections that break with routine and open up 
new perceptions, new affects, new thoughts and new ways of becoming.204 Such 
potentialities can only be intuitively grasped by looking beyond existing habits, 
categories, and models in order to experiment with tendencies that might have been 
overlooked.205  
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3.2. Test II: Anchoring the Concept in Law 
One of the difficulties highlighted with the other conceptions of dignity is that they do 
not relate to our legal practices and were not immanent possibilities.206 It is argued 
here that inherent within human rights practice is the possibility for the realisation of 
the investment construction of dignity. This will be established by explaining how 
each dimension of an investment construction of human dignity can be connected to 
international practice, although there is no perfect symmetry between the two. This 
broadly includes a consideration of how international practice can be connected to 
the social, bodily, mental and recreational dimensions of human personality.  
Some of these rights, particularly socio-economic rights, are protected through the 
existence of a minimum core, a reducible obligation on the State to protect certain 
essential needs without which a ‘right would be unrecognizable or meaningless.’ A 
minimum core encompasses those conditions essential to the unfolding and 
development of personality. The Indian Supreme Court has, for instance, argued that 
a life in human dignity includes the ‘bare necessities of life and also the right to carry 
on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of the 
human self.’207 The concept of a minimum core may be useful to denote a basic set 
of standards that enable individuals to realise creative potential by engaging in any 
form of activity at all. Other rights may require progressive realisation, whereby the 
State takes positive steps to fulfil certain human rights. Authorities would therefore 
by under an obligation to justify any measure that sort to retract and deny an ongoing 
investment into the conditions that promote the capabilities of all.  
3.2.1. Bodily Dimension 
The bodily dimension of human life is just as important to human dignity as the 
mental dimension. It was argued earlier that whatever increases or sustains the 
body’s power of acting is good for a person, whereas whatever decreases or 
destroys that power is bad. This entails, as Deleuze claims, an effort to ‘organize 
encounters on the basis of perceived agreements and disagreements’ between 
bodies.208 If the human body is ‘to be preserved [it]...requires a great many other 
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bodies, by which it is, as it were, continually regenerated.’209 Our power of acting 
therefore requires access to bodies that will compose with our own to enhance or 
protect capability, whereas it requires protection from bodies that will harm or 
decompose our capability.  
As Spinoza argues, our power of acting depends on those “goods as are sufficient 
for sustaining life and health.”210 Related to this, is Spinoza’s claim that the ‘human 
body is composed of a great number of parts of diverse nature, which constantly 
need new and varied nourishment.’ 211  A number of important provisions in 
international law, designed to protect human dignity and human rights, explicitly 
recognise the need to provide basic necessities for the preservation of health.212 
Alongside the provision of basic needs, international practice has also included the 
provision of health care as a “pre-requisite for the preservation of human dignity.”213 
A right to adequate health care is recognised in the terms of various international 
instruments.214  This includes a right to enjoy the “highest attainable standard of 
physical and mental health.”215  
 
The provision of shelter is also included in many international instruments. The 
connections to human dignity have been made explicit by a number of international 
bodies. Thus, the ECrtHR has held that “it is clearly desirable that every human 
being has a place where he or she can live in dignity.”216 In General Comment 
Number 4, the CESCR has stated that –  
 
[T]he inherent dignity of the human person from which the 
rights in the Covenant are said to derive requires that the 
term "housing" be interpreted so as to take account of a 
variety of other considerations, most importantly that the 
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right to housing should be ensured to all persons 
irrespective of income.217 
Human dignity plays a foundational role, in grounding a right to access housing, and 
as a justification for the argument that housing should not be interpreted in narrow or 
restrictive sense that equates it with possession of a roof over one’s head. Dignity is 
connected to the concepts of adequacy, security and the protection of psychological 
health. 218 The feeling of helplessness and utter destitution resulting from 
homelessness is a significant stress factor that can lead to psychological illness.219 
Shelter is therefore a necessary condition for the protection of a holistic conception 
of human personality.  
The protection of an individual’s health is closely related to the protection of 
individuals from pain. As Spinoza argues, pain ‘diminishes or constrains a man’s 
power of activity...in proportion as the pain is greater, so also is it necessarily 
opposed to a greater part of man’s power of activity.’220Clearly a person who suffers 
from chronic pain when moving will be deterred from engaging in a whole variety of 
activities, whilst pain at rest, such as arthritis, will make rest periods ineffective. 
Inflicted pain may be used as a technique of subordination, particularly in torture. 
Importantly, pain is not a singular phenomenon but affects the body and mind in a 
plurality of ways.221 
It is clear that international human rights practice recognises in principle the need to 
avoid the infliction of physical pain. Thus, it has long been recognised under Art 3 
ECHR that severe mental and physical suffering is prohibited, so long as it meets 
the minimum level of severity. 222  This includes a positive obligation to protect 
individuals from the infliction of severe pain by a third party, although not measures 
to avoid naturally occurring pain, unless exacerbated by state activity.223 If it does 
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not meet the necessary level of severity it may still be encapsulated within the right 
to private life under Art 8 ECHR, which includes both positive and negative 
obligations to avoid suffering.224 Closely connected to the protection of bodily health 
and prevention of pain is the protection of bodily integrity of the individual, which 
has been closely associated with the concept of human dignity..225 
3.2.2. Psychological Dimension 
The holistic account of humanity in the investment construction of dignity includes 
psychological dimension of personality. This includes, importantly, the ability to 
develop ones power of thinking by increasing adequate ideas and developing the 
imaginative capacity of individuals. This will necessarily entail a right to an education. 
International instruments make clear the connection between education and human 
dignity. Thus, the ICESCR clearly states that “education shall be directed to the full 
development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity.”226 Similarly, the 
CRPD requires the establishment of an inclusive education system directed towards 
‘the full development of human potential and sense of dignity and self-worth.’227 
There is in this right a clear connection between human potential and human dignity, 
with education being perceived holistically in terms of not only the imparting of 
information, but the development of human personality. 
Promoting of the activity of the mind entails more than just education. It may also, for 
example, entail the ability to produce and experience creative works. Many 
international instruments recognise the ability to produce such creative work through 
freedom of expression clauses, or freedom of conscience clauses. 228  Some 
instruments go further in recognising the need for appropriate measures to enable 
persons to develop their ‘creative, artistic and intellectual potential.’229  
As was demonstrated earlier in the chapter, some emotional experiences are 
harmful to our power of acting, both bodily and mentally. This includes those 
passions that Spinoza defines as sad in that they ‘diminish our power to think and to 
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act.’230 Emotions such as disgust, shame, anxiety, humiliation and distress may lead 
people to hide, or isolate themselves from others.231 The recognition that negative 
emotional experiences must not be inflicted, or must be prevented, has been 
recognised by the ECrtHR in the interpretation of Art 3. The Court has therefore held 
that Art 3 will be violated –  
Where treatment humiliates or debases an individual, 
showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her 
human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or 
inferiority capable of breaking an individual's moral and 
physical resistance, it may be characterised as degrading 
and also fall within the prohibition of Article 3.232 
There is here reference to a number of negative emotional responses, although they 
will have to attain the minimum level of severity to constitute a violation of Art 3. The 
ECrtHR has also held violations of Art 8 where a person has been subjected to gross 
humiliation233, severe embarrassment234, stress and anxiety.235  
The positive or joyful emotional responses connected with the increase in our power 
and activity is less easily translated into a legal framework. Emotions like love, 
gratitude and gladness are important emotions people should be able to 
experience.236  Whilst all of these are important to bodily and mental well-being they 
do not figure as rights in law. However, the state may still be under an obligation to 
promote, permit and recognise relationships that are the source of positive 
emotions.237 In this regard, international human rights law has long recognised the 
right to respect for family life, as well as the right to marry and found a family.238 The 
promotion of positive emotions can also be realised through education, as the 
ICESCR recognises –  
“[E]ducation shall…promote understanding, tolerance and 
friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or 
religious groups... “239 
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In this regard the CRPD recognises a clear obligation on the state to engage in 
awareness-raising so that the community is capable of understanding the effects, 
contributions and positive capabilities of individuals with disability.240 
3.2.3. Social Dimension 
Integration into society and the ability to develop relationships are both key elements 
of an investment construction of dignity. It has been argued that connections and 
combining with other people and nonhuman others is important to the enhancement 
of our own activity. This social dimension to dignity has been recognised expressly in 
various international instruments. Thus, for instance, the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights states that - 
The Union recognises and respects the right of persons 
with disabilities to benefit from measures designed to 
ensure their independence, social and occupational 
integration and participation in the life of the community.241 
The CRPD has similarly recognised an obligation to include all disabled individuals 
within the community.242 At the regional level, the ECrtHR has held that Art 8 entails 
to a degree the right to establish and develop relationships with other human 
beings.243 In this respect, the personality of an individual is recognised as taking 
place in community and does not develop in isolation, but in relation to other human 
beings.244 
3.2.4. Recreational Dimension 
One of the key dimensions of an investment concept of dignity is the idea of rest and 
recreation. As was argued earlier, the ability of individuals to rest and enjoy 
recreational activities is important in order to avoid stress. In addition, it is essential 
to the joyful and creative expansion of bodily and mental activity. In this regard, the 
importance of rest and recreation has long been recognised by the international 
community as a right in need of protection.245 
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The obligation on the state to regulate working hours and ensure holidays for 
employees has been established in the ICESCR.246 Unsurprisingly, in light of the 
importance of play to childhood development, the International Convention on the 
Rights of the Child has a specific provision requiring State Parties to ‘recognize the 
right of the child to rest and leisure, to engage in play and recreational activities 
appropriate to the age of the child.’247 The right to participate in recreational activity 
also entails a particular obligation to promote accessibility to groups who may have 
been historically excluded. Thus, the CRPD states that persons with disabilities 
should have ‘access to sporting, recreational and tourism venues.’248   
 
4. Conclusion 
The three component concepts of dignity have been assembled in a distinct way by 
reference to the idea that human life has this potential is promoted by investment 
into conditions that promote the powers of individuals, for action and rest, 
simultaneously for both mind and body. The provision of these opportunities allow for 
individuals to take on an active role in seeking out and experimenting with productive 
encounters by connecting with other people and their surroundings. In so far as this 
potential is not self-realising, it was argued that all were interdependent and 
vulnerable in the process of becoming.   
Once the theoretical ground work was put in place, the concluding section of this 
Chapter established the ways that this conception could already be connected to 
existing international legal practice. It was argued that existing human rights practice 
is already significantly committed to a number of capabilities that enable diverse 
channels of human activity. It is in light of these connections that the following 
chapters will begin to assess the actual protection afforded to dignity in the legal 
system in the United Kingdom.  
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Chapter Three: Potential Protection in the Common Law 
1. Introduction 
The previous chapter established a theoretical conception of human dignity and 
concluded by testing that conception by considering how it could be connected to 
legal practice. In the absence of a codified constitution, a possible further conduit for 
the potential protection of investment dignity in England and Wales is the common 
law. This chapter therefore continues to test the investment concept of human dignity 
by connecting it to the reality and practice of the common law.  
The common law provides an important testing ground in light of the fact that human 
dignity is already being used as a legal value in the law of England and Wales with 
increasing frequency and breadth. David Feldman, in the first and leading 
commentary on the role of human dignity in English Law, noted in 2000 that human 
dignity was a value incidentally protected by the common law.1 This did not really 
represent, for Feldman, a ‘developed role [for dignity] in the constitution of the United 
Kingdom’.2 However, a statistical analysis of official law reports show that, since 
2000, human dignity discourse has undergone ‘exponential growth’ both 
quantitatively and qualitatively.3 In quantitative terms, since 2000, dignity has been 
referred to by judges in higher courts in 882 cases, compared to 184 cases referring 
to the concept in the previous fourteen years.4 In qualitative terms, higher courts 
have begun to refer to the concept across a staggeringly wide range of legal issues. 
This compares with the previous fourteen years in which the vast majority of cases 
referred to the dignity of the State and the conduct of parties during judicial 
proceedings. 
Considering the growth in human dignity jurisprudence in the common law provides 
a new and useful insight in to the potential meaning and relevance of a concept, 
which, unlike in other jurisdictions, does not perform a ‘never-again’ or ‘never-forget’ 
                                                          
1
 David Feldman ‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 2’ (2000) PL 61, 61. 
2
 Ibid.  
3
 Gay Moon and Robin Allen, Dignity discourse in discrimination law: a better rout to equality?’ (2006) 
EHRLR 610, 614-615. 
4
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function.5  It can shed new light on the use of a concept that has predominantly been 
associated with (or studied in) a codified constitutional context. In these contexts 
dignity has usually served an ideological purpose, as a response to totalitarian 
experiences or a reaction to a constitutional crisis.6 The introduction of dignity as a 
sharp rupture from a repressive past is not an experience familiar to the English 
common law, which is a very different environment for the development of human 
dignity, built, as it is, on stability through legal continuity and incremental 
development.7 In fact, the common law appears to avoid deductions drawn from a 
broad code of rights based on a particular ideology or an abstract principle, such as 
dignity.8 Nevertheless, human dignity has developed in the common law to address 
problems that alternative concepts, familiar to the common law, may be less capable 
of resolving, emerging predominantly in the novel field of biotechnology.9  
 
It is clear that reference to dignity can no longer be treated as a random 
phenomenon in the common law of England and Wales, although doubts still remain 
about its ability to embrace and protect such a concept. Despite its growing use, 
there have been few concerted attempts to systematically conceptualise its judicial 
use. Thus, unlike in many other jurisdictions, there has been little effort to ground the 
development of dignity in the law of England and Wales within a particular structure 
of philosophical thought or to conceive of how the British vision of dignity reflects a 
particular conception of humanity.10 This is perhaps due to the fact that there is no 
singular locus, such as a constitutional right to dignity, around which the concept has 
been developed, and because the common law has traditionally ‘evolved through ad 
hoc, piecemeal, case-by-case resolution of narrowly defined issues’. 11  The 
developments surrounding dignity are more scattered and less likely to have arisen 
on the basis of some coherent philosophical vision of the concept. The fact that 
judges rarely specify the sense in which human dignity is being used in any 
                                                          
5
 Stuart Woolman, ‘Dignity’ in Stuart Woolman and T Roux, Constitutional Law of South Africa (2002 
Kenwyn) 36-4.  
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 See David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (OUP, 2002) 131.  
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Press 2013) 1–27. 
8
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9
 Charles Foster, Human Dignity in Bioethics and Law (Hart 2011) 40.  
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particular case, which can often be amenable to alternative interpretations, has 
further contributed to a less systematic understanding of dignity.12  
Far from treating these aspects of the common law as barriers to understanding the 
concept of dignity, or to its suitability for the common law, this chapter argues that 
such qualities are associated with its unfinishable nature, as a dynamic, 
experimental, inductive, open, responsive, experience-based and evolving body of 
law. These features, it is argued in this chapter, are essential to the protection and 
promotion of an investment construction of human dignity, as that concept is 
developed in relation to the concrete context and the person-specific needs of 
individual in their relational network that adapts over time. In this respect, it is argued 
the common law is the very type of legal system that is needed in order to protect the 
investment concept.  
Moreover, it is argued that the investment concept provides reasons for positively 
requiring the common law to be responsive to lived experience, open to change, and 
attentive to difference. Investment dignity is based on the creative potentiality of 
human life, which claims that an understanding of what will enhance our capability to 
affect and be affected always remains to be discovered within the experience of our 
relationship with other unique individuals, and through our engagement with our ever 
changing surroundings. In this respect, the investment concept is the first theoretical 
framework that has been developed with a particular consideration of the common 
law spirit in mind, relying upon and supporting its distinctive method.  
In light of the common law method, it is unlikely that a complete and systematic 
picture will ever emerge as to the meaning of the concept of human dignity adopted 
by the judiciary. Indeed, expecting such a complete and systematic development 
may be dangerous in the way that it would codify the system and limit the potential 
for development. However, a theoretical approach to dignity may still be useful as a 
means by which to enable the judiciary to focus attention on certain developing 
strands in the case-law and to make connections between these strands.. Such an 
approach does not entail providing a definitive account of the concept of dignity 
adopted in all cases, but rather entails extracting particular ‘tendencies’ or 
‘potentialities’ within a developing practice or set of social conditions in order to take 
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then further in the direction of maximising the powers and affections of a wider 
collective body.13  
This is in line with the constructivist approach to concepts developed in the 
introduction, which recognises that the utility of a concept is not confined to its ability 
to accurately describe an existing static state of legal affairs. The common law is not 
a static entity, made up of codified rules, but it is also a set of dynamic tendencies, 
pathways and movements, a ‘living thing, which evolve[s] over time and adapt[s] to 
new needs and circumstances.’14 More important from a constructivist perspective is 
the use of concepts to attune us to the potential that is part of such a dynamic legal 
practice and to explore how that potential might be further developed and realised. 
Such dynamic potentialities might be ‘extracted’ by the theory developed in the 
previous chapter and taken further in terms of enhancing and protecting the 
capabilities of the most vulnerable.  
This chapter argues that investment dignity can be used by judges to explore the 
potential of the developing use of dignity in the common law to realise an inclusive 
conception of personality, which embraces and connects the different dimensions of 
a holistic conception of humanity, and recognises that central to our development is 
vulnerability, which gives rise to certain responsibilities, and entails both positive and 
negative possibilities for life. Furthermore, such a concept may be used to extract 
potentialities capable of counteracting the distorted view of the legal subject as 
detached, self-controlled, personally responsible, independent and invulnerable. 
Investment dignity might be used to challenge these dimensions of the common law, 
to creatively reimagine the role of rights and interests as a means of nurturing those 
forms of caring relationships that are central to the development of human capability. 
This chapter is thus less concerned with getting the existing account of dignity in the 
common law ‘right’, were such a correct account possible, and more concerned with 
how investment dignity might be used to unlock and extend certain tendencies 
towards a future that we wish to affirm.  
Connecting investment dignity to the practice of the common law not only provides 
an opportunity to consider the contribution it might make to the development of the 
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common law. It is also valuable in terms of addressing the contribution that 
developments in the common law might make to the understanding of investment 
dignity. In light of the methodological points made in the introductory chapter, the 
process of testing investment dignity, by relating it to a set of factual circumstances, 
provides an important opportunity to deepen, enrich and even refine the concept 
because application is a key part of understanding.15  It was argued in the previous 
chapter that investment dignity is constructed as an intellectually mobile concept, 
one that continues to be dynamically co-formed through responsiveness to the other, 
receptiveness to singularity, and acceptance of creative movement. Connecting 
investment dignity to the common law is thus an opportunity not simply to ‘apply’ an 
already determined concept to a practice - to subsume it under an ideal - but to 
further develop that concept and to enrich our understanding of it.  
2. Human Dignity as a Value in the Common Law 
  
2.1. Introduction 
There appears to be a general consensus that human dignity already fits with (and 
in) the common law as a value.16 It has even been suggested that human dignity is a 
‘core value’, if not ‘the core value’ of the common law that ‘long predates the 
[European] Convention.’ 17   The precise meaning of dignity as a ‘value’ in the 
common law is, however, somewhat elusive as it can reasonably be construed to 
mean a variety of different things and does not necessarily prescribe any particular 
content for the concept.18 This section addresses the role of human dignity in the 
English common law and establishes the foundation for considering its meaning in 
the following sections. It tracks the development of at least three key senses in which 
human dignity can be understood to connect with the common law as a legal value, 
including the incidental, intentional and integral protection of the concept. These 
different roles, it is claimed, do not necessarily represent a particular commitment to 
a complete definition of human dignity, although, it is suggested, this is not 
necessarily to be treated as a negative aspect of the concept..  
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 Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy? (trs Hugh Tomlinson, Grahm Burchill, Verso, 
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2.2. Incidental Protection of Human Dignity 
The predominant means of protecting human dignity as a value in the common law, 
up until 2000, was through incidental protection. Thus, according to Feldman, dignity 
was ‘derived incidentally and indirectly’ from the legal protection of other interests.19 
The law of assault, for instance, which prohibits conduct that causes ‘people to fear 
immediate and unlawful violence’, protects dignity incidentally through the protection 
of interests such as ‘bodily integrity, moral integrity, and security.’20 These protect 
dignity understood as a subjective sense of self-respect and self-worth.21 In this 
respect, Feldman identifies a number of areas of English law where such incidental 
connections can be made, including medical treatment, defamation, treatment in 
custody, harassment and persecution.22 There are areas of law that lack a direct or 
systematic connection to dignity as a norm to guide their development. Dignity 
therefore appears to be protected more by accident than by design.  
 
Importantly, this incidental connection does not represent a commitment to a specific 
construction of human dignity. Thus, Feldman demonstrates how different interests 
protected by the common law connect with different as well as sometimes competing 
conceptions of human dignity. 23  Therefore, Feldman argues that the law which 
makes consent ineffective in the area of sadomasochistic practices, on grounds of 
public morality, incidentally protects dignity in terms of an objective assessment of 
the dignity of the individual or humanity generally, whilst undermining a more 
subjective sense that is supportive of autonomy.24 No clear trend or pattern therefore 
appears to emerge during the period in which the protection of human dignity was 
incidental, nor does it entail the protection of a specific construction of human dignity.  
 
2.3. Intentional Protection of Human Dignity 
Developments since 2000 demonstrate the emergence of a closer relationship 
between human dignity and the common law that is more than merely incidental. A 
key development, as part of the exponential growth in dignity discourse, is the 
intentional protection of human dignity though its judicial use as a heuristic device to 
                                                          
19
 Feldman ‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 2’ (n 1) 64.  
20
 Ibid  
21
 David Feldman, ‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 1’ (1999) PL 682,  
22
 David Feldman ‘Human dignity as a legal value: Part 2’ (n 1) 61.  
23
 Ibid 75.  
24
 Ibid 73, 75.  
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
125 
 
help ‘shape the contours’ of the common law in a way that is not dissimilar to a 
codified constitutional context, although it is inductively derived from an assessment 
of the common law.25 In this way, as Aharon Barak argues, human dignity ‘assists 
[the judiciary] in…interpretation’ and ‘plays a role in the limitations’ of rights.26 The 
courts necessarily rely on human dignity as a value to guide the development of the 
common law as an ‘interpretive tool for fleshing out other rights and doctrines’ and 
operates as a ‘regulative, organisational and integrative principle’.27  Therefore, in 
contrast to the incidental method, dignity is protected more by design than by 
accident.  
 
As an interpretive tool it can also become the primary interest that a particular norm 
seeks to protect, as opposed to an incidentally protected interest.28 Human dignity 
has certainly been used in this sense in a number of fields of the common law, but it 
has, perhaps, had the most marked role in shaping the breach of duty of confidence 
at common law into the ‘tort of misuse of private information.’29 Cases on the breach 
of duty of confidence were originally concerned with the ‘communication of 
commercially valuable information to trade rivals’ that was not in the public domain 
and was based on a relationship of confidence.30 It had little to do with the protection 
of human dignity and would not necessarily ‘protect an individual against the infliction 
by the press of mental pain and distress through invasion of…privacy.’31  
 
However, in its current guise, the law identifies ‘private information as something 
worth protecting as an aspect of human autonomy and dignity’ and now ‘focuses 
upon the protection of human autonomy and dignity — the right to control the 
dissemination of information about one's private life and the right to the esteem and 
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respect of other people.’ 32  Human dignity, as an interpretive tool, has had an 
important complementary role to autonomy in terms of protecting individuals from the 
disclosure of information that might damage self-esteem by causing severe 
embarrassment, distress or humiliation to the victim in ways that affect personal 
development and the ability to form relationships with others.33 
 
Dignity has also had an important inclusive role in this field in terms of bringing in to 
the ambit of the common law those who may have otherwise been excluded, 
because, for instance, they are a celebrity subject to public scrutiny or because their 
particular behaviour is considered unconventional. Thus, in HRH Prince of Wales it 
was recognised that, in light of human dignity, the Prince of Wales was as much 
entitled to privacy in his personal thoughts ‘as is any other’34 and in Max Mosley it 
was held that, despite the ‘unconventional’ nature of the sadomasochistic sexual 
conduct of the claimant, he was as much entitled to protection of his private 
information as a matter of ‘personal dignity’ as those whose sexual preferences are 
considered ‘mainstream’.35 This is particularly important in protecting minorities from 
intrusion based purely on ‘distaste and moral disapproval’ due to some sexual 
difference.36 The intentional method of protection represents a closer connection to a 
particular construction of human dignity. Thus, for instance, in Max Mosley, it was 
held that, although certain sexual behaviour may ‘seem undignified’ to some people, 
this did not prevent the disclosure from affecting the ‘personal dignity’ of the 
claimant.37  There thus appeared to be a rejection of a status-based concept of 
dignity that excluded the protection of acts considered disgusting by some external 
observers.38        
 
This is not to say that judges have formulated a singular construction or complete 
definition through the intentional protection of human dignity. Indeed, domestic 
courts have been criticised for failing to ‘embrace a full definition’ which, as a 
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consequence, leaves the concept ‘meaningless’.39 Even the most comprehensive 
survey of human dignity proposed in the case law by Munby J has been criticised by 
Justin Bates for shying away from a ‘general pronouncement as to the meaning of 
human dignity’ by concluding that ‘context is everything’. 40  However, it is 
questionable whether such a complete definition should be forthcoming in light of the 
relative infancy of the concept, in comparison to concepts with which the common 
law is more familiar, and the methodology of the common law, in the way it develops 
and evolves.  
 
The common law tends to develop principles over time from case-to-case and as a 
‘localised response to present conditions.’41 Courts in the common law tradition are 
thus inclined to avoid laying down broad and complete generalisations that extend 
beyond what is necessary to resolve a specific dispute.42 An account of dignity at 
common law, if it arises, will likely emerge though inductive inference, over time, 
from particular cases, to a general and fuller picture of the concept.43 Furthermore, 
rather than being a disadvantage, leaving the concept without a fully determined 
content can enable it be malleable in addressing changing conditions and problems 
as they emerge over time. 44  A malleable concept allows for the emergence of 
difference and ensures that victims are personally able to contribute to the shaping 
of the concept through the manner in which they construct their dignity argument.45  
Thus, as Dupré argues, the ‘open-ended conceptual texture’ of dignity ensures that it 
‘can always be taken in a different direction or become more inclusive of people and 
their needs and dreams.’ 46   The intentional protection of human dignity might, 
therefore, have an important inclusive, perhaps even democratic element, in 
enabling an applicant to construct dignity as a co-participant in the legal process.47  
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2.4. Integral Protection of Human Dignity 
A number of recent academic commentaries have suggested an even closer 
relationship between human dignity and the common law, which entails an implicit 
and inherent commitment. Jeremy Waldron, Mary Neal and Trevor Allan have all 
made visible a hidden commitment to human dignity that is more than merely 
incidental, but is rather integral to the very functioning of the common law and is 
inherent in its procedures, normative structure and the forms of coercion it 
employs.48 There is, on this account, an ‘implicit commitment to dignity in the tissues 
and sinews’ of the common law.49 Jeremy Waldron, for example, has argued that the 
procedural aspects central to the common law are imbued with the value of human 
dignity.50 These include, for instance, the guarantee of a hearing and an opportunity 
to make submissions and present evidence. 51  According to Waldron, these 
procedural guarentees protect human dignity by recognising that a person is -  
[C]apable of giving and entitled to give an account of herself 
(and of the way in which she is regulating her actions and 
organising her life), an account that others are to pay 
attention to; and it means finally that she has the wherewithal 
to demand that her agency and her presence among us as a 
human being be taken seriously and accommodated in the 
lives of others.52 
The law protects human dignity by recognising and respecting certain capabilities 
that individuals are presumed to possess, treating ‘humans as dignified agents, 
capable of self-control, with a good sense of their own interests, and an ability to 
respond intelligently to…[laws] demands.’ 53  On this account, the common law 
recognises that individuals are not just passive beings to be acted upon, but have 
the power to act within the process and be heard in proceedings..54 This connection 
to human dignity, inherent in ideas of procedural fairness, has been expressly 
endorsed by the Supreme Court in a recent decision relating to the right of recalled 
prisoners to an oral hearing before a parole board.55 The Supreme Court held, in this 
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case, that judicial procedure must pay ‘due respect to persons whose rights are 
significantly affected by decisions taken in the exercise of administrative or judicial 
functions.’56 The Court, citing with approval the opinion of Waldron, stated that -     
Applying a norm to a human individual is not like deciding 
what to do about a rabid animal or a dilapidated house. It 
involves paying attention to a point of view and respecting 
the personality of the entity one is dealing with. As such it 
embodies a crucial dignitarian idea – respecting the 
dignity of those to whom the norms are applied as beings 
capable of explaining themselves.57 
The Court therefore held that a hearing not only served a limited instrumental role, in 
the sense that it improved the chances of the tribunal reaching the right decision, but 
served a substantive role in paying due respect to human dignity by treating people 
as having a view or perspective of their own.58 It is for similar reasons that the 
common law has ‘set its face’ against the use of evidence obtained by torture and, to 
a lesser extent, self-incrimination and entrapment.59 
Human dignity can play a further role in terms of structuring the relationship between 
the state and individual in the exercise of its jurisdiction, as well as encompassing a 
need to respect the emotional dimensions of the individual and ensure particularly 
vulnerable persons are able to influence significant decision-making. Munby J, as an 
example, has argued that dignity requires the participation of vulnerable persons in 
decision-making on personal welfare, including mentally incapacitated persons and 
those subject to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. 60  This is vital to 
establishing a relationship within which an authority makes decisions as a servant of 
a particularly vulnerable person and in reference to their wishes or feelings, rather 
than through a process that merely dictates an outcome as a master controlling its 
subject.61 To make a decision without the participation of those affected violates 
human dignity in the way that it treats the person as insignificant, without a view of 
their own interests, and can undoubtedly lead to damaging emotions, such as 
humiliation, resentment, frustration, and despair. It is with this in mind that it has 
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recently been held that dignity includes, for those lacking mental capacity, the ‘right 
to be heard’ and excludes ‘the indignity of being forgotten’.62  
Anchoring human dignity in the very fabric and functioning of the common law in this 
way entails a commitment to dignity that is implicit, subtle, but pervasive.63 It is 
embedded in the manner in which the common law system exercises jurisdiction 
over the subject, through its ‘hearings and impartial proceedings, and the safeguards 
that go with them.’64 It is charactertic of the common law that it, according to Trevor 
Allan, seeks to respect dignity by elliciting the ‘co-operation of the citizen as a 
rational, responsible and self-determining agent’ through a ‘rational process of 
argument in which he is invited to participate.’65 Such a connection could not be 
broken without doing some very real damage to the character of the common law.66 
It is, of course, true that the integral protection of human dignity in the common law is 
not equivalent to the complete protection of the concept. Firstly, procedural 
connections are not necessarily a guarantee that the substantive remedies or rights 
in law will fully protect human dignity.67 Secondly, the concept of dignity, integral to 
the procedures of the common law, is by no means exhaustive of the dimensions of 
human personality worthy of protection. 68  Nevertheless, this integral form of 
protection provides a useful foundation upon which to develop a wider commitment 
to human dignity that is reflected in the substantive rights afforded at common law.69  
  
2.5. Conclusion 
Human dignity, as a legal value, is in a fluid state in the common law. There is a 
clear sense of progression in terms of both its visibility and importance. As has been 
seen, however, a singular definition of human dignity has not been adopted, nor has 
the concept had the same influence on every field of the common law that it might be 
expected to effect.  Despite the lack of a singular definition there are perhaps some 
signs and trends that can be inferred from the use of dignity as a legal value by 
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judges, as well as victims, who may construct and propose their own dignity 
argument.70  
3. Human Dignity as an Investment Concept in the Common Law 
3.1. Introduction 
This section deploys the investment construction of human dignity to highlight and 
explore certain trends and developments in the common law, with a particular focus 
on how that concept can be used to further realise the inherent potential of the 
common law to protect a more holistic, developmental and interconnected vision of 
the legal subject, which encompasses space for experimentation and emergence of 
difference. It is argued that investment dignity is capable of connecting with existing 
judicial uses of the concept, as well as potentially extending these to realise the 
possibility for more active and joyous forms of life. As discussed in the 
methodological section of the introduction, a concept needs to connect with current 
processes and pathways in order to effect change by extending and promoting these 
movements in a manner that unlocks new intensities, capabilities and 
compositions.71 This will help to extract certain developments in the common law, as 
well as enrich or refine the former concept, by connecting it to the messy world of 
real-life circumstances.72  
The section focuses on three central and important aspects of investment dignity to 
explore and discuss the use of dignity in the common law, specifically the protection 
of multifaceted humanity, developmental personality and vulnerability. It argues that 
investment dignity can be used to promote the potential of the common law to 
recognise the importance of permitting experimentation to enable joyous and active 
living, as well as protecting individuals from ‘good intentions vulnerability’. As a result 
of this encounter between investment dignity and the common law, the former is 
refined by drawing on certain judicial insights gained from relating human dignity to 
real-life circumstances, such as encompassing the importance of memory or time to 
the becoming of human personality and living environment to the inter-relational 
aspect of humanity.   
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3.2. Multifaceted Personality 
A significant feature of the investment concept of dignity that was constructed in the 
previous chapter was its multifaceted approach to human personality encompassing 
physical, social, recreational and mental (including emotional) dimensions. This 
holistic approach to dignity entails a wide view of the interests of individuals and 
requires us to ‘think of the human person as a whole’. 73  One of the key 
achievements of the judicial incorporation of human dignity into the common law is 
the way it has introduced, strengthened and made more visible a concern for certain 
dimensions of humanity that may have historically received limited protection. 
Perhaps the clearest and most consistent use of human dignity is in terms of the 
protection of the emotional dimension of human personality. Human dignity has, in 
this regard, strengthened the protection of individuals from exposure to negative or 
passive emotions as a recognisable form of harm.74 In the field of misuse of private 
information, human dignity has, as was discussed above, been associated with 
protection against the disclosure of information that might damage self-esteem.75 
Thus, it has been held that a photo of person in a ‘situation of humiliation or severe 
embarrassment, even if taken in a public place, may be an infringement of the 
privacy of his personal information.’76 Human dignity has also added weight to the 
importance of taking account of an individual’s wishes as a factor in assessing an 
individual’s best interests.77 This is primarily because, although a person may lack 
capacity, a failure to take account of their wishes may lead to humiliation, distress 
and anger at being treated as a passive object in the decision-making process.78  
 
Dignity has not only strengthened a concern for protecting individuals from negative 
emotions, it has strengthened the protection or promotion of positive emotional 
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experiences as a key aspect of human personality and fulfilment.79 This includes 
protecting or promoting feelings of happiness and well-being.80 The most notable use 
of dignity in this regard is in relation to the wide formulation of the best interests test 
formulated by Munby J in Re MM.81 This was the first in a line of cases to recognise, 
in the application of the best interests test, that ‘treatment [of an individual] at the 
hands of the State which, however well intentioned, can itself end up being abusive 
of her dignity, her happiness and indeed of her human rights.’82  In this regard, 
human dignity is used judicially to recognise that the intention of making someone 
physically safer by removing certain risks can be ‘bought at too high a price in 
happiness and emotional welfare’.83  
The concept of ‘good intentions vulnerability’ set out in the previous chapter can help 
to make theoretical sense of this developing trend. Seeking in good faith to promote 
one dimension of humanity may expose a person to greater vulnerability. Indeed, as 
Munby J has put it, realising physical safety at all costs can appear futile if it leaves 
people entirely ‘miserable’ or ‘broken hearted’.84 One of the key consequences of 
this approach is that intervention to protect a vulnerable adult should not be based 
on a mere fanciful risk of future physical injury.85 It is neither plausible nor possible to 
eliminate all human vulnerability in the form of openness to harm, for all “life involves 
risk.”86 Nor is it even desirable in terms of our human dignity to attempt to wholly 
eliminate our vulnerability. As Munby J has argued, reciting Holmes J, all ‘life is an 
experiment’.87 This is, potentially, a point that could enrich the investment concept of 
dignity, which, as was discussed in the previous chapter, incorporates elements of 
vulnerability and experimentation. As discussed in the previous chapter, vulnerability 
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is not merely a negative concept, but is central to human dignity in the way it enables 
us to grow, develop and experience joy. Therefore, to attempt the impossible task of 
eliminating all risks by keeping people ‘metaphorically wrapped up in cotton wool’ 
would deny all possibility of experimentation in life and any chance at maximising our 
joy.88 It would, undoubtedly, curtail, to an insufferable degree, human activity and 
social contact.89  
The Court of Protection has begun to use this dimension of human dignity to 
challenge, firstly, the premature institutionalisation of the vulnerable and, secondly, 
the separation of a person from a partner or family member, which is also related to 
the social dimension of human personality.90 A good example of the former is the 
case of Westminster City Council v Sykes, decided in 2014, where the Court of 
Protection had to consider whether it was in the best interests of an elderly women 
with dementia to be kept in residential care or whether she should be able to return 
to her flat where she had lived for 60 years.91 In a carefully considered decision, the 
Court used dignity as part of the complex balancing exercise to refine the application 
of the best interest test in a way that took a holistic approach to the needs of the 
individual and a realistic approach to the importance of physical safety in relation to 
other dimensions of human personality.92 It relied on dignity to recognise that where 
there was a risk of physical injury, such as a risk of falling, in allowing Miss Sykes to 
return home, those risks had to be considered pragmatically in light of the ‘loss of 
self-esteem and dignity’ that may come with institutionalisation.93 Specifically, the 
impact of placement in a residential setting and continued loss of her home was 
recognised as having, for Miss Sykes, a significant negative ‘effect on her mental 
health, happiness and well-being’.94  
In a closely related use of dignity, drawing on the opinion of Munby J, it argued that 
safety cannot always be an overriding consideration, for risk is unavoidable and any 
attempts to avoid it at all cost will negatively impact upon basic human functioning or 
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social activity. The Court therefore pointed to the reality that there may well be risks 
in falling in a care home, unless ‘one does not allow an older person who can do 
imperfectly the dignity of using the toilet alone’.95  
Finally, dignity appears to be used by the Court to recognise the importance of, what 
Dupré has termed, the protection of human time.96 That is, protecting ‘against an 
acceleration of time by bringing forward a future that could otherwise remain 
distant.’97  This includes enabling people to ‘live at their own pace, to sustain a 
tolerable status quo and crucially, to deteriorate at their own pace (if this 
deterioration becomes inevitable).”98 This aspect of dignity is evident in the way the 
Court notes that ‘periods of liberty and time at home are important to...dignity and 
quality of life.’99 It held that whilst her dementia may reach a stage where it would 
make ‘home care no longer viable’, the ability to live at home for several last months 
at the end of life was something of ‘value’ and ‘worth’.100 Again, this is a point that 
could be used to refine and enrich the content of investment dignity by recognising 
the importance of time to the unfolding of our capacities. It was recognised in the 
previous chapter that humans are always in a state of becoming through constant 
changes in interaction with various forces, some of which may increase or sustain 
our characteristic functioning, whilst others may inevitably reduce or destroy such 
functioning. The addition of an element of time recognises the importance to the 
individual of the ability to control the speed with which they undergo such a process 
and that a person, at the very least, should not have their characteristic functioning 
diminished prematurely..101   
This judicial use of dignity as a means by which to challenge institutionalisation of 
particularly vulnerable people is important in terms of widening the law’s field of 
vision to encompass (positive) emotional and temporal dimensions.102 There is, in 
addition, recognition of a relational dimension in the case. It was recognised that a 
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home was not merely important to an elderly person because it was a physical place, 
but also because of the ‘relational structure that is associated with a place.’103 
Removing an elderly person from their home can therefore have significant 
implications for their sense of connectedness to others, which are often constitutive 
of the self.104 This is supported by the interconnected nature of humanity at the heart 
of investment dignity and also, potentially, can enrich that concept by introducing the 
intuitively convincing idea that our living environment is, in part, central to our human 
dignity for the manner in which it can encompass ‘emotional warmth, emotional 
security and the commitment of human relationship.’105     
The investment concept not only supports the use of human dignity as a means of 
introducing different dimensions of human personality into the common law, but it 
also requires the recognition that each of the dimensions are connected to each 
other as equally important aspects that affect and reflect each other. As discussed in 
the previous chapter, a holistic approach to dignity recognises that impact on one 
dimension of personality, such as the activity of the body, will have a parallel affect 
on another dimension, such as the activity of the mind (and vice versa).106 In this 
way, a holistic concept of dignity can ‘go beyond the mainstream body-and-mind 
definition of human beings, i.e. the distinction between physical and psychological 
(or moral) integrity.’107 This might be realised through the  development of ‘injury to 
dignity’ as a basis for awarding damages in addition to any interference with any 
physical integrity.108  
This aspect of damage encompasses additional compensation for emotional harm in 
the form of humiliation, loss of self-esteem and mental distress.109 The distinctive 
role that dignity plays in this regard is to ensure the full effects of abuse or 
interference are given appropriate legal recognition. As an example, in the case of 
Dulghieru, concerning the sexual exploitation and trafficking of Moldovan women as 
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forced prostitutes, the High Court recognised through injury to dignity the feelings of 
humiliation, shame and degradation experienced as a consequence of the sexual 
abuse. More importantly, the Court was able to recognise within the legal narrative 
the ‘continuing harmful effects of their ordeal.’110 This included the recurrence of 
‘vivid intrusive images’ accompanied by continuing feelings of ‘hopelessness and 
guilt’. 111  Notably, the Court was able to recognise the continuing effects of the 
emotional experience on the social dimension of personhood, including the victims 
‘difficulty in forming or maintaining relationships’ and their fear of going outside.112 
Dignity appears to encapsulate and brings to the fore the full complexity of the 
narrative of the victim's ordeal. Investment dignity can help to make sense of the 
connections between these different dimensions by recognising that the interference 
with the body has a parallel effect on the mind in the formation of negative emotions. 
It also entails the mental trace of the image of degradation that remains ‘present to 
the mind’ and may, through that image, mean the body continues to experience the 
trauma long after it happened.113 In turn, this may affect the ability of the victim to 
outwardly develop relationships with others and may negatively impact on the 
unfolding of human personality over time. This raises the importance of memory, as 
an aspect of human becoming and a multifaceted concept of human dignity.  
3.3. Becoming and Developmental Personality  
One of the core components of the investment construction of dignity is the focus on 
a conception of human personality as becoming, which entails the idea that identity 
formation is a continuing process, rather than a fixed state. The capabilities of body 
and mind adapt and unfold over time in encounters with other forces in the world. 
This conception of human personality has a number of implications for the 
development of the law. Most notably, it requires the law to be attentive to the affects 
an encounter may have on the unfolding of the personality of an individual in to the 
future and in relation to others.114 This dimension of investment dignity is an element 
that can be used to explore, in a novel fashion, the development of the misuse of 
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private information, which, as has been seen, is expressly connected to human 
dignity.115  
Traditionally privacy has been concerned with preventing interference with a 
particular boundary or sphere of the self. However, recent developments suggest 
that it can also encompass the protection of developmental personality. 116  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the dimension of becoming demonstrates a 
greater concern with how events or encounters affect the unfolding of personality 
within social relations. A case that potentially is best explained through the notion of 
becoming, rather than traditional notions of privacy, is the case Campbell.117 This 
case concerned the publication of photographs of Miss Campbell leaving a narcotics 
anonymous meeting. The minority could not see anything significant about the 
picture and could not see how publication involved an intrusion into private space or 
understand how the publication was demeaning.118 In contrast, the majority was 
much more concerned with the future implications of the publication on Miss 
Campbell.119  Most importantly, the majority recognised that the publication of the 
photos would have had a detrimental effect on her health in terms of her progressive 
recuperation from a drug addiction. 120  It was therefore recognised that the 
publication would lead to ‘distress and potential harm’ and would affect her 
‘continuing health and development’.121 Human personality is prone to changes from 
external forces in ways that are not merely sudden - marked by a narrow temporal 
context that focuses on an interference with a fixed identity at a specific time - but is 
evolving and developing in a way that effects the becoming of holistic personality.122  
3.4. Human Vulnerability  
Human dignity has had, as was discussed above, an important role in terms of 
protecting individuals, including the elderly, from a particular form of ‘good intentions 
vulnerability’. 123  Vulnerability was understood in a positive sense, requiring the 
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exposure to some risk on the basis that it was central to experimentation, activity and 
joy. To completely eradicate vulnerability is not only impossible, but would deprive us 
of the kind of dignity that we possess as human beings by entirely closing us off from 
our surroundings and reducing our activity, relationality, and creativity. Investment 
dignity, however, does require certain positive interventions into the lives of 
individuals, particularly the most vulnerable people, by requiring investment into 
conditions that support or protect the development of activity and rest for mind and 
body.124  
 
The common law has recognised an entitlement to basic needs used to protect and 
support particularly vulnerable and excluded groups. This can be discerned from the  
‘law of humanity’ or, in its modern form, the principle of 'common humanity’, which 
has been developed in response to the imminent destitution that may be faced by 
certain ‘ostracised groups’.125 Despite the fact that the common law generally shies 
from imposing positive obligations, it has developed a minimum obligation to provide 
basic needs for vulnerable persons.126 Including, for instance, the destitution faced by 
asylum seekers who are prevented from working or accessing social welfare, and the 
eviction of gypsy travellers from their home. This concept has been held to 
encompass, in terms strongly reminiscent of those used in jurisdictions with a 
minimum core doctrine of human dignity, the provision of the ‘essential basics of 
life’127 and the protection of a ‘minimum standard of existence.’128  It has therefore 
been referred to as a ‘humanitarian safety net’ that includes a minimum provision of 
shelter and food.129  
It is in this light that the connections to human dignity appear obvious and as 
Feldman states it appears as something like a socio-economic right that is necessary 
to ‘maintain life and a minimum level of dignity.’130 The central focus on a basic level 
                                                          
124
 See p104. 
125
 For a fuller discussion, see Luke Clements and Janet Reed, Disabled People and European 
Human Rights (2003, Policy Press) 53; Richard A. Edwards and Peter Bilings, ‘Safeguarding asylum 
seekers' dignity: clarifying the interface between Convention rights and asylum law’ (2004) Journal of 
Social Security Law 83; Murray Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart 1997) 226. 
126
 See p146. 
127
 R.(on the application of Salih) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2003] EWHC 2273 
[69].  
128
 R v (Othman) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2001] EWHC Admin 1022 [65]. 
129
 Ibid 52.    
130
 Feldman notes that subsequent legislation has ‘removed the law of humanity’ in the field of asylum 
law. However, it still remains an ‘undercurrent in the common law and may assume more prominence 
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
140 
 
of respect for ‘common humanity’ provides an important, perhaps even necessary, 
conceptual link to human dignity that is essentially concerned with the protection of 
humanity.131   
Investment dignity recognises that basic existential conditions of life are necessary to 
enable people to engage in any kind of functioning or activity at all. They are 
necessary for the whole body to be capable of dong many things at once, and the 
mind equally capable of understanding many things at once. They enable people to  
‘carry on such functions and activities as constitute the bare minimum expression of 
the human self.’132  This protects two facets of vulnerability. First, it responds to 
exclusion vulnerability by recognising that an ‘asylum seeker’ or ‘gypsy’, who may, for 
instance, be excluded from the protection of the law because of their difference, are 
recognised as having some needs in virtue of their ‘common humanity’ from which 
they cannot be excluded. Second, it recognises that a human is a fragile being 
whose development is dependent on material needs and whose unfolding of 
capacities is contingent on being open to composing with substances necessary to 
maintaining and extending its power.133  
The provision of a minimum standard of existence differs from a more expansive 
power under the common law to intervene in the lives of adults who are vulnerable to 
exploitation through the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court.134 This enables the 
High Court to make declarations that safeguard particularly vulnerable people even if 
they do not lack capacity or do not support the intervention, thus raising the spectre 
of paternalism.135 Such declarations are usually used pre-emptively to restrict or 
prevent social or living conditions that could become abusive or harmful to a 
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‘vulnerable adult’. This aspect of the common law has been expressly treated by 
Munby J, a key judicial contributor to the development of the jurisdiction, as having 
the object of safeguarding human dignity.136 In the leading case before the Court of 
Appeal the continued existence was argued for on the grounds that it is important to 
have ‘remedies in place to combat [abuse]…to preserve human dignity’ which was 
an argument ultimately accepted by the Court.137   
 
It has been held by Munby J that the Court will exercise its inherent jurisdiction in 
order to prevent the abuse of a person who is under ‘undue constraint, coercion, 
undue influence or other vitiating factors.’138  Thus, for instance, the jurisdiction has 
been exercised to protect people from forced marriage as a dehumanising practice 
incompatible with human dignity and, for instance, to create an injunction to restrain 
the behaviour of a son who was alleged to have physically assaulted and verbally 
threatened his elderly parents, as well as controlled and unduly influenced aspects of 
their lives.139   
 
Investment dignity  supports the general thrust, if not every detail of this common law 
remedy, in that it seeks to address, at least in part, a certain form of power 
vulnerability that characterises particular relationships in which a subordinate is 
subject to the domination of another through emotional, social, or economic control 
in a way that renders them highly susceptible to abuse, coercion or oppression.140 
The current law recognises the importance of intervening to re-structure and re-
orient relationships of power that are damaging to the dignity of the subordinate in 
the way they leave people predominantly passive to the manipulation of another. 
This is not necessarily an autonomy denying practice.141 Rather, it recognises a less 
abstract and more grounded or relational model of decision-making in which 
autonomy, if it is to thrive, is ‘continually dependent on constructive relationships’ 
based on care and respect for human dignity. 142  The focus is, significantly, on 
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providing relief that is ‘facilitative’ and ‘empowering’ to the victim of abuse, directed 
at constraining the abuser in a dominant position of power, rather than ‘controlling’ 
the victim of abuse.143 Investment dignity may be used to develop this justification, 
on the basis that intervention must always be carefully considered in relation to ‘good 
intentions vulnerability’ whereby a person susceptible to one kind of abuse can be 
exposed to treatment that is abusive of another dimension of human dignity and 
must, as discussed above, be focused on a sensible and robust approach to risk that 
allows space for experiments in daily living. 
3.5. Conclusion  
It appears that aspects of common law practice provide a conceptual link to 
investment dignity, as well as enrich and deepen that concept. They potentially 
provide a much needed practical anchor and afford immanent pathways that can be 
extended to promote core dimensions of investment dignity. Realistically, however, 
common law practice is unlikely to conform perfectly to every element of a 
philosophically rich concept of dignity, such as investment dignity, especially when 
the common law is more familiar with other values and has a ‘messy’ quality 
possessing different strands or pathways that branch off in directions that may not 
always be consistent.144 However, it is less significant than the existence of possible 
strands or branches that might be extended or developed to protect investment 
dignity. Moreover, it is characteristic of the working of the common law that it is 
amenable to adaptation and development.  It is to these qualities of the common law 
that the chapter now turns, representing, it is argued, a potential further conceptual 
connection with investment dignity, which extends beyond content, to include the 
spirit of the common law.    
4. Investment Dignity and the Spirit of the Common Law 
4.1. Introduction 
The ‘spirit of the common law’ has been a topic of interest for many years.145 It has 
both excited and perplexed commentators in equal measure, with variable 
viewpoints emerging in regards to the core (perhaps somewhat elusive) 
characteristics, qualities, methodologies or features of the common law. This section 
selectively focuses on the evolutionary, inductive, unfinishable and grounded 
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features of the common law, emphasised by commentators who support its capacity 
or need to change, as opposed to theories that focus predominantly on integrity or 
tradition. 146  These qualities provide a particularly fruitful environment for the 
development of investment dignity, by creating space for the law to be attentive to 
singularity, responsive to human experience and engaged in creative movement. 
Moreover, it is suggested that, in light of these features, the common law is 
effectively in sustained dialogue with those it affects, creating an important bridge 
between the spirit of the common law and the rule of law or democracy, which are 
discussed in more detail in later chapters. In light of these dynamic features of the 
common law, it is argued that there are potential pathways and means by which to 
transform the common law which, in some respects, does not provide sufficient 
protection of particularly vulnerable groups. 
4.2. Work-In-Progress: Encountering Difference and Openness to Change 
Alan Hutchinson, drawing on the insights of commentators such as Roscoe Pound, 
Oliver W Holmes and Hans-Georg Gadamer, has aptly described the common law 
as a ‘perpetual work-in-progress’ that is being adapted and worked out in relation to 
the particularity of each case. 147  It largely adopts an inductive or ‘bottom-up’ 
approach to reasoning that moves from the particular case to the tentative 
development of a general principle, which may always be refined or corrected in 
relation to the emergence of new situations, or social conditions. This entails a 
necessary responsiveness of the common law to emerging social problems. It is 
potentially, through its inductive approach, attentive to the singularity and specificity 
of each case.148 Rather than merely subsuming a case under an abstract or general 
principle, recognising it to be merely an instance or repetition of that principle, the 
common law develops principles through concrete engagement with the particular 
problem raised in each case and treats understanding as something that can only be 
achieved in a specific encounter between individuals in each horizon.149 As Bingham 
MR put it, the common law ‘should respond to social needs as they are manifested, 
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case by case.’150  This feature of the common law provides a potentially fruitful 
environment for the promotion of investment dignity as it can allow for attentiveness 
to the singularity or individuality of the ‘other’, as well as the differences that 
characterise the becoming of humanity. Dignity is developed in relation to the 
specific needs and desires of individuals in particular cases as they emerge over 
time.  
 
The attentiveness of the common law is closely related to its responsiveness to the 
lived experiences of those it affects. Rather than focusing on logic or technical 
niceties, the common law is based on experience. 151  As Lon Fuller put it, the 
common law has the virtue that it necessarily ‘mirrors the variety of human 
experience; it offers an honest reflection of the complexities and perplexities of life 
itself, instead of concealing them in the specious geometry of a code. 152  Alan 
Hutchinson has, similarly, argued that the common law is ‘only brought and rebought 
to life in the active and persisting conversations between real people within, over, 
and across time.’153 The responsiveness of the common law, in this regard, suggests 
a kind of sustained conversation or dialogue with those it affects, so that the law, in 
each application, listens for the changing needs, problems or experiences of life.154 
This is a potentially beneficial characteristic of the common law, in terms of 
facilitating investment dignity, as it opens up space for individuals to articulate for 
themselves their experiences or needs.155 
  
Finally, the common law is, in light of its evolutionary qualities, a process of creative 
movement that is never settled or complete. The common law possesses an 
‘unfinishable’ quality, which is central to its adaptability and flexibility.156 As Alan 
Hutchinson has argued, it is characteristic of the common law that it is – 
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Perpetually...in flux, always in a process of further 
becoming, developing, and transforming...with a 
suppleness that resides in its inseparability from 
each discrete, concrete set of facts, the facts of the 
lived experiences which formed the basis of the 
litigation that led to the prior relevant court 
adjudications.157 
 
This ‘unfinishable’ nature of the common law has long been recognised by judges 
who have applauded its ‘capacity…to adapt itself to the needs of contemporary 
life’ 158  and for the way in which it ‘continues to evolve, as it has done for 
centuries.’159 Even today new legal concepts are being developed, as ‘new problems 
will generate new demands and produce new remedies’ on the basis that the 
common law has a ‘remarkable ability to adapt in dramatic way over a very short 
period of time.’160 A particularly good example of such a dramatic development is the 
inherent jurisdiction in relation to vulnerable adults. This remedy is, in effect, and 
according to Munby J, the ‘invention by the judges’ of a ‘novel jurisdiction’ which is 
an example of ‘judicial law-making on…a fairly heroic scale.’161 On this account, the 
common law can never really reach completion, for it must be capable of adapting to 
its surroundings and social environment, which is always evolving and changing. It 
must be able to refine, modify and even create concepts to respond to new 
problems, compositions, or relationships in each horizon.  
 
The common law also endorses continuity, consistency and stability through judicial 
precedent, qualities which are conventionally emphasised over the more dynamic 
and changeable characteristics of the common law. Such dimensions of the common 
law are undeniably significant in ensuring the law is carefully applied to changing 
conditions and shifting circumstances, which are also features that are vital to the 
protection of dignity (explored further in chapter five). However, continuity and 
stability are not equivalent to the idea of completion of the common law. 162  An 
exclusive focus on these aspects ignores the ‘peculiar forte’ of the common law that 
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‘allows for change in an overall process that emphasises the importance of continuity 
and stability.’ 163  The common law is a steady or stable process of growth or 
development, rather than being an entirely static or wholly revolutionary process.164    
  
The developmental and open nature of the common law makes it a particularly 
suitable environment for the protection of investment dignity. Investment dignity, like 
the common law, also has an ‘unfinishable’ quality. It is not possible to expect the 
completion of a mobile concept of dignity based on creativity, difference and 
experimentation. Unlike teleological dignity, which is premised on the idea of human 
beings realising an ideal end through the perfection of their nature, investment 
dignity, as was discussed in the previous chapter, is based on a dynamic conception 
of human personality in which an understanding of our capacity to affect and be 
affected is not fully determined in advance of our experimental encounters with 
others.  165 In this way, there is no completion of human dignity, as there is no final 
idealised mode of being. Investment dignity necessarily requires an environment in 
which the concept can be developed, supplemented, co-determined, corrected and 
enriched through the experience of relating it to ‘otherness’ and difference. The open 
and developmental nature of the common law means that the law can always 
become more inclusive and receptive to the creativity of life in ways that respond to 
the continuous production of difference in time, as well as the emergence of new 
problems or challenges.166  
 
Providing a suitable environment for the protection of investment dignity, does not, of 
course, guarantee the protection or development of that concept. Indeed, the 
adaptability of the common law may mean that it is taken by judges in a direction 
that, for instance, incidentally advances a rank-based dignity approach by prohibiting 
acts that are perceived as incompatible with the high status of humanity.167 In this 
regard, there are always dangers inherent in the creative and developmental aspects 
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of the common law and any developments must be undertaken with care, patience 
and prudence.168  
 
Indeed, from the perspective of investment dignity, some directions, which might be 
invented, must be off-limits precisely because they destroy or restrict the possibility 
for creativity, difference and responsiveness to otherness. 169  Nevertheless, the 
common law provides an environment that is necessary for the concept of 
investment dignity to flourish. Moreover, the common law is, perhaps, better suited to 
a concept like investment dignity compared to, for instance, teleological dignity, 
which, as noted above, suggests that the concept is being taken to ultimate 
completion and perfection, which the common law can and should never reach. 
Deontological dignity depends on a decision being deduced from a general principle 
and applied to a case, where, in fact, the common law allows for concepts to be 
moulded and shaped in the event of application. In contrast, investment dignity, as 
an intellectually mobile concept, provides direction for the development of the 
common law, but does not obstruct, in fact explains, the need for further adaptation, 
openness and responsiveness. Investment dignity is a conception of dignity that is 
ideally suited to the creativity, responsiveness and attentiveness of the common law.  
4.3. Change: Implications for the Common Law  
The adaptability of the common law means that there is scope for change that would, 
potentially, advance some aspects of investment dignity that may not be sufficiently 
protected by the common law or may sit uneasily alongside competing values or 
ideologies. In this regard, investment dignity may well have important transformative 
implications for longstanding and established values. 170  Investment dignity, for 
instance, may be used to nurture developing strands in the common law that 
challenge its focus on independence and personal responsibility to the detriment of 
interdependence and collective responsibility.  
 
Investment dignity strongly emphasises an interdependent and interconnected 
perspective on humanity through the idea of mutual becoming. This is especially 
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important in terms of entailing a heightened responsibility, on the spectrum 
dependency, for the needs of the particularly vulnerable persons and in ensuring that 
creative potentiality is realised through the investment of the community. This 
contrasts with a strong and historical undercurrent of the common law that prioritises 
personal responsibility and independence in terms of the obligations that we owe to 
one another.171 Thus, for instance, in the field of negligence, which is the area of law 
primarily concerned with notions of care and responsibility towards others, the courts 
have tended to avoid the imposition of positive obligations on public authorities to 
protect individuals from harm or to confer a benefit.172 This is partly based on the 
principles of corrective justice and individual responsibility. 173  These principles 
require that loss be borne by an ‘autonomous independent self’ unless it can be 
shifted to someone who has actively caused that loss.174 This conceptualises the 
subject of law in an atomistic way.175  
  
It is helpful to turn to an example of extreme abuse to demonstrate the manner in 
which the common law may be underpinned by values that potentially differ from 
interdependence and holism.176  The case that has been chosen is the Court of 
Appeal decision in X and Y v Hounslow London Borough Council,177 due to the fact 
that it is demonstrative of a number of key themes in the case law on duty of care, 
especially a narrow conception of responsibility, but also because it concerns two 
highly vulnerable individuals who were subject to treatment that was undoubtedly 
incompatible with human dignity. The case concerned a married couple (X and Y) 
who had significant learning difficulties and lived with their children in a council 
owned flat. During their residency they befriended some youths who began to use 
their flat for illicit activities. On one occasion, X was seriously assaulted by one of the 
youths. The social services department was aware of the exploitation of the couple, 
as well as the residency.  
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Following the receipt of complaints from other residents concerning the activities at 
the flat, a meeting to discuss the situation was arranged for a future date. In the 
interim, the claimants were imprisoned by the youths and became victims of extreme 
sexual, psychological and physical abuse.178 The claimants argued that the local 
authority had owed a duty of care to re-house them before the incident in light of the 
foreseeable and imminent physical danger. The Court of Appeal dismissed the claim 
on the basis that no duty of care was owed to the claimants. The crux of the 
reasoning was that, although the local authority was exercising statutory functions, 
there had been no assumption of responsibility for the particular claimants’ welfare 
and that was no general duty to prevent third parties from causing damage.179 
 
An investment dignity-based approach would entail a different approach to 
determining whether a duty was owed in such a case.  Most notably, it could provide 
a means by which to establish legal responsibility beyond the narrow confines of an 
assumption of responsibility. It was argued in the previous chapter that human 
personality and its power of acting develop dynamically through interactions with 
others.180 On this account, there is no individual who is prior to, or can be extracted 
from, the complex network of relationships within which they develop.181 In contrast, 
the existing law is effectively concerned with a ‘boundary-setting role’182 that treats 
the autonomous subject as ‘prior to the relationships on which it is dependent.’183 A 
stronger emphasis on interrelationality would shift the focus of the common law away 
from questions about whether a relationship has been created, to a consideration of 
how to structure relationships, from which person can never be extracted, in a 
manner that produce, nurture, and protect.  
 
Directly related to this interconnectedness in the concept of investment dignity is that 
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of vulnerability.184 Investment dignity would lead to less emphasis on ideas of self-
reliance and personal responsibility and greater emphasis on issues of power, 
exclusion and insecurity in relations of interdependency.185 Thus, in the case of X 
and Y, investment dignity, would require an evaluation of the relative power and 
control of the parties over the situation to determine responsibility. Within a 
relationship of power, a claimant may, in part, be marked by passivity and 
subordination because they may entirely lack the ability to take steps to protect 
themselves from harm. They may be dependent on a defendant who possesses 
significant control over the situation. Thus, in X and Y, it was evident that the 
claimants had distinctive needs and lacked the ability to take steps to safeguard 
themselves.186 In contrast, the local authority could have taken effective measures to 
respect and protect human dignity, as it was aware of the exploitation, as well as the 
escalating threats, and it was exclusively within its power to safeguard the family.  
 
This aspect of vulnerability may, it is suggested, also be used to set limits on the 
positive obligations of the state. Vulnerability can ‘provide justifiable limitation on the 
duty of care’ and the obligations of public authorities.187 In order for a duty to arise, 
there must be a ‘distinct capacity to control [that] particularizes the defendant, while 
a distinct vulnerability to harm particularizes the plaintiff…[as] each position 
constitutes and individualizes the other.’188 Where a public authority, for instance, 
lacks an ability to control the situation, or the claimant is not any more vulnerable 
than the general population to harm, there may not be an individualised duty that is 
owed to the particular other.189  
 
This is not to say that the common law is fixed in its opposition to aspects of 
interdependence and positive obligations to protect particularly vulnerable people. It 
is characteristic of the common law, returning to its spirit, that it possesses dormant 
strands, cultivates new branches and extends alternative pathways. 190  Thus, for 
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instance, cases have begun to emerge in negligence where some judges have 
reinterpreted past decisions and tentatively relied upon ‘vulnerability’ as a concept in 
establishing a duty of care.191  Investment dignity might therefore be used to take 
these aspects of the common law further in protecting a more interdependent and 
interconnected view of humanity.    
4.4. Conclusion 
In conclusion, the common law not only provides a possible conduit for the protection 
of a concept of dignity, but provides a fertile environment in which to develop the 
protection of a concept of human dignity based on creative potentiality, unfolding 
differences and shifting problems in time. It is suggested that dignity need not be 
treated as a concept that is mainly or predominantly suited to a codified constitutional 
context. Indeed, an emphasis on the somewhat understated qualities of the common 
law (dynamic, inductive, unfinishable and adaptive) reveals that in certain respects it 
offers the possibility of being more in tune with the richness and complexity of human 
experience, even if it sometimes falls short of that potential.   
5. Overall Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to rely on the concept of investment dignity to explore the 
developing jurisprudence on human dignity in the common law. In light of the lack of 
systematic conceptualisation of dignity in the case law, and the fact that few cases 
provide an explanation as to the sense in which dignity is being used, investment 
dignity has been deployed to highlight, identify and extract some of the key 
developments in the common law, as well as to further the potential of human 
dignity, as a common law concept. It has been argued that investment dignity can 
make clearer the connections between the concepts of dignity, experimentation, 
vulnerability and emotion that are at the early stages of development in the common 
law, and provide insights into the theoretical justification for the connection between 
these concepts.  
The common law has provided a basis in which to anchor the theoretical concept of 
investment dignity within the practical confines of law, connecting to existing legal 
pathways or processes that might be extended, fostered or developed by the use of 
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investment dignity to provide even greater protection of particularly vulnerable 
people. The multifaceted nature of the concept of investment dignity broadens our 
legal imagination in terms of our understanding of human beings, extending beyond 
a limited conception of autonomy, to encompass and connect the emotional, 
interdependent, social aspects of a person, which, it was argued, is a trend that can 
be extracted from the case law. In this respect, investment dignity has been used to 
challenge the conception of the legal subject as bounded, independent, and isolated, 
which underpins some of the law, exploring instead the possibility of opening new 
paths and extending others towards a more inclusive, holistic, creative, 
interconnected and dynamic conception of the human subject.  
Connecting these aspects of investment dignity to the common law has not only 
shown the relevance of investment dignity, but has allowed for a fuller picture to 
emerge concerning its content. The concepts of vulnerability and experimentation 
have, for instance, been given fuller content by drawing on the experience of elderly 
people faced with institutionalisation, which has been captured in the case law. The 
process of refining investment dignity has further led to the introduction of new 
concepts, such as time, memory and environment, which have been constructively 
connected to some of the existing components of investment dignity. The refined 
definition of human dignity might therefore recognise that in order to promote the 
power of acting and rest for mind and body, in which the personality of a person is 
always in a state of becoming, it is necessary to invest in conditions that enable 
people to control the time of their deterioration. This process of refinement helps to 
highlight the intellectually mobile nature of the concept of investment dignity. It is a 
concept that is most likely to endure in the common law, as it is capable of variation 
in relation to the singularity of each new case and the open nature of time, and can 
only thrive through reliance on the supple, inductive and dynamic features of that 
system of law.  
The concept of investment dignity does not, of course, connect with all cases that 
make use of the concept of dignity. Further exploration would very likely reveal 
alternative conceptions. But investment dignity provides a basis by which to 
challenge those aspects of the law that might advantage the autonomous, 
independent, rational, able-bodied self as the ideal subject, which, as a 
consequence, disadvantages the ‘other’ and obscures the lived experience of real 
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people’s lives.192 In this regard, there are many areas of the common law that might 
be taken in new directions. The great strength of the common law is that it can allow 
space for such change to occur through a process that is creative, responsive and 
attentive, at the same time as being stable, prudent and careful. Far from being 
unsuited to human dignity, which is concept often addressed in a codified 
constitutional context, this chapter has argued that the common law tradition is 
particularly suited to the protection of an unfinishable concept of human dignity 
based on creative potentiality, difference and experimentation, which is at the core of 
the investment concept.  
                                                          
192
 See p63. 
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
154 
 
Chapter Four: Potential Protection under the Human Rights Act 1998 
1. Introduction 
This chapter considers how investment dignity can be deployed to highlight and 
explore central developments in the use of human dignity under the Human Rights 
Act, which has been a key driving force in the exponential growth of dignity discourse 
in the United Kingdom. This is despite the fact that the HRA, like the ECHR upon 
which it is based, provides no direct textual anchor for human dignity and, in this 
way, differs considerably from many modern human rights instruments.1 However, 
the concept of human dignity has emerged in case law as an important value that 
informs the entire system of rights protection under the HRA. It has, therefore, been 
recognised as the ‘essence’ of the rights and the ‘core’2 value that is ‘immanent’3 
within the rights and ‘permeates’ the Act. 4 
   
In much the same way as the previous chapter, this chapter starts by considering the 
current role of human dignity within the system of fundamental rights protection 
established under the HRA. It focuses specifically on the foundational and bridging 
function of the concept of human dignity, which, it is argued, supports the indivisibility 
of human rights and creates a link between the predominantly civil and political 
character of rights found in the HRA and economic and social rights that inform other 
human rights instruments. In addition, it creates and governs the relations between 
rights, such as Art 3 and Art 8.  
  
The second section discusses the potential of investment dignity to highlight and 
explore the developments in the judicial use of human dignity under the HRA. It 
focuses on Articles 3 Sch 1, Part 2, HRA (prohibition of torture, inhuman or 
degrading treatment) and Article 8 Sch 1, Part 2 HRA (right to private and family life). 
Although many of (if not all) the rights can be conceptually connected to human 
dignity, these are rights that are often considered to be most closely related to 
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human dignity.5 It is notable that the most concerted effort to explore the potential 
meaning of human dignity as a legal value under the HRA has been made in relation 
to these Articles. This effort has not led to a ‘general pronouncement as to the 
meaning of human dignity’ but it has resulted in the development of certain 
connections between the concepts of dignity, vulnerability, emotion, dependence, 
development of personality, social and recreational activity, and interpersonal 
relationships. The chapter highlights how investment dignity can be used to develop 
clearly the theoretical connections and links between those concepts, providing, in 
particular, a valuable insight into how such dimensions of humanity may be 
interconnected as part of a holistic concept of the person, rather than simply treating 
such dimensions as separable aspects of humanity. This section further explores 
how the investment concept may be used to help realise the potential of human 
dignity under the HRA to establish positive obligations that promote and protect the 
interconnected functioning (social, emotional, physical) of persons who may 
otherwise be subject to particularly circumscribed and isolated conditions. This is an 
important aspect of the investment concept, and a potential limitation of the common 
law.6 Investment is also close conceptually to positive obligations which have been 
recognised as requiring the fulfilment and promotion of rights through ‘investment, 
monetary and otherwise’.7  
 
Testing investment dignity in the context of positive obligations will help to refine the 
concept in relation to the extent of the obligation of the community to promote human 
potentiality via investment, as well as delineate clearer conceptual boundaries by 
addressing the practical problems of resource allocation and collective action. In 
respect of Article 3, the discussion concentrates on the extent to which investment 
dignity connects with the judicial use of human dignity to protect basic needs, which 
provide existential conditions of life necessary to the realisation of any human 
potentiality and such functioning as constitutes the bare minimum expression of the 
human self.8  
                                                          
5
 R (Haidar Ali Hussein) v The Secretary of State for Defence [2014] EWCA Civ 1087 [44]-[45]. R. (on 
the application of Hall) v University College London Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust [2013] EWHC 
198 [33]; R. (on the application of SC) v Salford City Council [2007] EWHC 3276 [33]; Hegarty v 
Enforcement of Judgments Office [2013] NICA 56 [8.   
6
 See p146.   
7
 Daniel Moeckli,  Sangeeta Shah,  Sandesh Sivakumaran, International Human Rights Law (OUP, 
2013) 272.  
8
 See p 132.    
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The discussion of Art 8 is in two parts. The first part addresses the potential of Art 8, 
considering specifically cases where the human dignity argument is deployed 
successfully to protect the disabled and is of material benefit to the victim, which is 
mainly in the context of the decisions of the High Court. 9  Investment dignity is 
deployed in order to help explain the connections that are made between dignity and 
cognate concepts, including a multifaceted concept of humanity and development of 
the personality of vulnerable people who are subject to the most circumscribed and 
isolated conditions. These connections have been made by judges, but not always 
explained, or fully explored in terms of the potential implications.  
 
The second part addresses the current protection of human dignity for the 
vulnerable, following, particularly, the rejection of the dignity argument by the 
majority of the Supreme Court in the case of R (on the application of McDonald) v 
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea. 10  The final section of the chapter 
summarizes certain trends in the judicial use of human dignity under the HRA 1998. 
Supported by the work of Dupré, Carozza, Riley, Hale and Gearty, it argues that 
human dignity is an important value that performs a distinctive role in the 
determination of rights. It has, it is argued, an open dimension that promotes 
inclusivity of the ‘other’.  
2. Protection of Human Dignity under the Human Rights Act 1998 
The concept of dignity under the HRA despite its textual absence, predominantly 
operates as a ‘foundational value’ that underpins the system of rights protection and 
acts as a guiding principle that is used by Courts to inform the content of human 
rights, as well as the relationship between those rights. Lord Dyson, for instance, has 
held that ‘dignity is the foundation of all the freedoms protected by the [European] 
Convention’11 and Lady Hale has argued that all human rights are ‘founded on the 
inherent dignity of all human beings.’ 12  This foundational aspect performs an 
important role in terms of providing reasons for the protection of human rights, as 
well as, potentially, grounding and ordering other values that may be relevant to 
                                                          
9
 East Sussex Case (n 2); Burke (n 2); R (on the application of Bernard) v Enfield LBC [2002] EWHC 
2282.    
10
 [2011] UKSC 33. See also Anufrijeva v London Borough of Southwark [2003] EWCA Civ 1406.  
11
 RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38 [39].  
12
 Cheshire West and Chester Council v P [2014] UKSC 19 [45].  
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human rights adjudication.13 There is clear evidence emerging to suggest that dignity 
can and does perform this role under the HRA. Thus, for instance, in the case of 
Ghaidan, Baroness Hale held that the value of democracy was ‘founded’ on the 
principle that ‘each individual has equal value’ and that treating individuals as having 
less value ‘violated his or her dignity as a human being’. 14  According to Hale, 
democracy ‘values everyone equally even if the majority does not’ or even if the 
group is ‘unpopular’. 15  This treats human dignity as a foundational feature of 
democracy, providing the conditions of its legitimacy, as well as challenges a purely 
procedural model, re-structuring the relationship between the majority and minority.16 
This foundational role has been repeated in cases concerning the rule of law and 
equality.17 
  
As a result of being the foundational value of human rights, dignity can also act as a 
bridging device that ‘connects different rights, particularly minimal prohibitive claims 
(to life, contra torture) to more substantial rights concerning personality (to family life, 
to health).’18 This entails, as Stephen Riley argues, a potentially important function 
for dignity in terms of justifying the indivisibility of human rights, as well as creating 
connections between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic and 
social rights on the other. It is far from surprising, therefore, that in the cases 
discussed below, where the dignity argument is accepted in the majority reasoning of 
the domestic courts, it has had social and economic implications. 
 
The natural corollary of treating human dignity as the foundation of human rights, 
which justifies and provides reasons for their existence, is its role as a guiding 
                                                          
13
 Mary Neal, ‘Respect for human dignity as substantive basic norm’ (2014) 10 International Journal of 
Law in Context 26, 37-39. 
14
 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza [2004] UKHL 30 [132].  
15
 Ibid 
16
 See Catherine Dupré, ‘Dignity, Democracy and Civilisation’ (2012) 33 Liverpool Law Review 263, 
273; Erin Daly, Dignity Rights (Pennsylvania Press, 2013) 132.  
17
 Ghiadan (n 14) 9; R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2006] EWCA Civ 1293 [268], [270]; R. 
(on the application of Carson) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2005] UKHL 37 [49]; R 
(On the Application of Gurung) v Ministry of Defence [2002] EWHC 2463 [36]; Secretary of State for 
Work and Pensions (Appellant) v. M [2006] UKHL 11 [101]. See also Jeffrey Jowell, ‘Equality as a 
Constitutional Principle’ (1994) 7 CLP 1, 7; Gay Moon and Robin Allen, Dignity discourse in 
discrimination law: a better rout to equality?’ (2006) EHRLR 610, 622. 
18
 Stephen Riley, ‘Human Dignity: Comparative and Conceptual Debates’ (2010) 6 International 
Journal of Law in Context 117, 125. 
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concept that helps to shape the content of human rights.19 Human dignity in this 
regard is a ‘heuristic notion’ and ‘problem-solving tool’ that affects, amongst other 
things, the scope of rights. 20  Human dignity has, for instance, been used as a 
heuristic device to find an obligation on the state to move pre-operative transgender 
women from a male prison to a female prison21 and to effectively protect people from 
the practice of human trafficking.22 In respect of some rights, dignity has more than a 
background role and is more akin to a determinative legal test used to decide a case 
in a substantive way. Dignity has, for instance, become a central concept used to 
define the limits of the manifestation of beliefs that are protected by Art 9 Sch 1, Part 
1.23 Human dignity, in this regard, has a potentially important role to play setting the 
boundaries and limitations of rights.  
Although dignity is a value that is generally relevant to the whole of the HRA and 
Convention, it seems to be treated as particularly relevant to informing the content of 
certain rights, most notably Art 3 (prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading 
treatment) and Art 8 (right to private and family life).24 Domestic courts appear to 
have established a special connection between these Articles and human dignity.  
Dignity has, for instance, been recognised as an integral component concept used to 
shape the scope of Article 3.25  It has similarly been treated as ‘immanent’ and 
‘included’ in Art 8.26 The recognition that dignity is inherent in both rights has resulted 
in the UK Courts stating that the ‘structure of the ECHR means that affronts to 
human dignity are addressed not only by Article 3 but also by Article 8.’27 Dignity can 
possibly act as ‘a bridge between Arts 3 and 8’ through the way that it connects 
these rights and affects their relationship. Indeed, it has even been suggested that 
there is little that ‘dignity as a right-in-itself [could] add to the combined jurisprudence 
                                                          
19
 Christopher McCrudden ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 
EJIL 655, 694.  
20
 Riley (n 18) 124.  
21
 R (on the application of B) v Secretary of State for Justice [2009] EWHC 2220 [39]-[43].   
22
 Hounga v Allen & Anor [2014] UKSC 47. 
23
 Grainger plc v Nicholson [2010] IRLR 4 [24]. Drawing on the decision in Campbell and Cosans v 
United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 293.   
24
 See Pretty v United Kingdom [2002] ECHR 427 [65]. See Elizabeth Wicks, ‘The Meaning of ‘Life’: 
Dignity and the Right to Life in International Human Rights Treaties’ (2012)14 Human Rights Law 
Review 199, Catherine Dupré, ‘Human dignity and the withdrawal of medical treatment:  missed 
opportunity?’ (2006) EHRLR 678.  
25
 Pretty (ibid) 52;David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales (OUP, 
2002) 130; Ellie Palmer, Judicial Review, Socio-economic Rights and the Human Rights Act (Oxford: 
Hart 2007) 69.  
26
 See fn 4. 
27
 Haidar Ali Hussein (n 5) [44]-[45].   
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
159 
 
of Articles 3 and 8’ in which dignity is deployed as a legal value.28 This is perhaps 
going too far, but it does capture something of the expansive and expanding scope 
of these Articles. This undoubtedly raises important questions about the distinctive 
scope of each Article and the degree of ‘overlap’ that exists in terms of their dignity 
content. 
3. Investment Dignity and Positive Obligations  
The extent to which human dignity has jointly shaped the content and limits of Art 3 
and Art 8 is the main focus of this section. Specifically, it focuses on the extent to 
which human dignity has been used to guide the development of positive obligations 
to access care and welfare services for particularly vulnerable individuals. Positive 
obligations are defined broadly as the duty on the state to take action to secure 
rights and to not merely refrain from taking action.29 As will be seen, Art 3 and Art 8, 
although primarily phrased in negative terms, have both been recognised as capable 
of ‘imposing positive protective measures requiring financial expenditure in welfare 
needs contexts’.30 It is primarily through the dynamic interpretation of these Articles 
that the Courts have been able to indirectly adjudicate on the legal implications of the 
health and social care needs of particularly vulnerable people, supporting, 
potentially, the indivisibility of human rights.31   
The purpose of addressing this specific category of positive obligations is threefold. 
First, it potentially covers the needs of acutely vulnerable individuals, a major priority 
for investment dignity, such as the disabled or elderly, who may be unable to benefit 
effectively from first generation rights without access to certain social or economic 
conditions and who do not necessarily correspond to the ideal sometimes at the 
centre of law.32 Second, the doctrine of positive obligations to provide social facilities 
and welfare benefits is at the very ‘outer boundaries’ of Art 3 and Art 8. 33 
Considering, therefore, the role that human dignity plays in testing these boundaries 
might provide some useful insight in to the substantive difference it can make to 
transforming traditional human rights paradigms. Finally, and crucially, positive 
                                                          
28
 Neal (n 13) 33. 
29
 Alistair Mowbray, The development of positive obligations under the European Convention on 
Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights (Hart 2004) 2.  
30
 Palmer (n 24) 22. 
31
 Eva Brems, ‘Indirect Protection of Social Rights by the European Court of Human Rights’ in Dephne 
Barak Erez et al (eds), Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Hart 2011)  138.   
32
 See p 59.  
33
 Mowbray (n 29) 187. 
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obligations are, it is argued, closely related to the idea of ‘investment’ as a central 
aspect of the concept of human dignity that has been proposed. 34  Positive 
obligations entail a collective duty on the state to ‘take protective action to safeguard’ 
the rights and values encompassed within the Convention.35 According to Erin Daly, 
such a system of positive obligations recognises that ‘while dignity is inherent in 
each member of the human family, it must be nurtured and protected by the others, 
including the state.’36  
Positive obligations, in this regard, embrace the idea that human capabilities are 
vulnerable. They need to be protected, developed and unfolded. 37  Positive 
obligations correspond to the way investment dignity captures the meaning of 
‘respect’ as a core component concept of human dignity and reflects the structure of 
the intrinsic ‘value’ of human life as potentiality. In this regard, creative potentiality, 
as a value, requires ‘protection’ for what has been actualised, and ‘promotion’ of 
what may be unrealised.38 This includes positive action through collective investment 
in to conditions that enable individuals to unfold creatively their human personality 
and develop their capacities, with priority going to the most vulnerable that need 
support to develop their personality. 
3.1. Article 3: Investment into a Minimum Core  
3.1.1. Scope for Protecting and Promoting Dignity  
Human dignity is the ‘first principle’ of Art 3 and ‘most commonly arises’ in case law 
on that provision.39 This is hardly surprising in light of the way the Article prohibits 
conditions that ‘dehumanise’ and ‘degrade’ the victim.40 In this regard, the Article 
appears to have been ‘specifically designed’ to protect human dignity, although it 
does not directly deploy the language of that concept.41 The scope for protection 
depends, fundamentally, on the construction of the key terms used in Art 3 and the 
extent to which human dignity can be used to shape these terms. In this respect, Art 
                                                          
34
 See p 96.   
35
 K Starmer, ‘Positive Obligations under the Convention’ in Jeffrey Jowell et al (eds), Understanding 
Human Rights Principles (Hart 2001) 203.   
36
 Daly (n 16) 114. 
37
 Martha Nussbaum, ‘Human Dignity and Political Entitlements’ in Human Dignity and Bioethics: 
Essays Commissioned by the President's Council on Bioethics (US Independent Agencies and 
Commissions 2008) 359; Martha Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought (CUP 2001) 272.  
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 R (on the application of Razgar) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2) [2004] 2 A.C. 
368, 373.  
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3 has a number of separate component concepts, each of which has distinct 
features.42  
 
Some of these components of Art 3 are more relevant to a consideration of the role 
human dignity plays in shaping the content of positive obligations to protect the 
welfare and care needs of particularly vulnerable people than others. The concept of 
torture, for instance, would seemingly have less relevance to a failure to provide 
services in light of the need for the severe suffering to be done for a purpose and, 
similarly, ‘punishment’ requires the infliction of some kind of consequential suffering, 
to be distinguished from a failure to ameliorate suffering.43 In contrast, inhuman and 
degrading treatment could, potentially, cover a wide body of measures that include a 
failure to provide welfare provision that leaves a person in dire need and in a state of 
destitution.  
 
Undoubtedly the most detailed judicial summary of the potential scope of the 
protection of human dignity under the requirements of ‘inhuman and degrading 
treatment’ and the most comprehensive survey of the case law in relation to positive 
obligations to provide for the care needs of particularly vulnerable people, has been 
elaborated by Munby J in East Sussex44 and Burke.45 In relation to ‘inhuman and 
degrading treatment’, Munby J begins, in each case, by outlining the basic threshold 
requirement of a minimum level of severity in order for treatment to fall within the 
scope of the Article and that such a minimum is relative.46 Suggesting, therefore, that 
‘not every type of indignity amounts to degrading or inhuman treatment’ but only 
those types which are particularly serious.47 The existence of a high threshold of 
indignity will often depend on a combination of factors, including personal factors, 
such as the existence of a health condition and contextual factors, such as improving 
social standards.48  In regards to context, although an intention to cause degrading 
treatment will often be an important aggravating factor relevant to a finding of a 
violation, it is not, as Munby J recognizes, a prerequisite for such a finding. 
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 Each concept is a complex multiplicity of components, see p 21. 
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 Greek case [ECommHR, 1969] 186; Ireland v UK [1978] ECHR 1 [167]. 
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Importantly, then, human dignity can be violated by ‘thoughtless, uncaring and 
uncharitable actions’ which can be just as ‘damaging and distressing to the victim as 
the vicious, wilful or malicious.’49 This puts significant emphasis on the subjective 
experiences of the victim.50  
 
A lack of seeming awareness of the indignity of a certain form of treatment, or the 
inability to complain about the effects of such treatment, is not however a barrier to a 
finding the treatment ‘degrading’, as this would exclude the protection of a significant 
group of particularly vulnerable people.51   This potentially brings in an objective 
element to the protection of human dignity, in which a violation may be found on the 
basis of, for instance, the perspective of a ‘right-thinking bystander’ who views the 
treatment as ‘humiliating or debasing to the victim, showing a lack of respect for or 
diminishing human dignity.’ 52  In addition to negative obligations, Art 3 has been 
recognised as imposing a positive obligation to ensure that individuals are not 
subjected to ill-treatment administered by private individuals. 53  Significantly, 
however, there is a heightened degree of protection for particularly vulnerable people 
who are likely to be subject to abuse.54 A state is also under an obligation to take 
positive measures to provide suitable physical conditions or medical care where 
‘indignities are likely to be exacerbated by the deprivation of liberty.’55 This includes a 
positive obligation on the state to create differential conditions of detention to 
ameliorate differences in people’s abilities or physical and mental needs.56  
 
Outside of the context of detention, there is a lack of clarity about the extent of the 
positive obligations of the state to provide for the health or welfare of vulnerable 
people.57 Pretty suggests that liability would arise only where the state assumes a 
responsibility and then takes a course of conduct that results in inhuman or 
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degrading treatment, such as, for instance, deporting an Aids sufferer who is 
receiving treatment in the UK to a jurisdiction with totally inadequate health care.58 
However, as Munby J notes, some cases have suggested a wider obligation.59 It has 
thus been held, for instance, that the lack of appropriate medical treatment 60 or 
‘wholly insufficient amount of pension and social assistance may, in principle, may 
raise an issue under Art 3.’61 A wide reading of Art 3 might therefore suggest that 
there is an obligation to positively invest in to the protection of the human dignity of 
the most vulnerable. In contrast, a narrow reading may suggest that an obligation 
arises only when the state has already made some kind of investment to maintain 
dignity and then acts to retract that investment, or where the state has subjected a 
person to conditions, such as detention, in which a failure to invest in dignity is likely 
to make suffering reach a minimum level of severity. 
3.1.2. Existential Conditions of Investment Dignity 
The concept of dignity, as was argued in chapter two, requires the positive 
investment of the community to provide some basic entitlements that are necessary 
to the realisation of any human potentiality and to basic human functioning.62 These 
are the existential conditions of investment dignity and are connected to the 
‘minimum core’ or an ‘irreducible obligation’ to respect human dignity.63 The absolute 
nature of Art 3, and the increasing recognition by the ECrtHR that certain living 
conditions may cause suffering that meets the minimum threshold of severity, 
indicates that Art 3 could be developed to encompass a minimum core of respect for 
human dignity. 64   Courts in England and Wales have been more explicit and 
expressly recognised that destitution may, in certain circumstances, constitute 
inhuman or degrading treatment by diminishing human dignity.  The leading case in 
this regard is the House of Lords decision in ex parte Limbuela.65 This concerned a 
ban on the provision of social assistance to asylum seekers who were deemed not to 
have applied for refugee status as soon as reasonably practicable.66 In short, a 
violation of Art.3 ECHR was found on the basis that the entire package of restriction 
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and deprivations surrounding the victim was sufficiently severe to violate human 
dignity and, as such, could be qualified as inhuman and degrading treatment.67  
The decision in Limbuela appears to provide some degree of protection of a 
minimum guarantee of social security in ensuring that the state does not impose 
conditions on individuals that deny access to basic means of subsistence. Human 
dignity is deployed in the case to address the needs of a group who were subject to 
exclusion from the realisation of basic needs on the possible grounds that they were 
considered ‘unworthy or unpopular.’ 68  Dignity was used to prevent exclusion 
vulnerability by ensuring that a certain group of people, who may have already fled 
abuse, are not then subject to conditions that might further perpetuate their suffering 
and, in addition, treats them as less worthy of respect. These are a group of people 
who may be unable to fully comprehend the processes or procedures of making an 
asylum application, and are very likely to lack other means of social support.69 In 
addition, in much the same way as the common law doctrine of ‘common humanity’, 
it recognises that humans are vulnerable beings who can only for a very ‘short and 
foreseeably finite period’ endure destitution.70  
  
Moreover, and crucially, dignity was used to unlock an assessment of destitution that 
progressed beyond the limited assessment of its physical impact, as an exclusive 
factor in determining the minimum level of severity. For instance, Lord Hope after 
reiterating the importance of human dignity to the second part of the Pretty test, 
which encompasses dignity, emphasised that ‘humiliation and sense of despair’ was 
a factor to be assessed in meeting the threshold of severity. 71  Similarly, Lord Scott 
argued that a sense of ‘growing despair and loss of self-respect’ were part of the 
overall assessment. 72  Richard Edwards has suggested that these references 
reinforce the potential for degrading treatment to be applicable to the ‘bare fact of 
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sleeping rough’ as it difficult to detach such a fact from the invariable (and severe) 
humiliation and despair that results from destitution.73  
The importance of dignity to a holistic assessment of destitution is potentially 
supported by the strong role granted to human dignity in the earlier High Court 
decisions of Q and T, which addressed similar issues. These cases emphasised that 
human dignity required a consideration of the impact of destitution on the emotional 
dimension of personality. In T, for instance, Kay J recognised that the decision in 
Pretty could be used to ‘illustrate that the consequences of the treatment [destitution] 
are not limited to physical injury or illness’ and could be used to ‘emphasise the 
importance, in the context of Article 3, of respect for human dignity.’74 In these cases, 
as Richard Edwards argues, ‘separate weight’ was attached, as a consequence of 
focus on human dignity, to the ‘humiliation and sense of despair that results from 
exposure to the elements, associated risks to health and safety and lack of access to 
sanitary facilities.’75 The distinctive contribution of dignity in Q and T, and to an 
extent Limbuela, is to emphasise the importance of material stability to the well-being 
of the victim as an aspect of Art 3. The consequence of such a dignity focus is that 
an obligation on the state to prevent destitution may occur earlier, rather than later. 
Rather than waiting to see whether a person would slip in to extreme hardship, it 
requires support at earlier stage before physical suffering becomes too extreme.76 
Moreover, it recognises the importance of the future to the unfolding of human 
personality, ensuring that the lives of people are not entirely absorbed with seeking 
subsistence in the short-term. Human dignity, as Catherine Dupré argues, ensures 
that ‘people can keep looking forward to their life…in this sense dignity has a 
compelling aspirational dimension and is closely related to hope.’77 
Although these cases do recognise the importance of the minimal necessities of life 
to the protection and promotion of human dignity, it is possible to conceive them as 
adopting the narrow reading of degrading treatment, whereby a state is only liable for 
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a breach when it decides to expressly exclude persons from work and social 
security.78 This potentially limits the usefulness of Art 3 for certain groups who may 
not be officially excluded from work or social provision, but are nevertheless 
dependent on social care.79 it is not surprising that some of their Lordships refrained 
from setting down a more general principle, which would have gone beyond that 
which was necessary to resolve the particular dispute, and further intensified the 
strained relationship with the other branches of government in relation to a sensitive 
issue.80 However, some of the dicta in Limbuela suggest that a wider obligation can 
be derived from Art 3. Lord Brown, for instance, suggested that the outcome of the 
case would not be different if a ban on work was lifted but someone who was 
unemployable was left destitute and that any analysis of the obligations under Art 3 
should elide the unhelpful negative-positive dichotomy in favour of an assessment of 
state responsibility.81  
Later cases support this wider reading of Art 3.It has thus been held in a case 
concerning a complaint about inadequate pensions provision that it ‘cannot exclude 
that State responsibility could arise for “treatment” where an applicant, in 
circumstances wholly dependent on State support, found herself faced with official 
indifference when in a situation of serious deprivation or want incompatible with 
human dignity.’ 82   This entails an expansive understanding of ‘treatment’ which 
requires only the ‘official indifference’ of the state towards those who exist within a 
relationship of dependence who cannot take measures to provide for themselves 
and are thus wholly reliant on the support of others to avoid destitution. This 
obligation depends on the particular degree of vulnerability of the victim in a 
relational matrix of interdependence, and the attitude expressed by the state in 
response to that particular vulnerability.83 
3.1.3. Human Vulnerability and the Spectrum of Dependency  
The high threshold of severity established under Article 3 and the generally 
prohibitive nature of that Article might suggest that it provides a limited basis for 
securing dignity for particularly vulnerable people that extends beyond a deprivation 
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of basic existential needs. However, in the field of detention, the ECrtHR has been 
willing to find violations of Art 3 on the basis of inadequate conditions of care and 
environment.84 Interestingly, in this field, the concepts of dignity and vulnerability 
have had a key role to play.85 A noticeable trend in detention cases is the recognition 
that the removal of liberty renders prisoners subject to the control and authority of 
the state, which gives rise to vulnerability leading to clear concerns for human 
dignity.86 The combination of these principles has led to recognition that a deliberate 
violation is not a necessary component of Art 3 and can, instead, be based on a 
failure in the coordination between public bodies, as well as a lack of respect and 
concern for the needs of a detainee expressed by the detention system as a whole.87 
Moreover, the concepts have been deployed to recognize that, whilst in detention, 
certain groups may be in a particular state of dependency and that inadequate 
conditions of detention can still damage the personality of a person suffering from a 
pre-existing illness, even if the State is not the cause of that illness, by affecting the 
way it evolves and manifests itself over time.88  
 
A good example of the domestic courts taking such an approach is the decision 
reached in Napier v Scottish Ministers, where a remand prisoner was successful in 
arguing that the conditions of detention was a violation of Art 3.89 In this case, the 
cell of the detainee lacked ventilation, lighting and living space, being recognised by 
the court as ‘disgustingly smelly, stuffy, gloomy and cramped.’ 90  The sanitation 
facilities were also recognised as ‘poor’, which included the victim being exposed to 
‘slopping out’.91 The effects of these aspects of detention led to a severe outbreak of 
his eczema from which he had ‘suffered throughout his life’.92 In what has been 
described as a ‘thoughtful, carefully constructed judgment, interspersed with external 
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benchmarks’, 93  Lord Bonamy held that the combined effect of the features of 
detention were enough to ‘diminish his human dignity and to arouse in him feelings 
of anxiety, anguish, inferiority and humiliation’ in contravention of Art 3. 94  In 
particular, Lord Bonamy addressed the mental effect of the ‘oppressive’ living 
environment on the applicant, noting that the applicant suffered, as a reasonable 
consequence of the conditions, feelings of ‘shame, disgust, loss of self-esteem, low 
mood, anxiety, tension and anger…[resulting in a stressful environment].’95   
 
Although the consequences of these emotions were not necessarily the deliberate 
intention of the State to humiliate, Lord Bonamy was willing to recognize that ‘many 
features of the regime seemed designed to stamp a mark of inferiority on the 
petitioner’96 and, as such, was harmful to mental health because ‘it impressed on the 
inmate that he was treated as someone who was not esteemed by the institution or 
by society at large - it denigrated the person as an individual’.97 It was therefore 
sufficient that the conditions of detention as a whole failed to express sufficient 
respect for the victim in order for a violation to be found. Importantly, from the 
perspective of investment dignity, Lord Bonamy recognised the interaction between 
the psychological effects of detention and the episode of severe eczema. It was thus 
held that the resurgence of eczema was a consequence of the ‘stress’ experienced 
by the living conditions.98 This adopts a strongly holistic approach to the mind-body 
by referring to expert evidence of psychologists to recognize the affect that mental 
distress can have on the manifestations of a physical illness. It also reflects the 
becoming of human personality, by recognizing that the detention worsened the 
eczema, thereby affecting the personality of the victim as it evolved and manifested 
over time.99  The fact that a pre-existing mental condition is not the fault of the state 
does not mean that the state may not cause a further deterioration, or restrict prompt 
access to treatment that might alleviate the degree of suffering.100  
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A further contributing factor in the recognition of a violation of Art 3 was the limited 
opportunity to engage in structured physical and recreational activity.101 Inevitably, 
the activity of a person in detention will always be restrained for the purposes of 
reforming the character of the detainee and there will always be an element of 
hardship experienced in detention that is a consequence of the victims own 
actions. 102  However, in light of the need to restrain such activity, the applicant 
becomes more acutely vulnerable, as multiple channels of human activity become 
cut-off and the person is severely restricted from making connections that develop 
their capacities.103 There is a strong relationship of dependency between the prison 
authorities and the detainee who is reliant on the former to provide stimulation, 
including some social, physical and recreational activities, in which they are capable 
of developing and exercising their creative capacities.  
 
The pressing nature of the obligation to respect the dignity of vulnerable detainees, 
as an aspect of the case law on Art 3, has been recognised by both Luke Clements 
and Ellie Palmer. Luke Clements, for instance, has argued that Art 3 – 
 
[P]rovides a spectrum of safeguards that become more 
intense the greater the individual’s vulnerability”; the 
greater the gravity of the potential consequences; and the 
greater the constraints he or she experiences. The 
protection is graduated…104 
 
This gradation is particularly clear, according to Clements, in the context of detention 
and the duty to take measures to provide effective protection for particularly 
vulnerable persons from the actions of other private individuals, such as victims of 
domestic or parental abuse.105 Ellie Palmer has similarly argued that -   
 
[Courts appear willing] to draw a direct correlation 
between the extent of an individual’s disability and the 
positive obligations of states parties to provide services 
tailored to her health and welfare needs.106 
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The greater the vulnerability of the individual, the stronger the positive obligations 
become. This aspect of the case law, which is recognised by Palmer and Clements, 
is closely related to the idea of a ‘spectrum of dependency’ which is a central feature 
of investment dignity.107 The spectrum of dependency, as an aspect of investment 
dignity, is an important concept that entails a heightened degree of responsibility in 
relation to those who are most vulnerable and who, as a consequence, are the most 
dependent on the state to protect and promote their dignity.108  
 
However, Palmer and Clements both note that outside of the context of detention 
that Art 3 has been less prominent as a means by which to establish positive 
obligations to respect the dignity of particularly vulnerable people.109 Clements terms 
this the ‘prisoner’s dialectic’ in which deprivation of liberty is used as a ‘cliff edge’ so 
that if an applicant is ‘fractionally the wrong side of detained, then they fall and the 
court is powerless to intervene’.110 There is no reason in principle why other types of 
severe vulnerability, in which people have their liberty constrained, but not deprived, 
should not attract the protection of Art 3.111 Indeed, some marginalised people are 
often subjected to conditions that border on imprisonment. 112  The distinction 
between Art 3 and Art 8, in this framework, would potentially be on a continuum in 
which there is a ‘seamless spectrum of protections’ for human dignity, with Art 3 
covering the more extreme end of the spectrum in terms of the level of constraint, 
dependency and indignity, which the state must take ‘reasonable steps’ to 
address.113 In contrast, Art 8 covers the less extreme end, in which the state must 
consider a ‘fair balance’ between the interests of the individual and community as a 
whole.114   
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3.2. Article 8: Holistic Humanity and Dignity as a Prism  
3.2.1. Scope for Protecting and Promoting Dignity  
The scope of protection for human dignity under Article 8 is wider then Article 3 and 
is the broadest of any of the rights protected by the HRA.115 It has been interpreted 
dynamically, as David Feldman argues, to provide protection for a range of interests, 
including self-fulfilment, identity, moral integrity, organisation of relationships and 
business activities, which clearly extend beyond the original concern of protecting 
people from ‘threats to private space’.116 Human dignity has been recognised as 
inherent in that Art, with some dicta even suggesting that Art 8 includes a ‘right to 
human dignity’.117 Art 8 is, much like Art 3, a multiplicity of component concepts. It 
includes ‘respect’ for ‘private life’, ‘family life’, ‘home’ and ‘correspondence’. Each, in 
turn, has distinctive, but sometimes overlapping features. The most directly relevant 
components in terms of protecting a positive obligation to care and social support is 
respect for private and family life. There is, in this regard, according to Feldman, the 
‘potential’ for ‘generating some social or economic rights imposing positive 
obligations on states’. 118  This potential has been expressly recognised by the 
ECrtHR who have held that state parties, in principle, may need to take positive 
measures to provide sufficient funding for health care 119 , facilities for disabled 
individuals120, housing for those suffering from severe illness121 and protection from 
pollution.122 Importantly, there must be a sufficient link between the measures sought 
and the applicants’ private and family life.123  
Again, Munby J has offered the most comprehensive judicial survey of how private 
and family life relates to human dignity. Munby J has argued that Art 8, in relation to 
human dignity, includes primarily the protection of the ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ dimensions 
of human personality.124 The inner dimensions include space within which people 
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can ‘freely pursue the development and fulfilment of his personality’,125 as well as the 
protection of physical and mental integrity, which Munby J argues ‘embrace’ human 
dignity.126 These interests include the impact of measures on physical and mental 
stability or well-being, such as environmental hazards, medical care, sexual identity, 
personal information and housing assistance.127 This makes Art 8 a potentially rich 
source for the protection of a holistic concept of human dignity that recognises and 
encompasses a broad set of human needs or desires. The outer dimensions of 
human personality, in contrast, include the right to develop personality by 
establishing and forming relationships with other human beings. This inter-personal 
dimension is, perhaps, a distinct element of Art 8 that differentiates it from the scope 
of Art 3. More broadly, the outer dimension also encompasses, according to Munby 
J, a right to ‘participate in the life of the community’ and to have ‘access to essential 
economic and social activities and to an appropriate range of recreational and 
cultural activities’.128 However, this does not mean that the scope of Art 8 is open-
ended. 129  It has thus been recognised that Art 8 potentially does not cover 
interpersonal relations of a broad and indeterminate scope and does not necessarily 
extend to ‘relationships of the individual with his entire immediate surroundings, in so 
far as they do not involve human relationships’.130  Even in relation to a measure that 
adversely affects physical or mental integrity there can be no automatic recognition 
that Art 8 is engaged.131 This either suggests that some potential indignities will fall 
outside the scope of Art 8 or that some discomfort is a necessary aspect of everyday 
life.  
It has been recognised that inherent in effective respect is an obligation on the state 
to positively adopt measures ‘designed to secure respect for private life even in the 
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves’.132 The strength of the 
positive obligation, according to Munby J, is more stringent where certain people are 
shut off from what is available to the vast majority and, in such circumstances, 
matters of dignity weigh particularly heavily.133 However, the positive obligation on 
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the state is not absolute and only requires the state to take ‘reasonable and 
appropriate’ measures to secure the applicant's rights under article 8 in which ‘regard 
must be had to the fair balance that has to be struck between the competing 
interests of the individual and of the community as a whole’134 This recognises the 
reality that the dignity claims of an individual can, especially where they concern the 
allocation of resources, never be considered in isolation from the wider network of 
relationships within which an individual is always a part and must be considered in 
light of the dignity claims of others.135  
 
3.2.2. Potential for Positive Investment under Article 8: Deploying Dignity in 
the High Court 
There is thus significant potential for Art 8 to ensure a positive obligation on the state 
to protect and promote the human dignity of particularly vulnerable people.136 This 
potential has been best realised by the High Court in the cases of Bernard and East 
Sussex County Council, which were decided shortly after the HRA came in to force. 
Bernard 137  concerned a severely disabled woman with right-side paralysis. Her 
housing was completely inadequate to her needs, causing her to be confined to the 
living room. Due to her double incontinence, this meant she was left to defecate and 
urinate on the living-room floor. She also struggled to participate in the upbringing of 
her children and was particularly concerned for their safety when being left alone 
with them. Additionally, she could not lead an independent life, being incapable of 
leaving the property due to the fact there were steps to the front door.  
 
The High Court held that there had been a violation of Article 8, as the State had 
failed to provide suitably adapted accommodation. 138  Sullivan J recognised that 
suitably adapted accommodation would have: 
[F]acilitated the normal incidents of family life, for 
example the second claimant would have been able to 
move around her home to some extent and would have 
been able to play some part…in looking after their 
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children. It would also have secured her ‘physical and 
psychological integrity’. She would no longer have 
been housebound, confined to a shower chair for most 
of the day, lacking privacy in the most undignified of 
circumstances, but would have been to operate again 
as part of her family and as a person in her own right, 
rather than being a burden, wholly dependent upon the 
rest of her family. In short, it would have restored her 
dignity as a human being.139 
Dignity is used here an overarching concept to encompass and connect a number of 
different dimensions of human personality, which, importantly, includes the 
promotion of activity and rest for mind and body. One of those dimensions includes 
the power of her body to move and interact with the home environment, as well as 
the ability to control the conditions under which she was able to use the toilet. 
Similarly, dignity was used to recognise the importance of enabling Mrs Bernard to 
develop her personality by forming relationships with other people and bodies in a 
way that would promote the capability to affect and be affected, which was also 
central to a sense of mental well-being in terms of avoiding feelings of isolation, 
humiliation and insecurity.140 The unsuitable accommodation not only restricted the 
mobility of the claimant, but also caused her health to deteriorate.141 In order to 
respect dignity, it was important to provide accommodation that enabled the claimant 
to affect the pace of deterioration by ensuring that she was subject to conditions that 
would not diminish her characteristic functioning prematurely.   
The vulnerability of the applicant played a particularly important role in the case in 
determining the existence of a positive obligation to promote the above dignity 
interests of the applicant. Thus, according to Sullivan J, whilst there was no general 
right to a home under Art 8, the applicant was part of a ‘particularly vulnerable group’ 
and, as a consequence, ‘positive measures…[had] to be taken (by way of community 
care facilities) to enable them to enjoy, so far as possible, a normal private and 
family life’. 142  In this regard, Sullivan J noted the applicants particular living 
conditions were so bad that it was ‘virtually impossible’ to have ‘any meaningful 
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private or family life for the purposes of Art 8.’143 This, it is suggested, adopts similar 
reasoning to Munby J in East Sussex County Council and, potentially, as discussed 
in reference to that case, protects investment dignity by prioritising the acutely 
vulnerable who are subject to multiple disadvantages in which many different 
channels of human activity and rest are blocked.   
This leads to the second High Court case to consider the argument that human 
dignity entails a positive obligation to respect the care needs of particularly 
vulnerable people.144 East Sussex County Council (No 2) concerned the lifting of two 
severely disabled individuals with learning difficulties. East Sussex County Council 
had developed a policy implementing manual handling regulations, which generally 
prevented care staff from personal lifting. 145  The applicants complained that the 
policy restricted the possibility of manual lifting that was needed in order for them to 
engage in activities outside the home, including shopping, swimming and horse-
riding, as well as access to basic facilities, such as toilets.146 Inside the home, the 
applicants complained that mechanical handling had caused them, on a number of 
occasions, significant distress and concern.147 Munby J therefore had to consider 
whether there was a positive obligation under Art 8 to provide for manual lifts.   
Munby J recognised that human dignity was contextually sensitive and would not 
always be best respected by personal handling. 148  As, in some cases, the 
‘independently minded but physically disabled person might prefer to hoist himself 
up’.149 However, in the particular context, Munby J was willing to recognise that the 
applicant’s human dignity could require personal handling. In this regard, a blanket 
policy restricting personal handling, which applied indiscriminately, was incapable of 
responding to the particular dignity interests of the specific claimants. 150  This 
contextually sensitive approach to human dignity, therefore, led to a focus on the 
individuality and difference of the particular disabled individuals in the specific 
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encounter, responding to their person-specific needs and concerns. 151 Dignity, as in 
this case, takes account of the ‘relative’ needs of disabled people.152  
In order to address the particular needs of the applicants, Munby J articulated a 
number of relevant dignity interests, such as the ability to develop personality, 
participate in the life of the community and to have access to an appropriate range of 
recreational and cultural activities.153 This is, according to Munby J, ‘matched’ by the 
positive obligation of the state to take appropriate measures designed to ensure that 
a disabled person to the ‘greatest extent feasible’ is not left ‘so circumscribed and so 
isolated as to be deprived of the possibility of developing his personality’.154  Where 
that life is already circumscribed, then anything which ‘impacts upon what remains 
to…a [severely disabled] person of the pleasure of life is commensurately 
important’.155 Therefore, for those who are severely disabled, ‘enhanced weight’ is 
attached to their dignity interests, as they are ‘already deprived of so much of what 
makes life enjoyable and enriching for the majority’.156 Applying these principles to 
the particular facts, Munby J held that the remaining activities of the applicant was 
able to engage in, such as bathing, shopping, swimming and horse-riding, were of 
‘great importance’ to the applicant, for which there could be a positive obligation to 
enable through personal lifting.157 This is consistent with the reasoning in Bernard 
and can be connected to investment dignity, which imposes a responsibility to 
prioritise investment into the most vulnerable who live in the most circumscribed 
conditions and the most isolated conditions..158  
This definition of vulnerability is important for delimiting the possible boundaries of 
the obligation of the state to invest in human potentiality. It provides a basis for 
determining when ‘enhanced weight’ should be attached to the dignity claims of the 
applicant in comparison to the claims of others. It is, for instance, possible to 
distinguish a case like East Sussex, from a case like Botta, decided at the regional 
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level, on the basis of the degree of vulnerability.159 Botta concerned a physically 
disabled applicant who was unable to access or make use of a private beach at a 
particular holiday destination.160 The crux of the reasoning was that the effect of not 
allowing access to a single private beach was not sufficiently serious to violate the 
positive obligation under Art 8, as the applicant had access to an appropriate range 
of alternative social, recreational and cultural activities.161 The applicant in Botta, 
unlike those in Bernard and East Sussex, was not so isolated or circumscribed that 
they could not make connections with others that would extend or develop their 
capacities. Vulnerability, in this regard, acts as a restraining factor, setting the outer 
boundary and limits of the positive obligation under Art 8.162  
The judge also held that there was a positive obligation to provide personal lifts in 
the home for the applicants. Munby J placed particular emphasis on the personal 
experiences and emotional welfare of the applicants. The applicants had, on 
previous occasions, been put at risk from the hoisting system, resulting in the 
applicants becoming noticeably distressed by the prospect of mechanical lifting. 163 
Munby J held that there could be a positive obligation to provide personal lifting to 
respect the dignity interests of the individual, particularly by avoiding a situation in 
which the applicants might be forced to sit in the bath for too long, left sedentary with 
the risk of bedsores, or left sitting in bodily waste.164 This takes a holistic approach to 
the interests of the individual, specifically in terms of simultaneously promoting 
emotional fulfilment, relaxation, personal hygiene and physical mobility. More 
importantly, the reasoning of Munby J protects the applicants from a form of good 
intentions vulnerability by ensuring that a measure based on the ‘good intention’ of 
protecting an already vulnerable person, in this case mechanical lifting, does not 
                                                          
159
 See Luke Clements and Janet Read, Disabled People and European Human Rights: A review of 
the implications of the 1998 Human Rights Act for disabled children and adults in the UK (Policy 
Press, 2003).   
160
 Botta v Italy (1998) 26 EHRR 241.   
161
 East Sussex case (n 2) 102.  
162
 Lisa Waddington, ‘Unravelling the Knot: Article 8, private life, positive duties and disability: 
rewriting Sentges v. Netherlands’ in Eva Brems, Diversity and European Human Rights: Rewriting 
Judgments of the ECHR (CUP, 2003) 339. 
163
 East Sussex case (n 2) 20.  
164
 Ibid 114, 154.    
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
178 
 
expose that person to conditions that make them miserable and entirely passive.165
  
Whilst significant weight should be placed on promoting the interests of those who 
exist within the most circumscribed and isolated conditions, it is vital not to exclude a 
consideration of the interests of others that might be affected by a decision. A full 
assessment of the dignity interests of the individual must take into consideration all 
those affected by a decision within their network of interdependence. 166 Within this 
model we cannot readily separate the interests of those within the network of 
relationships and we must, as such, treat the good of the one as an aspect of the 
good of the ‘other’.167  As stated in chapter two, attending to what enhances personal 
joy and empowerment, will also entail fostering the joy and empowerment of others 
who may be involved in the care of the individual on the basis that their interests are 
closely tied together.   
  
A concern for the dignity interests of others was readily evident in the East Sussex 
case where Munby J held that the carers of the disabled applicants also had dignity 
interests and, in the circumstances, such dignity interests had to be weighed against 
the dignity interests of the two severely disabled children. This included the risk of 
physical injury to the professional carers involved in manual handling, which, 
according to Munby J, was an interest in competition with the interests of the 
disabled children.  In balancing these interests, it was held that hoisting could not be 
precluded in every situation where there was a measurable impairment to the rights 
of the disabled children, nor could manual lifting be permissible only if the particular 
lift is physically incapable of being achieved by a hoist or in exceptional 
circumstance. As noted, Munby J held that the interests of the disabled children 
weighed heavily in the balance, and were of such importance, that a significant 
amount of manual handling was required, although the interests of the disabled 
person can’t be an overriding consideration in all circumstances. In this context, as in 
others previously addressed, Munby J took a pragmatic, sensible and robust 
approach to the management of perceived risk. 
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A greater focus on the reflexive dimension of dignity might go further than this and 
treat the dignity interests of the carers as part of the interests of the two disabled 
individuals, as well as the interests of the children as part of the carers, and not as 
entirely separable interests to be understood as in competition.168  Harm to one 
person in a caring relationship is harm to another. Charles Foster, writing on human 
dignity, alongside Jonathan Herring in relation to an ethics of care, have jointly 
argued in this respect that attempts to pit the rights of the carer and the cared for 
against one another is out of place. This unjustifiably separates the interests of the 
parties in relationships of care and dependency. They propose that assessment of 
the intermingled nature of the interests should emphasise the responsibilities owed 
to one another in the context of mutually supporting relationships based on 
reciprocity, accommodation and compromise.169 
Although there is primarily a discussion of balancing competing interests in East 
Sussex, perhaps because of the existence of risk of physical harm to the carers, the 
idea that interests can become intermingled is implicitly recognised by Munby J in his 
claim that the compassion of the carer is an aspect of the dignity of the carer.170 The 
dignity of the carer therefore pertains to a wider range of interests then physical 
safety of the individual, encompassing altruistic acts as an essential part of being 
human, although, importantly, such care does not extend so far as to demand 
abnegation or self-sacrifice.171  
In conclusion, the early case law of the High Court under the HRA began to realise 
the potential of Article 8 to create positive obligation to protect the dignity of the 
particularly vulnerable. The cases of Bernard and East Sussex adopt similar 
approaches and a number of trends can be extracted from the reasoning. Most 
notably, they both suggest that human dignity is a holistic concept that encompasses 
different dimensions of humanity and, in addition, respect for such dimensions is 
context dependent, relative to the particular experiences of certain vulnerable 
groups. The most vulnerable being those who are forced to live in particularly 
circumscribed and isolated conditions.   
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3.2.3. Limiting Positive Investment under Article 8: Dignity in the Supreme 
Court  
It was some eleven years after the HRA 1998 came into force that the UKSC was 
faced with addressing the issue of how far Art 8 can be used to establish a positive 
obligation to provide a particularly vulnerable group, such as the disabled, with 
welfare support. In the case of R (on the application of McDonald) v Royal Borough 
of Kensington and Chelsea, the UKSC was required to consider whether the Local 
Authority was entitled to withdraw an overnight carer in favour of meeting the needs 
of Ms McDonald through incontinence pads as a more economic option. 172 The 
applicant had required a night-time carer to gain access safely to a commode, 
without a risk of falling or injuring herself. Her neurogenetic bladder had meant that 
she needed to urinate much more frequently than normal. In July 2008 the local 
authority had assessed the needs of Ms McDonald to be that of access to a 
commode at night under the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 
and Chronically Sick and Disabled Persons Act 1970. However, in October 2008 the 
authority informed Ms McDonald that it intended to reduce the available funding and 
that a night-time carer could no longer be provided. The Court of Appeal had 
previously found that during this period there had been a breach of statutory duty as 
there had been no reassessment of her needs, which was a requirement under the 
Act. Care plan reviews in November 2009 and July 2010 had concluded that Ms 
McDonald needs were night-time toileting and that those needs could be met more 
appropriately by the provision of incontinence pads.  
Rationality: Incontinence and Disability 
The first ground of appeal was narrowly framed by the parties and limited to the 
issue of whether the CA had been correct to hold that the 2009 and 2010 care plan 
reviews were to be understood as including a reassessment of her needs though 
there had been no separate needs assessment. The majority held that the reviews 
were indeed to be read as including a reassessment of the needs of the appellant 
and that it was irrelevant that there was no additional documentation. 
In the minority, Lady Hale chose to address a much broader point of general public 
importance not raised by the parties, which was specifically whether it was lawful, in 
accordance with Wednesbury reasonableness, to provide incontinence pads for a 
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person who is not in fact incontinent but requires help to get to the lavatory or 
commode.  
The decision to focus on a point not raised by counsel, and her reasoning in finding 
irrationality in the decision-making process of the local authority, were subject to 
strong criticism by three of the majority judges. The central question for Lady Hale 
was how the needs of Ms McDonald were to be defined under legislation. Hale 
distinguished between two separate questions. First, what are the needs of the 
disabled person; and second, what is necessary to meet those needs. Disagreeing 
with the previous authority of Barry, she argued that resources should figure in the 
second question of determining the most appropriate means of achieving a need, but 
not in the question of defining that need. In relation to addressing the second 
question, Lady Hale argued that Ms McDonald could be expected to cooperate with 
the local authority by choosing the most cost effective means of achieving the need, 
properly defined, such as Sheltered Housing Schemes or Homeshare Schemes.  
Lady Hale nonetheless did not feel it was necessary to find Barry wrongly decided to 
establish that the decision-making of the authority irrational. Noting that there were 
two questions, including identification of need, and appropriate means to realise 
those needs, Lady Hale argued that the need to get the lavatory or commode were 
so different from the need for protection from uncontrollable bodily functions it was 
irrational to confuse the two, and meet one need in the way that is appropriate for the 
other. The issue was whether the local authority had identified the correct question 
and responded in a rational way. Thus, as a consequence of mischaracterising the 
needs of Ms McDonald, the local authority had never asked itself how to meet those 
needs.  She concluded by expressing her concern with wider consequences of the 
way in which the needs of Ms McDonald had been mischaracterised. She noted in 
particular the concern that it might logically enable the removal of a night-time carer 
from someone who needed to defecate at night and that help could be removed 
during the day subject to changing the pads to avoid infection.  
Her judgment, as noted above, was subject to a number of strong critical comments 
from the other judges. Robert H George has suggested that many of the criticisms 
directed at the judgment of Lady Hale by the majority were misplaced and 
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
182 
 
misconstrue the points raised in her dissenting judgment.173 This includes, firstly, the 
claim by Lady Hale that it might well have been open to the local authority to provide 
her with Extra Care Sheltered Housing or a House Share Scheme. This was an 
option that Ms McDonald had expressly rejected, and consequently Lord Brown 
argued that Lady Hale had failed to grasp the fact that the very solution that is 
mentioned had previously been rejected. However, this, according to George, is a 
misreading of Lady Hale, whose point was limited to the claim that the local authority 
had ‘mischaracterised Ms McDonalds needs and so had never asked itself how to 
meet those needs.’174 In this respect, had the authority asked the right questions it 
was ‘possible that they might have reached this answer’ and the options proffered 
‘might be acceptable, regardless of Ms McDonald’s views on it.’175 
Lord Walker further addressed the dignity issues in response to the suggestion by 
Lady Hale that the reasoning of the majority might logically imply that someone could 
be left lying in her own faeces. Lord Walker stated that it was unfortunate that Lady 
Hale should refer to defecation in her judgment, despite the fact that there was 
evidence that it was a concern of the applicant, and that Lord Walker recognised that 
it was necessary to ‘think about’ faeces.176 Lord Walker appears to treat urination as 
different, suggesting that ‘most people’ would agree that use of incontinence pads for 
urination may be ‘unpleasant and undignified’ but a great deal ‘less so’ then for 
faces. The difference, then, appears to be one of degree in terms of the impact on 
the dignity of the applicant and not a distinction in kind. In which case, as George 
notes, it was legitimate to raise defecation as a concern.177 
In response to the specific claim that the measure was irrational in the Wednesbury 
sense, Lord Walker offered a strong critique of the arguments offered by Lady Hale. 
Lord Walker stated obiter that the position reached by the local authority could not be 
considered irrational (in the Wednesbury sense). The council was entitled to take 
account of costs in assessing the ‘needs’ of the applicant and had, in addition, come 
to the reasonable conclusion that the use of incontinence pads would maximise 
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privacy, independence and security. 178  He further pointed to a range of expert 
evidence that suggested that use of incontinence pads, even for people who were 
not in fact incontinent, was widespread and accepted practice. It is clear that such 
evidence did inform the judgment of Lady Hale, although she argued there was no 
accepted practice in effect to oblige the client to accept incontinence.179  
Nevertheless, Lady Hale did not appear to say that the outcome was necessarily 
irrational, only that the ‘decision-making process was irrational because it treated 
mobility problems and incontinence as being the same need’.180  In summary, then, 
Lady Hale can reasonably be understood to have argued that the decision-making 
process was irrational in the way it had mischaracterised the needs of Ms McDonald. 
This resulted in a situation where it had not addressed the question of how to best 
meet those needs, which had important consequences for the dignity of the 
individual. Had the authorities asked the right questions, it might had been open to 
them to then have offered sheltered care, which Ms McDonald could not 
unreasonably reject.  
Applicability of Article 8 ECHR 
The second ground of appeal concerned whether the measure had been a violation 
of Art 8 ECHR. There were at least two ways in which this matter might have been 
addressed by the Court. First, was in terms of whether there was a positive obligation 
to provide ‘night-time care’ in order to enable a disabled person to access the toilet, 
which is how the applicant characterised her claim before the ECrtHR. In order to 
establish a positive obligation, and for Article 8 to be applicable, there must be a 
direct and immediate link between the requested measure and the private life of the 
applicant. In order to discharge the obligation the State must adopt reasonable and 
suitable measures to respect the private life of the individual. In determining whether 
an obligation exists, and what steps should be taken, regard must be had to fair 
balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of the individual and of 
the community as a whole. At the ECHR level, this entails the provision a wide 
margin of appreciation by states in terms of determining whether the steps to be 
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taken. Strictly speaking, such a doctrine is irrelevant at the domestic level, as it is 
premised on the principle of subsidiarity.181  
Munby J, as noted earlier, has added to these principles, recognising that, where a 
severely disabled person is already forced to live a highly circumscribed and isolated 
life, anything that further impacts on their quality of life is of commensurate 
importance, and their interests must be given enhanced weight in the balancing 
exercise. Moreover, the positive obligation under Art 8 to secure human dignity ‘calls 
for human empathy and humane concern as society…seeks to try to ameliorate and 
compensate for…disabilities.’182  
The second option available to the Court was to address whether the withdrawal of 
night-time care, and requiring her to use incontinence pads, even though she was not 
incontinent, constituted an unjustifiable interference. Assuming such measures 
interfere with Article 8, they must be necessary to achieve a legitimate aim under Art 
8.2.  The choice of approach is not insignificant. It is clear that the Courts (at least the 
ECrtHR) are much more likely to find a direct interference, then to ‘find the state is 
under a positive obligation where the interferences are linked to the consequences of 
impairment or disability.’183 
It appears that Lord Brown, who addressed the Art 8 issue, primarily considered the 
applicants claim in terms of whether there was positive obligation to provide night 
care. He noted that, ‘even assuming’ a direct and immediate link existed between the 
measure sought (night care) and private life, one only had to consider the facts of 
many of the ECHR cases on disability to ‘recognise the hopelessness of the article 8 
argument in the present case’.184 This follows the line of ECHR cases relating to 
disability, which have been resolved on the basis of an assumption of applicability. 
Such cases have been criticised on the basis that merely supposing applicability 
cannot take the place of paying proper attention at the definitional stage.185 This 
leaves the case unclear as to whether the criteria for establishing a positive 
obligation have been met, and why those criteria may have been met in relation to 
the particular circumstances.  
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In order to clarify the threshold for establishing a positive obligation to reduce the 
disadvantages faced by disabled persons, it is important that Courts, when faced with 
such cases, specify clearly how inaction might affect the interests protected by Article 
8 and whether the criteria for positive obligations have been satisfied. Such clarity is 
vital in terms of distinguishing between the issue of whether the complaint falls within 
the scope of the right and the review of its justification.186 Moreover, establishing 
whether the Article 8 is applicable is essential to enabling a parallel consideration of 
Art 14, which may be used to ‘effectively accommodate the needs of disabled people 
and to ensure that they are not subject to discrimination because of the environment 
which they inhabit.’187  
Lord Brown went on to claim that the case law of the ECHR was consistent with the 
decisions of domestic courts. Citing with approval the CA decision in Anunfrijeva, he 
went on to argue that there will be very few situations where the: 
[P]redicament of an individual will be such that article 8 
requires him to be provided with welfare support, where his 
predicament is not sufficiently severe to engage article 3. 
Article 8 may more readily be engaged where a family unit is 
involved.188 
Although recognising that a positive obligation under article 8 might arise in very 
exceptional circumstances, where a family unit was not involved, Lord Brown held 
that it could not be plausibly argued that respect, privacy and autonomy were not 
afforded to the applicant. The authority had gone to great lengths to consult the 
appellant about their needs and possible means of meeting those needs. He then 
proceeded to argue that interference could not be established and that, ‘even if’ 
interference ‘were’ established, it would be easily justified under Art 8(2). There is a 
degree of uncertainty around whether this point is still concerned with a positive 
obligation, such as whether a failure to addresses the consequences of impairment 
constitutes an interference, or whether Lord Brown was in fact addressing at this 
stage the separate point that the reduction in the care constituted an interference. It 
is notable that a consideration of Art 8(2) is unusual in relation to positive obligations.  
                                                          
186
 Ibid. 
187
 Olivier De Shutter, ‘Reasonable Accommodations and Positive Obligations in the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ in Anna Lawson and Caroline Gooding, Disability Rights in Europe: 
From Theory to Practice (OUP, 2005) 35. 
188
 McDonald v RBKC (n 209) 18. 
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
186 
 
Ambit of Article 8: Holistic and Contextual Dignity  
It is important to be clear at the definitional stage as to whether appropriate access 
to a toilet at night for a disabled person, who is able to control their bodily functions, 
might fall within the scope of the concept of “private life”. This will be central to 
establishing what measures can be deemed ‘appropriate and reasonable’ for the 
purposes of determining the content of any positive obligations and whether an 
interference has occurred. If, for instance, provision of support at night to enable a 
person to urinate safely is understood to ensure that a person can live with dignity 
and autonomy, then the right to respect for private life may well be appropriately 
realised through the use of incontinence pads. On the other hand, if obliging 
someone to behave as if they cannot control their bodily functions, when they in fact 
can, does not enable a person to live with dignity and autonomy, then a right to 
respect for private life may not be appropriately respected by the provision of 
incontinence pads. Furthermore, defining clearly what the interests of a disabled 
person encompasses is important to establishing their particular needs, which the 
authorities must have due regard for in the ‘fair balance’ test.189 In this regard, it is 
notable that Lord Brown engaged in limited discussion of the content of the interests 
protected by Art 8, although noting that the authorities afforded some degree of 
respect for dignity and autonomy, as well as safety and independence.190  
 
It is argued here that access to a toilet for a disabled person who can control their 
bodily functions does relate to private life and the inability to access such facilities 
may have a significant impact on the dignity interests of applicant. In this regard, a 
disabled person who can control their bodily functions may have a vital interest 
protected by the Convention in receiving support necessary to access a toilet. 
Private life, as was seen above, encompasses the protection of the dignity interests 
of an applicant. This requires a holistic consideration of the potential and 
simultaneous impact of inaccessibility to basic facilities on the social, mental, 
recreational and physical functioning of the individual. It cannot be denied that failure 
to provide appropriate access to toileting facilities for a continent person, who wishes 
to remain active and mobile, is likely to give rise to feelings of humiliation and 
distress, capable of impinging on dignity, and quality of life. It is well-documented 
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that urinary incontinence has multiple implications for the sufferer, including 
depression and shame associated with not being able to control bodily functions.191  
Of course, in many cases, incontinence is unavoidable and measures can only be 
taken to help individuals cope with the negative feelings associated with loss of 
bodily functioning. In this respect, incontinence pads, like hoisting in East Sussex, 
may be the most effective means of preserving the dignity of the applicant. In some 
cases, as Lady Hale recognises, there may even be people who can control their 
bodily functioning who consider incontinence pads a ‘more convenient, comfortable 
and safer way of solving the problem.’192 In this regard, and as mentioned above, 
dignity is responsive to the context-specific needs of a disabled person and a one-
size fits all approach may not be suitable to determining those needs.  
At least in cases where a person is unwilling to act as if they were incontinent, when 
they can in fact control their bodily functioning, certain negative feelings may conflict 
with the image of the self, which might reasonably be avoided. In its decision in 
McDonald, the ECrtHR recognised the concerns of older people that they may be 
forced to linger in ‘states of advanced physical or mental decrepitude which 
conflicted with their strongly held ideas of personal identity’.193 In this regard, it went 
on to accept that the applicant faced living in a manner that conflicted with her 
‘strongly held ideas of self and personal identity’ and the use of incontinence pads 
could have ‘undignified and distressing’ consequences.194 The Court then expressly 
endorsed the opinion of Baroness Hale and held that human dignity fell within Art 8 
and stated that the principle was infringed when ‘someone who could control her 
bodily functions was obliged to behave as if she could not’.195 
The prospect of significant distress at not being able to access the toilet is, it is 
argued, to be expected in light of the way that the use of incontinence pads for a 
disabled person could result in reduced bodily functioning and physical activity. 
Negative emotions, as well as the way in which obliged incontinence contrasts with 
strongly held ideas of personal identity, relate to the way in which characteristic 
bodily functioning and mobility may be prematurely diminished. As argued in chapter 
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two, experiencing a certain emotion, such as shame, is an idea in the mind that 
perceives the body and its modifications in a certain way. Mental processes map 
body states, from which a mental image of the body can emerge, which act as the 
basis of emotion. In this respect, being obliged to act as a person who cannot control 
bodily functioning can be registered by feelings of despair, distress and humiliation. 
These emotions indicate the modifications in the characteristic functioning of the 
body. The protection of the bodily functioning of the individual is potentially captured 
by Art 8, at least for the disabled, which has been held to address issues of mobility 
and quality of life, as well as compensatory measures to ameliorate the impact of 
disability as an aspect of physical integrity.  
 
Previous case law, as well as international treaties setting down obligations in 
regards to disabled persons, supports the contention that a lack of night-time care 
may fall within the scope of Article 8. In East Sussex, Munby J held that not only 
would Art 8 be engaged, but also Art 3, if the consequence of failing to personally lift 
a person would mean they could not access a toilet, or would be left remaining sitting 
in ‘bodily waste’, unable to be moved for an appreciable period of time. 196 
Presumably, this reasoning would be especially relevant to a person who is capable 
of controlling their bodily functioning.  
 
It is notable that in the interpretation of the Convention, courts will draw inspiration 
from other international instruments, including the ‘evolving norms of national and 
international law.’ 197  This method of interpretation has had an impact on the 
development of positive obligations under Article 8 in other contexts, and has led to a 
narrowing of any margin of appreciation afforded to states where a growing 
international consensus can be demonstrated. 198  Of particular relevance in this 
context is the CRPD, which contains a number of obligations that are pertinent to the 
treatment of disabled persons, and are designed to promote dignity. The most 
important of which is Article 19 that provides a right to live in the community, which 
includes ensuring that persons with disabilities have access to a range of in-home 
residential and community support services, including personal assistance 
necessary to support living in the community. They should also have the opportunity 
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to choose their place of residence and not be obliged to live in a particular living 
arrangement. These rights are further supported by Art 26 and Art 25 of the EU 
Charter on Fundamental Rights.  
  
One of the others interests protected by Article 8, which may be relevant in this 
context, and was referred to by the ECrtHR, is the ‘development of the personality’ of 
the individual. Whilst the development of personality under the Convention is 
commonly associated with the possibility of developing relationships with others and 
the outside world, it also includes the ‘intimate’ dimensions of bodily functioning, 
which are also central to personal identity. Indeed, case law on Article 8 has 
attached significant weight to the ‘intimate aspect’199  of private life and it has been 
claimed that ‘acts of daily living’ are more likely to be treated as central to the 
‘fulfillment of one’s personality’ in cases relating to disability under Article 8.200  
 
The concept of personality, it is suggested, is also capable of embracing a 
consideration of the impact of action or inaction of an authority on the unfolding and 
development of the personality of the person into the future. In this respect, it can 
encompass a wider temporal perspective on the interests of the applicant. This was 
a clear consideration of Lady Hale, who placed particular emphasis on the impact of 
obliging incontinence on the applicant prematurely, as this can lead to a person 
becoming ‘unnecessarily dependent’ upon them and make them behave as if they 
cannot control their bodily functions, when, in fact, they can do.201 According to 
Dupré, this aspect of the reasoning of Lady Hale recognises the importance of 
ensuring that a person who was already in a situation of great dependence is not 
forced into one of greater dependence.202 Dignity is concerned with protecting as 
long as possible a tolerable status quo. Incontinence pads are also not risk free, and 
evidence suggests they carry the prospect of ‘infection and compromised skin 
viability.’203 There premature use thus has the possibility of diminishing ‘human time’ 
by denying people the ability to affect the speed with which they undergo the process 
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of deterioration (if inevitable) and, in addition, leads to their characteristic functioning 
being diminished prematurely.  
 
A concern related to increased dependence is that (obliged) incontinence might 
accelerate the process of deterioration in social functioning by leading to premature 
institutionalisation. Clements has suggested that ‘incontinence (albeit that, in this 
case, it is forced incontinence) is the second greatest cause for older people being in 
institutionalised in the United Kingdom.’ 204  This is undoubtedly contentious, and 
Clements does not provide the necessary evidence to support it and it is not clear 
whether the necessary evidence would be relevant to obliged incontinence. 
However, a number of studies do provide data that suggest that urinary incontinence 
can be a significant risk factor associated with admission to an institutional care 
setting.205 Incontinence is further related to resultant risks of despair, shame and 
depression, which have also been recognised in studies as associated prognostic 
indicators of institutionalisation.206 Further evidence has suggested, as noted above, 
that incontinence pads should not be offered prematurely in case a person becomes 
unnecessarily dependent on them. 
 
Obliging incontinence might therefore diminish the prospect of the person to 
‘participate in the life of the community’ and to remain in their home, which, as was 
discussed in the previous chapter, has a ‘relational structure’ providing emotional 
warmth, security and the commitment of human relationship.207 It is notable that, in 
other contexts, such as moving elderly persons from their care home on an 
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involuntary basis, the ECrtHR has been willing to countenance expert evidence that 
such a measure might carry a risk of negatively affecting life expectancy and the 
health of such a person.208 This looks to the potential implications of a measure on 
the development of the person into the future. However, and crucially, it must be 
established that there is a ‘particular and quantified risk’ in such circumstances.209 In 
this respect, it is unlikely that the applicant in McDonald would have been able to 
establish a necessary and direct link between the development of their own 
personality, and the prospect of entering into a care home due to the use of 
incontinence pads.  
Positive Obligation: Establishing a Duty to Provide Night Care 
Central to establishing a positive obligation to secure effective respect for private life 
is the existence of a direct and immediate link between the measure sought and the 
private life of the applicant. An overview of cases where such a link has been 
established, or at least assumed to exist, in contrast to cases where no such link 
exists, demonstrates that the concept has been interpreted narrowly. According to 
Olivier De Shutter, such a link is more likely to be established where the applicant is 
‘permanently affected in their everyday life [and activities] by the alleged refusal to 
provide them with support’ and where it impacts on the immediate surroundings of 
the applicant.210 In this respect, where a measure is sought that is a ‘personalised 
care measure, for the benefit of particular individuals, as opposed to a general 
measures for the benefit of an ill-defined community’, a special link can be 
established. This includes situations where the lack of action has a ‘direct impact on 
his/her functioning in daily life’ and affects the ‘capacity to perform acts of daily life 
(such as switching a computer on, making telephone calls, eating or drinking)’.211 In 
contrast, an obligation leading to wide-scale restructuring and transformation of the 
environment for the temporary benefit of an ill-defined group would be ‘too broad and 
indeterminate’ in scope.212  
This interpretation of ‘direct and immediate link’ is supported by the cases of East 
Sussex and Bernard, which, as was discussed above, concerned the permanent 
impairment of the ‘normal incidents’ of everyday life (such as bathing, moving around 
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the home, using the toilet) and the impact of immediate surroundings on their 
disability (such as unsuitable housing and inappropriate facilities). In East Sussex, it 
was made clear that an ‘enhanced degree of protection’ was called for as A and B 
were so ‘disabled as to be critically dependent on the help of others for even the 
simplest and most basic tasks of day to day living.’213 In this light it appears clear that 
McDonald satisfies the criteria for establishing a special link, in the sense that what 
was sought - continued access to a toilet for a continent person through night-care - 
was a personalised care measure for the benefit of a disabled person that would 
affect her functioning in an intimate aspect of daily life and her capacity to perform 
everyday acts in her immediate living environment. Ms McDonald was likely to be 
permanently affected by any refusal to provide her with night care and use of a toilet 
is undoubtedly part of the ‘normal’ and intimate aspects of private life.   
Fair Balance: Existence of an Obligation 
Even where a direct and immediate link can be established, in ‘determining whether 
or not a positive obligation exists, regard must be had to the fair balance that has to 
be struck between the general interests of the community and the interests of the 
individual.’214 The fair balance test will require a consideration of whether the factors 
of public interest weight against the need of the applicant to obtain access to night-
time care. In striking any balance, it is important to take into consideration the degree 
of vulnerability of the individual. As noted in relation to both East Sussex and 
Bernard, ‘enhanced weight’ may need to be attached to the interests of a disabled 
person in the balancing exercise due to their particular vulnerability and degree of 
dependence. A key factor that affects the vulnerability of a disabled person is the 
degree to which their power of acting and rest for mind and body are circumscribed, 
as well as the extent to which a person is isolated. On this account, the more 
circumscribed a life is in terms of the different possibilities for activity, the more 
important is the remaining access and control over those activities a person can 
engage in, and, importantly, anything that further impacts on that activity and 
pleasure of life is of commensurate importance.215 In East Sussex, even the simplest 
of activities, including bathing, took on a particular significance in light of the already 
circumscribed and isolated lives of the disabled children.  
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Moreover, any discretion afforded to authorities in determining an appropriate 
balance, should be influenced by external developments in the field of human rights. 
In particular, and as noted above, the CRPD represents an emerging international 
trend towards the recognition of the rights of disabled persons to personal assistance 
necessary to support living and to not be obliged to live in a particular living 
arrangement. It is therefore suggested that the existence of positive obligation to 
provide access to a toilet at night, in light of the degree of vulnerability of the 
applicant, and international developments, did not fall within the discretion of the 
State and was not outweighed by the interests of the community. Nevertheless, such 
interests and discretion may still be relevant as to the appropriate means of achieving 
respect for the right to private life. 
Discharging the Obligation: Reasonable and Appropriate Measures 
A State may demonstrate that it has discharged its positive obligation by having 
taken ‘reasonable and appropriate’ steps to respect the private life of the individual. 
In some positive obligation cases, further reference is made to the need for 
‘adequate and effective’ measures to safeguard the applicants’ interests under Article 
8. In order to effectively respect the rights of the individual, it has been suggested, a 
disabled person must be enabled to function as a continent person by having 
accessing a toilet or commode, where they are, in fact, capable of controlling their 
bodily functions. It would neither have been a reasonable nor an appropriate 
response to the needs of a disabled person in such circumstances to have solely 
sought to satisfy those needs by providing them with incontinence pads (although it is 
unlikely to be unreasonable to offer this as part of a variety of alternatives enabling 
access to a toilet). The use of such pads would not afford the requisite protection of 
the dignity interests of the applicant safeguarded by Article 8. This would have been, 
as Baroness Hale put it, to have met the need to get access to the lavatory with the 
provision of a type of support suited to the very different need of protection from 
uncontrollable bodily functions.  
It might further be open to an applicant to claim that a failure to treat differently a 
continent person, from an incontinent one, is unjustified discrimination under Art 14 
ECHR.216 The sole provision of incontinence pads would also have been inconsistent 
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with Bernard, which recognises that the steps taken by the authorities, in terms of the 
provision of accommodation suited to an able-bodied person, were unsuited and not 
adapted to the particular needs of the disabled person identified under Art 8, and 
thus did not enable a ‘normal private and family life’.  
In determining what measures an authority should adopt to fulfil a need, the State, as 
discussed further below, is entitled to have regard to the interests of other care users, 
but such interests should not operate to obscure the nature of that need. This makes 
clear that a positive obligation to secure the rights of a disabled person under Art 8 
cannot be discharged by measures unsuited to addressing their particular needs or 
where they are ineffective in respecting the interests identified as falling within the 
scope of private life.  
Nevertheless, in this context, even if a positive obligation is established to provide 
night-time access to a toilet, it was clearly open to the State to claim that it had 
discharged its obligation by taking reasonable steps to ensure that the applicant 
would be able to access a toilet at night, which the applicant had unreasonably 
rejected. The authority had proposed a range of acceptable responses to her need, 
such as a Home Share Scheme and Extra Care Sheltered Housing Scheme, which 
would have enabled her to receive night care and access a toilet at night. It is at this 
stage that the important remarks raised by Lord Brown become pertinent. In 
particular, his recognition that the local authority had taken reasonable measures to 
consult with the appellant and to provide her with the possibility of other options that 
demonstrated sufficient respect for her autonomy and dignity.217 Although not using 
these terms, to the extent that there was a positive obligation to provide night care, 
this was discharged by the provision of a range of suitable options capable of 
enabling her to access the toilet.  
In choosing a particular scheme, the applicant, as Baroness Hale argues, can be 
expected, once the needs have been identified properly, to ‘cooperate with the 
authority in choosing the most economical and acceptable way of meeting the need 
that she has’.218 This is compatible with a number of ECHR decisions concerning 
positive obligations, such as O’Rourke and Marzari, in which the Court emphasised 
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the substantial role of the applicants in being responsible for the deterioration in their 
functioning, following a refusal of a range of appropriate and adequate options that 
would have effectively respected private life. 
The concept of co-operation, as discussed in chapter two, is an integral part of 
investment dignity. There is a responsibility on an individual to cooperate in the inter-
personal dialogue with the State and other service-users. A dialogue is clearly two 
ways, and whilst dignity may be used to ensure that the authorities are receptive to 
the particular experiences and needs of the individual, the individual must also be 
willing to cooperate with the authorities and recognise that they are part of a network 
of relationships in which the good of others is an aspect of their own good.219  
It has been suggested by Foster and Herring that the notion of a ‘fair balance’ 
implicitly recognises that individuals have responsibilities towards others on the basis 
of the intermingled nature of the interests of persons in a relational nexus.220 Thus, 
an applicant can be expected to take account of the dignity of other particularly 
vulnerable people as an aspect of their own dignity in responding to the opportunities 
made available to them. In determining what steps are to be taken to ensure 
compliance with the positive obligation, a State is entitled under the ECHR to have 
regard to the ‘fair balance that has to be struck between the competing interests of 
the individual and society.’ 221  Thus, in assessing the range of available options 
designed to enable night care for the applicant, the authority was entitled to have 
regard to the dignity interests of other persons in its decision as to how to respect 
those rights and the applicant was expected to accommodate the interests of others 
in their decision-making. 
It is true that the co-operation expected of an individual in recognising the interests of 
others may have certain limits. As was seen in relation to East Sussex, and as an 
aspect of ‘good intentions vulnerability’ in investment dignity, use of a particular 
means to realise dignified ends can itself end up violating human dignity.222 The 
intention to achieve a certain dignified end for particularly vulnerable people can 
exacerbate vulnerability to the extent that certain means may be deployed that in 
reality violate human dignity. In the context of McDonald, an assessment may need 
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to be undertaken to determine whether obliging a person to move home, or requiring 
them to allow others to live in their home, in order to access night care, would itself 
respect the dignity of the individual. This would itself make up an assessment of the 
appropriateness of the steps to be taken. It is not possible at this stage to explore 
fully these complex considerations and the wealth of guidance on caring for the 
elderly, but it is highly unlikely in this context that an obligation can be said to exist to 
provide the applicant with a professional night carer in her own home. In this respect, 
East Sussex appears to be on a quite different scale in terms of the degree of 
seriousness of the issues raised by the choice of means to realise dignified ends. In 
that case there was clear evidence that hoisting had put the two severely disabled 
applicants at risk, and this understandably had caused them significant distress. 
Moreover, hoisting had proven ineffective in enabling access to an appropriate range 
of social and recreational activities. In contrast, in McDonald, there was little 
evidence to suggest that the alternatives would have been inappropriate and 
ineffective, or violated human dignity, beyond the concern that Ms McDonald had 
about a ‘stranger living in her home’ and her unwillingness to move.   
To summarise, it is suggested that there is a positive obligation on the state to 
provide night-time care to enable a disabled, but continent person, to access a toilet 
at night. However, this positive obligation does not entitle a disabled person to a 
specific means of realising their needs, save that the means used are not 
inappropriate to realising those needs or don’t themselves diminish respect for 
human dignity. In this respect, a disabled person is expected to cooperate with 
authorities and recognise the interests of other vulnerable persons in choosing from 
a range of alternative schemes that may enable the individual access a toilet at 
night. 
Retrogressive Measure: Establishing an Interference  
The second possible ground for taking a claim under Art 8 ECHR was that the 
decision to reduce the care package that the applicant had benefited from on the 
basis of reassessment of her needs constituted an interference with private life. This 
is how the case was approached by the ECrtHR, which avoided a consideration of 
whether there was a positive obligation to provide the level of care requested. The 
claim of Ms McDonald under Art 8 was partially successful. Ms McDonald succeeded 
on the grounds that the local authority had interfered with private life of the applicant 
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and during November 2008 and 2009 had failed to reassess her needs or to meet 
her needs in ‘accordance with the law’ under Article 8. However, the complaint 
concerning the proportionality of the new care package after 2009 was held to be 
manifestly ill-founded. 
The decision taken by the local authority to reduce the care package constituted an 
interference with Art 8 on the basis that it would impact on her ‘mobility’ and quality 
of life, as well as lead to a situation in which she was obliged to behave as if she 
could not control her bodily functioning, which conflicted with her strongly held ideas 
of personal identity’.223 This is largely in line with an approach to rights that requires 
authorities to take progressive steps to realise and fulfil the rights of disabled 
persons, which conforms to the progressive nature of the obligation established in 
East Sussex and Botta. 224  Such an obligation prevents unjustified retrogressive 
measures that diminish, limit, suppress or restrict the content of the provision 
afforded to a disabled person. 
Justifying Interference: Rights of Others and Minimising Impact 
On the issue of justification for the interference under Art 8(2), the ECrtHR held that 
the care package given to the applicant during November 2008 and November 2009 
was not in ‘accordance with the law’ and could not therefore be justified.  
The decision to adjust the care package from November 2009 onwards, although an 
interference with Art 8, was held to pursue a legitimate aim, and was found to be in 
accordance with the law, as well as within the margin of appreciation.  According to 
the Court, the measure was capable of being justified on the basis of the social 
responsibility of the public authority to allocate scarce resources to provide care to 
the community at large and to respect the rights of other service users. The Court 
refused to substitute for the national authorities (the UKSC) its own assessment of 
the proportionality of the measure.225  This is despite the fact that the margin of 
appreciation, which Lord Brown relied upon his judgement, is a concept not strictly 
speaking relevant at the domestic level.   
This is problematic as it means no proper proportionality analysis was undertaken in 
McDonald. Lord Brown, in his decision, predicted how the ECrtHR might decide the 
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case in light of the margin of appreciation and, in turn, the ECrtHR relied on the 
margin of appreciation to find the measure justified. In this respect, the exchange is 
an example of what Luke Clements has called the ‘mature expression of the “pass 
the parcel” deference game’.226 A more rigorous analysis of the proportionality of the 
measure might have considered the potential future costs of obliging incontinence 
compared to the provision of a night-time carer, compared to any immediate cost 
saving in the reduction of the care package. As noted above, some evidence exists 
to suggest, albeit capable of dispute, that incontinence is a prognostic indicator of 
institutionalisation. In this respect, Clements suggests that (forced) incontinence 
might potentially entail significant costs by increasing the risk of a person entering an 
institutionalised setting, which, crucially, would be the same as the cost of providing 
someone like Ms McDonald with a night-time carer. 227  However, without, as 
discussed above, establishing the existence of a ‘particular and quantifiable risk’, it is 
highly unlikely that such evidence will weigh heavily (if at all) in any assessment.  
In determining whether a reduction is care is justified, it has been made clear by the 
Courts that a measure taken to minimise any impact on the interests of the applicant 
will be of significance in determining the proportionality of a measure. 228  In this 
respect, as with the issue of the measure taken to discharge a positive obligation, it is 
clear that in reducing the package the authorities had provided a range of options 
that would have continued to enable the applicant to access a toilet at night. The 
provision of pads was only part of a wider range of options that would have enabled 
her to receive personal care and remain living independently. In this respect, 
reduction in the care package is unlikely to be considered disproportionate in light of 
the need to respect the dignity interests of other care users and the need for the 
individual to accommodate the interests of others within their own circle of concern.  
Justifying Interference: Maximising Privacy, Safety and Independence 
The focus of the ECrtHR on the interests of the community, and the rights of other 
service users, as a basis for justifying the measure, can be partially contrasted with 
the focus of Lord Brown in the UKSC, who appears to argue that the measure was 
also in the best interests of the applicant. Although primarily addressing the issue of 
Art 8 from the perspective of a positive obligation, as noted earlier, Lord Brown went 
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on to address whether any interference, assuming it had occurred, could be justified 
under Art 8(2). It is suggested that many of the actual reasons given for justifying the 
replacement of night-care, which concern the personal interests of the applicant, do 
not withstand scrutiny, are not entirely consistent with the concept of dignity, and are 
incompatible with the reasoning of earlier case law.  
As mentioned above, Lord Brown, accepting the arguments put by the Local 
Authority, held that the measure, reducing the care package, even if it interfered with 
Art 8, could have been justified on the basis that it maximised the privacy, 
independence and safety of the applicant. These claims are problematic as they 
effectively suggest that an individual, who is not incontinent, and wishes to maintain 
control over bodily functioning, would be better off by being less capable of having 
control over that functioning and the place, or manner, in which they expel bodily 
fluids. Reading between the lines, it appears that the privacy of the individual is 
understood to be best protected by isolation, through excluding other parties from 
sight, whilst the individual urinates. This aspect of the reasoning is, it is suggested, 
not context-specific, in the sense of relating to the particular problems, concerns of 
experiences of the individual in the particular case, taking account of their difference 
or ‘otherness’.  
Whilst, in general, excluding people from intimate functions will respect privacy 
(preventing emotions such as shame or humiliation) the argument in this particular 
case is somewhat questionable when it is considered that, regardless of whether the 
appellant is made mobile, so as to access the toilet, or whether they are left to 
urinate in an incontinence pad, a care-worker will be required to support the applicant 
by helping to clean them the next day. Even Lord Walker, for the majority, recognised 
that this scenario may be ‘quite unpleasant for both the user and the carer’.229 The 
view, therefore, that privacy is maximised entails the application of a generalised 
understanding of privacy, applicable to the ‘norm’, without due regard to the person 
specific needs of the individual. It therefore can be contrasted with the decision in 
East Sussex.  It is also not entirely logical to find that a measure that has interfered 
with the private life of a person also maximises their privacy.  
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A similar issue arises in the argument that the measure would maximise the safety of 
Ms McDonald by reducing the risk of falling. In this particular case, there was no 
actual evidence to suggest that the current night-time care posed any risk to 
safety.230 Moreover, it is important to keep in mind the argument, which began to 
emerge in the last chapter, that it is neither possible, nor desirable, from the 
perspective of dignity, to eliminate all vulnerability from life. Some things that are our 
source of activity may always carry certain risks of harm, which cannot be removed 
without also making that activity impossible.231 Dignity may actually require people to 
be vulnerable to certain manageable risks, as, otherwise, their life may become 
miserable and extremely circumscribed.232  
This is, perhaps, why Baroness Hale was concerned about the potential implications 
of McDonald. Baroness Hale seemed particularly concerned that the focus on 
maximising safety, in contrast to personal dignity, might also enable the withdrawal of 
care during the day, or to the use of pads to enable defecation for someone who 
does not suffer from faecal incontinence, subject to the need to avoid infection or 
other hazards.233 Whilst Lord Walker rejected this implication, calling it deplorable, it 
is notable that no actual reason was provided by him to explain why Lady Hale was 
wrong in this regard. 234  The potential, albeit unexamined, consequence of the 
majority reasoning is that, when the local authority provides care during the day, by 
enabling the individual to access the toilet, they are actually treating the appellant or 
less well than they do during the night (at least in respect of privacy, safety and 
independence).  
Such reasons are more problematic in terms of the implications they carry for 
someone in a situation that was similar to the applicant, who may not be afforded the 
same range of options the applicant was afforded. The implication of the decision is 
that an authority is entitled to provide pads on the basis that they are the most 
suitable measure to address the needs of the applicant, and, as such, provision of 
alternatives enabling access to a toilet may not be strictly necessary. In those 
circumstances, it might be recognised that, despite any interference with private life, 
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it was in their best interests of the disabled person to have their mobility and control 
over bodily functioning reduced.  
4. Convention Rights and the Openness of Human Dignity  
The potential of Art 3 and Art 8, in terms of establishing a positive obligation to 
protect the care needs of particularly vulnerable people has not always been 
consistently realised in case law. However, some of the cases discussed above 
tentatively point towards the possibility that such potential is most likely to be 
realised when human dignity has a significant and prominent role in the reasoning of 
the Court. This section draws together some of the themes that have begun to 
emerge where human dignity has made a substantive difference to the outcome of 
cases, and contrasts this with cases where the concept of human dignity is given 
less significance. It explores the manner in which human dignity, where it is deployed 
successfully, performs a more inclusive functional role. It claims that this 
corresponds to existing commentaries that have identified three important ‘open’ 
facets in the judicial use of human dignity. ‘Openness’ is used here to denote 
responsiveness to the other, receptiveness to singularity, and acceptance of 
creativity.235 It is argued that these aspects of openness correspond to the way 
dignity is used by the judiciary to respond to difference, embrace a wider set of 
human dimensions and provide space for dialogue in which dignity can be co-
created through a range of actors across boundaries. These open facets, it is 
argued, encompass the following aspects of investment dignity, specifically, 
differentiation of life in time, multifaceted humanity and interconnectedness.  
4.1. Openness and Difference 
The first open dimension of the judicial use of human dignity under the HRA 
concerns its responsiveness to difference and ‘otherness’. This represents an open 
dimension in the sense of an obligation to others which is not delimited to a particular 
group on the basis of preference and worthiness or insulated from concerns of those 
outside the group on the basis of difference.236 Dignity is open because it is inclusive 
and can be ‘receptive and responsive to singularity’.237 This is a role that has already 
been recognised by Catherine Dupré and Conor Gearty. Dupré has, for instance, 
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argued that in respect of a number of cases where dignity is deployed in majority 
reasoning, it is deployed in such a way that it respects the ‘other’ by having ‘an 
inclusive effect, bringing under the mainstream protection offered by the law all those 
who did not benefit from it due to their difference’. 238  Similarly, Gearty has 
recognised the inclusive effect of dignity as a legal value by arguing that case law 
demonstrates a ‘respect for human dignity that is on the move, expanding the moral 
dictates of civilised society ever outwards, bringing more and more persons within its 
field of vision.’239 Importantly, this inclusive role of dignity has required the law to be 
attentive to difference and, in some cases, as in Bernard and East Sussex, has 
required the law or social environment, built around the ‘normal man’, to be adjusted 
or refined to incorporate the person-specific needs, experiences and capabilities of 
the ‘other’.   
  
Human dignity is receptive to the emergence of difference in human life and 
responds to the claims of the unfamiliar. The open tendency, as an aspect of dignity, 
embraces uniqueness, the possibility of discovering or learning something new.240 
The creative potentiality of human life recognises that, over time, through 
experimentation with our surroundings, differences can emerge in the form of novel 
modes of being and new forms of activity or relationality. 241  This represents a 
temporal form of ‘otherness’ in which humanity differentiates itself over and across 
time.242 The open tendency of dignity has, in this regard, been central to responding 
to this form of ‘otherness’ in law. Dignity has, for instance, had an inclusive effect in 
terms of incorporating the experiences of post-operative transgender individuals who 
did not correspond to historical paradigms of sexual identity.243 It is true that dignity 
has not always been used by the judiciary to embrace every ‘new’ type of activity or 
mode of being.244 However, it is contended that this reflects the uncertainty about the 
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consequences of such new courses of action because it is unclear whether it will be 
beneficial or destructive, such as, for instance, whether allowing voluntary 
euthanasia will release the vulnerable from suffering or place undue pressure on 
them to end their life.245  Human beings do not always possess a fully adequate idea 
of the effects of a particular course of action and must be careful not to chart a 
course based on imagined, rather than real consequences.246  
In such circumstances, as Dupré argues, the role of dignity is ‘not to close a debate 
by providing a once and for all answer, but rather to open it, so that similar questions 
may be raised in subsequent instances’.247  Dignity thus has an open dimension in 
the way it creates space to continuously examine, with patience and prudence, 
contentious issues in light of new knowledge, experiences and social conditions. In 
addition, there may be concerns that being open to a new course of action will 
restrict future openness and limit the continuing differentiation of human life. 248 
Human dignity, in this regard, may well, at least without better understanding, be 
closed to certain possibilities precisely in order to keep the future open in the sense 
that it enables continuing experimentation, difference and creativity.  
4.2. Openness and Multifaceted Humanity  
A second open dimension of the judicial use of the concept derives from its use as a 
holistic tool and bridging device. 249  In this regard, dignity as a holistic concept 
enables individuals to be treated ‘as a whole’ which represents a ‘shift from a mono-
dimensional to a holistic, or pluridimensional’ understanding of humanity.250  This 
represents, it is argued, an open tendency in that it embraces an inclusive 
understanding of humanity, which encompasses a wider set of dimensions then 
‘abstract individual autonomy’.251 Such a holistic understanding of human dignity is 
therefore much more likely to capture the experiences, needs and aspirations of 
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‘real’ people, particularly those that do not fit the ‘autonomy norm’ and may be 
excluded as ‘other’ because they lack a particular feature of the human ideal.252  
 
Treating people ‘as a whole’ has important implications for conventional legal 
constructs, such as the public-private divide, which separate social identities in to 
separate spheres of activity. Dignity may, for instance, require the law to respect the 
continuity of the multiple identities of a person regardless of the sphere of activity in 
which they are operating.253 This is evident in the East Sussex case where Munby J 
held that the carers of the disabled applicants also had dignity interests and, in the 
circumstances, such interests could not be excluded because the carers were 
professionals or because the activities were within the sphere of work.254 This, again, 
demonstrates a potential open tendency in dignity, in the way that it can be used to 
include the identities of a person in a ‘sphere’ where such an identity is traditionally 
excluded, thus opening the traditional dividing boundaries.  
 
4.3. Openness and Dialogue 
The final open dimension of human dignity as a legal value under the HRA is, it is 
argued, inherent in the way dignity is constructed through dialogue by a range of 
actors across traditional boundaries. Human dignity has, for a considerable time, 
been employed by judges to ‘legitimate and license transnational jurisprudential 
openness’255 and has justified ‘transnational transfers of human rights norms across 
different courts and contexts’.256 Indeed, it has been recognised as one of the key 
potential functions of human dignity in the interpretation of human rights.257 In this 
way, dignity is understood to be intrinsically suited to dialogue.  
This role is supported by the particular legal context in which human dignity 
jurisprudence is constructed, as case law and academic commentaries treat 
dialogue as a core feature of the HRA underpinning many of the operative provisions 
and structuring the relationship between the UK courts and the ECrtHR, as well as 
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the UK courts and the legislature.258 In this way, the HRA provides a particularly 
fertile legal environment in which dialogue on human dignity can take place. With 
respect to the meaning of dialogue in such an inter-institutional context, a number of 
definitions have been proposed.259 It has been defined as, inter alia, a ‘process of 
rational persuasion…[where] each participant must be willing to expose their views 
to the critical analysis of the others and must be ready to change them if others put 
forward better arguments’ 260  and the participants must ‘take into account each 
other’s perspective and try to incorporate them into their own views’.261 Importantly, 
the process aims at ‘taking decisions in common; reaching agreement; solving 
problems or conflicts collectively; determining which…thesis is true, the most justified 
or the best’.262 The form of dialogue represents a genuine open dimension through 
the way it possesses the qualities of reciprocity, responsiveness, mutual respect, 
and exposure to otherness. Dialogue, in this regard, must be contrasted with a 
‘monologue’ in which a court simply deploys ‘ideas of conclusions [that] are 
borrowed by foreign courts, whether on the national or supranational level’.263  
Granting a dialogic role to human dignity is controversial. The concept has been 
treated by some as inappropriate to any meaningful dialogue because there is no 
consensus meaning beyond a minimum core and any transnational sharing of 
human rights norms will, in this light, simply be an exercise in arbitrary judicial 
choice.264 However, it is questionable whether dialogue would be necessary at all if 
such a clear or determinate consensus was forthcoming. Dialogue is, more often 
than not, a process of seeking to reach agreement, rather than finding it. In this 
regard, Paulo Carozza proposes a more convincing claim that the dialogic function of 
human dignity is primarily –   
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A provocation to reflect more deeply, collectively, 
and comparatively on the breadth of human 
experience and the fulfilment of elemental human 
needs and desires.265 
Dialogue in this respect is less about transporting dignity from one jurisdiction into 
another, but is rather a discussion that seeks to incorporate and respond to lived 
experience, an experience that is ‘concretely encountered in the Other and 
recognised in oneself.’266  In this way, in line with an experimental and inductive 
process of reasoning, dignity is something that is developed and discovered through 
engagement with the ‘other’.267 
There are a number of interconnecting forms of interaction which can be understood 
to take place in the construction of human dignity under the HRA which conform to 
this abstract understanding of dialogue. The first type of dialogue differs from the 
preceding discussion as it occurs between the court and the victim on an inter-
personal level and is, perhaps, the least visible or prominent. It is, however, no less 
important for it allows victims to propose their own dignity argument according to 
their experiences and individuality. The court will, if it is open to dialogue, address 
those arguments, take account of the experiences of the victim and try to incorporate 
them, but, where it decides against the victim, provide reasonable arguments that 
justify the conclusion. The principle of co-operation, which has been introduced in 
the chapter, means that, in turn, the applicant must be open to recognising the 
dignity of the ‘other’ as a dimension of their own dignity. The importance of the 
experiences of the victim to the construction of dignity is clearest in the way the 
judiciary has already relied on the concept to respond to the person-specific 
problems, needs and desires of the victim. An exemplary approach of the 
responsiveness to human experience is the decision in Napier, where Lord Bonham 
placed significant emphasis on  the testimony of prisoners, who he termed 
‘experienced students’.268  This represents an open tendency in the formation of 
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dignity, which is capable of being developed through the sharing of narratives, 
experiences and testimonies.269  
The inter-institutional dialogue that operates between the ECrtHR and the UK courts 
is still in the very early stages of development. Most leading analyses focus on the 
notion of inter-judicial dialogue, without a particular focus on the role of human 
dignity as a concept that structures any such dialogue. However, it is possible to 
discern some tentative judicial trends in the use of human dignity, as part of the 
judicial dialogue, from the selective case-analysis that has been undertaken.  Such 
trends are most easily identified by contrasting cases like Napier or East Sussex, 
where human dignity played a significant role in the reasoning of Court, from cases 
like McDonald, where the human dignity argument was given considerably less 
weight. A particularly important trend that can be tentatively extrapolated is that, 
where human dignity plays a substantive role in the outcome of a case, the UK Court 
draw widely on the reasoning and animating principles of ECHR case law, creatively 
deploying those principles in a rigorous fashion to novel factual circumstances. Thus, 
in East Sussex, Munby J engaged in an extraordinarily detailed analysis of some key 
dimensions of human dignity interests in the case law and applied these to the 
unique situation of the disabled applicants. This is in marked contrast to the 
judgment of Lord Brown in McDonald who limited his analysis predominantly to the 
facts of a number of ECHR cases and then held that, in light of such facts, the Art 8 
claim was ‘hopeless’ and would clearly fall within the margin of appreciation.270 Far 
less attention was paid to the potential effect of the framework of dignity interests 
that might be relevant to the particular case.  This, it is suggested, reflects the idea 
that the case law of the ECHR should be treated as a ceiling of human rights 
protection, which cuts off engagement with the particular encounter.271 Focusing on 
dignity interests, in contrast, entails less emphasis on a ‘narrow and pedantic’ 
approach related to the ‘austerity of tabulated legalism’.272  
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The cases where the dignity argument is accepted also suggest that the UK Courts 
are more willing to draw on a wider body of sources than just the case law of the 
ECrtHR. This is exemplified in Napier where Lord Bonham relied on an impressive 
range of ‘external benchmarks’ in order to construct human dignity.273 Most notably, 
reference was made to reports of the Chief Inspector of Prisons for Scotland, 
European Prison Rules, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners, and the Committee for the Prevention of Torture.274 Moreover, Lord 
Bonham made extensive use of expert evidence from psychiatrists and 
environmental psychologists to find that the conditions made the applicant feel 
‘small, inadequate and worthless’.275 Similarly, in the minority opinion of Baroness 
Hale in McDonald, reference was made to a number of sources to support the claim 
that the measure was incompatible with human dignity, including Care Quality 
Commission Guidance.276  In contrast, the reasoning of the majority was lacking in 
such sources and has been criticised for failing to address important instruments, 
such as the CRPD and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.277  
It is impossible to prove a direct correlation between the expansive use of external 
materials and human dignity, but there are at least some good reasons for explaining 
why such a correlation might exist. First, the ‘semantic open texture’278  of human 
dignity and its sensitivity to the particular context means that guidance will have to be 
sought to define the requirements of the concept in the specific case, by drawing on 
established experience and expertise. Second, and more importantly, human dignity 
is the foundational value of all human rights and, as has been argued, performs a 
bridging role between rights in different human rights instruments. It is hardly 
surprising, therefore, to see additional international instruments being cited in case 
law in order to inform and flesh out the meaning of human dignity. In addition, human 
dignity is a key principle at the centre of good care practice.279 Many, therefore, of 
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the policy documents and guidance cited by Baroness Hale and Lord Bonham set 
down key requirements for respecting human dignity.280 In this light, reliance on 
dignity may draw a court away from the narrow confines of the facts of previous 
cases to a broader range of dignity materials and benchmarks. This aspect of the 
jurisprudence ensures that human rights are not determined in isolation and 
challenges exclusive reliance on conventional norms or the legal status quo. Thus, 
for instance, Baroness Hale in McDonald relied on the dignity materials to break from 
the traditional judicial reluctance of UK Courts to scrutinise resource allocation 
concerns.  This makes the legal system less insular and more porous or outward 
facing. It represents an open dimension in the way dignity is constructed through a 
sharing of human experience and expertise by a range of actors, as well as by 
learning from other conceptual responses to (potentially) shared problems.  
Dialogue, of course, must be two ways and there are clearly some routes by which 
UK Courts might seek to influence the construction of human dignity at the 
international level, particularly before the ECrtHR. One such route is through reliance 
on the argument that the jurisprudence of the ECrtHR is ‘unconvincing’, ‘unclear’ or 
‘inconsistent’.281. This could potentially have a beneficial impact on improving the 
dignity reasoning of both courts.282 This is clearly not an aspect of dialogue that is 
intrinsic to human dignity, but is a consequence of the context in which adjudication 
on human dignity takes place. However, the open texture of human dignity makes it 
particularly amenable to such dialogue. One trend, however, which does appear 
directly related to human dignity, is its use in cases which extend beyond the minimal 
standards of protection of human rights established by the ECHR. Thus, for instance, 
both Nicolas Bratza and Baroness Hale have suggested that (at least at the time) the 
UKHL in Limbuela went beyond the case law of the ECHR.283 It is also noteworthy 
that in none of the cases on disability (prior to McDonald) had the ECrtHR held that 
there had been a violation of Art 8, in contrast, for instance, to the findings of the 
High Court in East Sussex and Bernard.  Not only does this enable the UK Court to 
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be open to developing human dignity to address the holistic needs of particularly 
vulnerable people, as they emerge over time, it also enables the UK Courts to inform 
the development and improvement of human dignity standards at the level of the 
ECHR.  
5. Conclusion   
A perusal of the cases where human dignity has been used to establish positive 
obligations, suggests that the injection of dignity improves, rather than worsens, the 
quality of decision-making in comparison to cases where the concept is absent. The 
concept of dignity has sometimes been associated with arbitrary decision-making on 
the part of judges, a concept that provides insufficient guidance or constraints.284 
However, the reasoning of the courts in cases where human dignity is given a 
prominent role are more nuanced, carefully considered and supported by a wide 
body of evidence and experience. This is a consequence of, rather than in spite of, 
the openness of human dignity. Such openness requires the judiciary to build its 
understanding by turning to sources beyond themselves and even the limited legal 
culture of which they are a part. This appears less arbitrary than the alternative, 
where the human dignity argument is rejected. In such cases, the judiciary appears 
more comfortable engaging in minimal scrutiny of resource allocation concerns.285 
More systematic use of human dignity may therefore prompt an important shift in the 
constitutional culture and democratic discourse in the UK, issues that are further 
explored in the next two chapters. A shift, it is argued, which makes the law more 
reasonable and representative, not less so. However, it is important to keep in mind 
that Convention Rights are not primarily designed to encompass or address socio-
economic concerns and it is therefore understandable that judges have approached 
the issue of resource allocation in a cautious manner.286  
 
The positive contribution that human dignity has made to the case law on positive 
obligations under Art 3 and Art 8 has been interpreted through the prism of 
investment dignity. The concept, it has been argued, entails a more holistic 
perspective on the interests of individuals, recognizing the overlapping needs of the 
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individual in terms of social, emotional, physical and recreational functioning. The 
clear emphasis on the concept of vulnerability as a basis for giving rise to a 
heightened responsibility for human dignity across a spectrum of dependency 
supported by the concept investment dignity, whilst also being largely in tune with 
the definition of the concept outlined in the decisions of the High Court. This has 
provided not only the basis for determining the conditions upon which a positive 
obligation arises, but also aids to set certain boundaries on the limits and stringency 
of that obligation..287 Within this framework individuals are expected to cooperate 
with the State in order to recognize the dignity of others as an aspect of their own 
good.288 This co-operative attitude, expected of the individual, creates one side of 
the dialogue between the state and the individual. In turn, the state should be 
sufficiently in tune with the relative and context-specific needs and experiences of 
the individual. These strands of discussion begin to raise questions about what 
dignity requires in respect of an appropriate relationship between the community and 
the individual. It is the nature of this relationship, structured by an appropriate 
dialogue, which is the main focus of the following chapters.    
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Chapter Five: The Rule of Law as a Productive Encounter 
1. Introduction  
The final section of the thesis addresses the transformative implications of 
investment dignity for two central concepts that have been closely connected to 
human dignity and which clearly affect the relationship between the individual and 
the community. This includes the concept of the rule of law, which is the focus of this 
chapter, and the concept of democracy, which is the focus of the next chapter.1 In 
one of the leading, and most influential, discussions on the concept of the rule of law, 
Joseph Raz has stated that ‘observance of the rule of law is necessary if the law is to 
respect human dignity.’2 Lon F Fuller has also argued that the rule of law entails a 
‘certain built-in respect for human dignity.’3  
Impressively, associations with human dignity cut-across different conceptions of the 
rule of law, so that both formal and substantive conceptions have been linked to the 
concept.4 However, it cannot be imagined that the introduction of a new construction 
of dignity into discourse will leave those connections the same. This is a necessary 
repercussion of the conceptual methodology that was discussed in the introduction. 
The process of constructing a concept has resonating effects for cognate concepts. 
This is because other concepts may possess some components which are shared 
with other concepts, or because there are established bridges that connect concepts. 
A concept, such as the rule of law, which is connected to human dignity, is likely to 
be affected by the construction of that latter concept.  
The aim of this chapter is to explore the current relationship between the rule of law 
and human dignity, as well as the implications of an investment concept of dignity for 
current thinking on the rule of law. The first part of the chapter establishes the 
existing theoretical connections between the rule of law and certain constructions of 
human dignity. The formation of the content of the rule of law is demonstrated as 
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being related to a consideration of the source of dignity in the human condition. The 
first perspective - the stability of rules - connects the practice on the rule of law to 
dignity by either creating a stable normative framework by which people can guide 
their behaviour and plot their futures.5 This is a conception that favours dignity-as-
autonomy. The second approach, which is considered, connects the practice of the 
rule of law to protecting dignity on the grounds that humans are rational beings, who 
cannot have a burden imposed without adequate justification through principled 
adjudication.6  
Once the connections between the rule of law and the concept of dignity has been 
established, the second part of this chapter argues that stability and justification 
should be recognised as two equally important and interconnected dimensions to the 
protection of human dignity. These dimensions, it is argued, are both essential to the 
protection of human dignity on the grounds that humans are neither entirely rational, 
nor irrational, neither entirely active, nor passive. It will be argued that stability is 
important on the grounds that it is necessary for active agency, so that individuals 
are capable of securely investing in and ordering ‘productive encounters’ without 
arbitrary interference. Stability is required in order to restrain the possibility of being 
subject to the passive desires of another, ensure the continuity of life, and to 
establish space for creative experimentation. The second dimension of the rule of 
law, justification, requires that state coercion be, as far as possible, exercised on the 
basis of reasons that can be formed with those most affected by a legal decision. It 
includes the formation of adequate ideas that correlate to the relations that mutually 
sustain and enhance the capabilities of the individual, as well as restricts those 
relations that lead to decomposition and destruction.  
The chapter concludes by highlighting how the two dimensions of the rule of law in 
their connection to dignity can be promoted through the concept of dialogue. It is 
argued that the law is an encounter between those most affected by a legal decision 
and the state. Law on this model is neither a fixed set of rules that individual cases 
are subsumed under, nor are they a complete set of ideal principles. Instead, law is a 
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creative dialogue responding to the particularities of the individual situation, unfolding 
case by case, in exactly the same way as life is unfolding in different events over 
time.7  
2. The Protection of Human Dignity and the Rule of Law  
2.1. An Immanent Connection to Human Dignity 
In this first section of the chapter, connections between human dignity and the rule of 
law are clearly established. It becomes clear that the meaning ascribed to the rule of 
law is fundamentally connected to a consideration of human dignity. This is 
established by focusing on two major conceptions of the rule of law. The first focuses 
on the idea of the rule of law as necessary for creating stability and the second on 
the need for principled justification.  
2.2.1. Respect for Rational Autonomous Agency 
The first important paradigm of the rule of law is the creation of a set of clear, 
predictable and prospective rules that enable individuals to regulate their conduct.8 
On this account, law must be ‘capable of guiding the behaviour of its subjects.’9 
Joseph Raz is a leading proponent of this conception of the rule of law and has 
outlined some of its key tenets. These include the requirement that law be clear, 
prospective, relatively stable, accessible, and administered fairly by an independent 
judiciary.10 Raz claims that there are a number of reasons to value this concept of 
the rule of law, including the idea that observance restricts the exercise of arbitrary 
power and promotes individual freedom.11 However, according to Raz, the most 
important of the virtues of the rule of law is that its observance is necessary if the law 
is to respect human dignity..12 
The rule of law is understood by Raz to respect human dignity in two ways. The first 
is that stability in law respects the ability of human beings to plan their future.13 The 
second is that the rule of law protects human dignity by preventing entrapment or 
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manipulation that results from the thwarting of settled expectations.14 The law cannot 
therefore encourage people to rely on it in order to guide conduct only to then 
withdraw any of its assurances after the event. This would, according to Raz, 
encourage ‘autonomous action only in order to frustrate its purpose.’ 15  On this 
account, there is, built in to the rule of law, a certain presupposition that human 
beings are ‘rational autonomous creatures’ in the way it ‘attempts to affect their 
actions and habits by affecting their deliberations.’16 According to Raz, this version of 
the rule of law is still compatible with very many ways in which the law can violate 
human dignity.17   
2.2.2. Solution to Conflict 
There are other versions of a stability-based concept of the rule of law that are 
premised on different conceptual ties to the concept of human dignity. Conor Gearty 
has, for instance, argued that the rule of law is needed as a solution to the problem 
caused by the uncertainty and conflict inherent in human dignity. As an example, 
Conor Gearty had proposed a concept of the rule of law that requires prospectively 
and foreseeability in order for individuals to be able to regulate their conduct, which 
is very similar to the model proposed by Raz.18 The need for such a conception, 
according to Gearty, arises because there is often a lack of consensus about the 
concrete meaning of concepts like human dignity. The result of this is a ‘clash of 
conflicting interests and struggle for power characteristic of pluralist democracy.’19 A 
sovereign democratic body is necessary to create clear and stable rules to settle the 
content of dignity and its place within the order of values. This thereby replaces 
conflict in social relationships with stability and predictability by ensuring that people, 
as well as judges, do not rely on their own particular conceptions of moral values.20 
On this account, the rule of law appears to be connected to dignity in settling the 
meaning of that concept, but only in order to solve the kinds of problems that it 
supposedly creates.  
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2.2.3. Equal Respect 
A very different approach to the rule of law, which connects with dignity, requires the 
justification of state force on principled grounds. Perhaps the leading and most well-
known formulation of this approach to the rule of law is the one proposed by Ronald 
Dworkin who has argued that it entails treating people with equal concern and 
respect.21 This requires that the community act in a ‘principled and coherent manner 
toward all its citizens’ by extending to ‘everyone the substantive standards of justice 
or fairness it uses for some.’22 On this account, differences between the rights of 
citizens should not be based on unreasonable or arbitrary distinctions, but must be 
objectively justifiable in reference to principle.23 There are therefore two key strands 
to this form of the rule of law. The first is the presupposition that the existing body of 
legal material should be interpreted, subject to constraints of fit, in line with the best 
possible theory of justice and fairness.24 The second is that the best conception of 
justice and fairness should be extended to all without unfair distinction. Importantly, 
for Dworkin, these responsibilities are imposed on all members of the community 
who are expected to govern their behaviour in reference to those principles of justice 
and fairness that the community shares.25   
The equal respect-based approach to the rule of law entails an important role for the 
individual in identifying the public standards of the community. 26  This role 
presupposes a wider view of the individual capacities that need to be respected in 
order to treat people with human dignity. The stability-based approach replaces 
recourse to underlying moral values or reasons that a person may have to act in 
favour of a set of clear and authoritative regulations.27  The equal respect-based 
approach treats individuals as capable of moral agency by requiring an individual, 
when ‘deciding how to treat his neighbour when their interests to conflict, to interpret 
deciding the common scheme of justice to which they are both committed.’28  
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Dworkin relates these features to concepts often connected to human dignity, 
including, most importantly, personal responsibility and the ideal of self-legislation.29 
This is because each member of the community is said to be under a personal 
responsibility to identify for themselves the moral scheme of the community and to 
treat themselves as the author of that moral scheme.30 There is, underlying this 
construction, a strong Kantian element and therefore a possible conceptual 
connection to the moral autonomy-based concept of human dignity. 31  This 
construction of human dignity, it will be recalled, is premised on the rational capacity 
of individuals to guide their conduct by reasoning to universal moral principles which 
they are understood to impose upon and ‘will’ for themselves.32 The second model of 
the rule of law engages and respects a variation of this moral capacity. An individual 
is expected to determine the best scheme of moral principles shared by the 
community, which must be capable of being rationally extended on a universal basis 
to all members and for which each member identifies as their own scheme.33  
The central focus of moral agency, as an aspect of human dignity, also entails 
certain burdens and duties on the state in its treatment of the individual.  
Significantly, this account of the rule of law depends on the assumption that the 
coercive power of the state must be capable of justification on principled grounds 
and this justification must be directed to the parties affected.34 Trevor Allan has 
argued that this aspect of the Dworkinian account is necessary to respect human 
dignity in the way that it seeks the co-operation and rational consent of those 
affected by the outcome of a particular legal decision.35 This can only be satisfied, 
according to Allan, when a decision is underpinned by values that a citizen is 
capable in principle of accepting.36 This can be understood to respect moral agency 
in the way that it appeals to the capacity of the individual to understand, as well as 
consent to, the reasons and values justifying the outcome.  
Respect for moral autonomy does not exhaust the possible conceptual connections 
between this construction of the rule of law and human dignity. First, Dworkin argues 
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that his conception of the rule of law is a ‘rights conception’, as opposed to a ‘rule-
book conception’, which ‘presupposes particular rights. It assumes that citizens have 
moral rights and duties with respect to one another, and political rights against the 
state as a whole.’37 Clearly, this could include the protection of human dignity-based 
rights. Indeed, in later works, Dworkin has argued that any intelligible scheme of 
justice will include a conception of dignity.38 These rights must also be extended on 
an equal basis. This entails a further possible connection to human dignity in that, 
according to Dworkin, it ensures that ‘each person is as worthy as any other.’39 
According to Dworkin, if the practices of a community demonstrate a particular 
commitment to certain principles, it must extend those principles to all if it is to treat 
each person’s life as equally important and that each member must express concern 
for the well-being of each of the other members.40  
2.3. Dignity at the Crossroads 
The preceding analysis has argued that human dignity stands at the crossroads 
between two major conceptions of the rule of law. It has shown how these concepts 
of the rule of law differ depending, at least, in part, on a consideration of those 
capacities of humanity that must be respected in order to treat someone with human 
dignity. The first model of the rule of law, requiring the stability provided by clear 
rules, is understood to respect the capacity of individuals to plan their future. 
However, on some accounts, this need only arises because concepts like dignity, as 
part of moral reasoning, give rise to conflict and clashes of power. In contrast, the 
second model of the rule of law, requiring principled justification, respects the moral 
reasoning of an individual, requiring them to extend the moral dimensions of decision 
making to all members of the community, treating each member as equally 
important. Unsurprisingly, due to the disagreement, each conception poses problems 
for the other about how best to respect human dignity.  
The stability of rules model of the rule of law, for instance, can be criticised for its 
formalism and the view that the rule of law is merely instrumentally valuable. Raz, for 
instance, argues that the primary virtue of the rule of law is efficiency, which is a non-
moral value. Conformity to the rule of law enables the law to effectively guide the 
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behaviour of citizens to whatever ends the law is put. In order for obedience to be 
possible, law must be capable of figuring in the practical reasoning of the citizen. In 
this regard, efficiency is a virtue which is morally neutral as to the ends to which the 
law as an instrument is directed. Whether it does have moral value depends on 
whether the aims of the legal system are morally good. Thus, the rule of law does 
not claim a positive moral virtue and, as such, should not be confused with 
promotion of human dignity.41 It only claims a negative virtue in terms of reducing the 
risk of a particular form of harm to dignity which only the law itself makes possible. 
That is, it limits the evil of frustrating expectations and exercise of arbitrary power, 
which are dangers that only the law creates. 42  Observance of the formal 
requirements is necessary if the law is to avoid violating human dignity, but this is not 
the primary virtue or justification of the rule of law. Dignity does not require 
establishment of a legal system based on the rule of law, nor does conformity to the 
rule of law enhance respect for dignity.  
This contrasts with the view of Lon Fuller whose basic precepts of the rule of law are 
largely similar to Raz’s formal requirements. Fuller claims that ‘law is – the enterprise 
of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.’43  Fuller believes that 
conformity to the rule of law is a necessary condition for the protection of human 
dignity as it treats the citizen as a responsible and rational agent capable of 
‘understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults.’ 44  This is 
particularly the case with the precepts of natural justice, as aspects of the rule of law, 
which are not explicable by reference to efficient governance alone.45  
The rule of law, as an aspiration to restrain the use of arbitrary force, over regulation 
and possible contingency in human affairs is associated with an orientation towards 
a particular conception of the person as a rational agent.46 Through the necessary 
constraint of regulation of behaviour the rule of law establishes spheres of optional 
conduct that ‘make space for choice and self-constitution’ that are independent of 
official whim.47 This is not to say that the rule of law exhausts the requirements of 
human dignity. Those who follow Fuller tend to recognise that the observance of the 
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formal requirements are not equivalent to full respect for human dignity, and is only 
one dimension of a ‘morally healthy relationship’ between the government and the 
governed.48 The rule of law entails a substantive constraint on power, and otherwise 
plays a role in limiting other forms of unjust goals of government, with a commitment 
to establishing the conditions under which a person is capable of planning their 
affairs and making important choices.    
For a Fullerean, efficiency does not explain the virtue of the rule of law, as it appears 
obvious that in many circumstances a totalitarian government seeking malevolent 
ends may more readily achieve those ends by violating the rule of law. The rule of 
law is likely to ‘curtail the efficiency for evil of an evil government because it 
systematically restricts its freedom of manoeuvre’.49 There is, in this respect, a ‘deep 
tension between ruling by law and systematically pursuing unjust ends’.50 According 
to Murphy, it is difficult to envisage an alternative system of governance, not based 
on the rule of law, that is capable of treating citizens as ‘responsible and self-directed 
agents in the way and to the extent that a legal system does’.51 The alternative to the 
rule of law is the subjection of persons to a particularly humiliating condition by 
creating ‘uncertainty and fearfulness because one’s fate lies in the hands of official 
whim [and]…can choose at will to stigmatize conduct as criminal’.52 The rule of law is 
not therefore merely a negative virtue by which a risk of a violation of dignity is 
avoided. It is a positive value that establishes a minimal set of conditions under 
which social co-operation, reciprocal reliance and mutual trust is possible.53 Whilst 
Raz focuses on the perspective of the government, treating the rule of law as a 
means of successful governance, Fuller places greater emphasis on the value of the 
rule of law to the citizen. From the alternative perspective of the citizen the rule of 
law is ‘primarily a set of constraints that limit the pursuit of [government]…objectives 
in the interests of individual autonomy and security.’54 It is valuable as a means of 
creating a predictable environment in which a person can confidently pursue certain 
conduct in the knowledge that it is independent of the will of another and can rely on 
                                                          
48
 Colleen Murphy, ’Lon Fuller and The Moral Value of The Rule of Law’ (2005) 24 Law and 
Philosophy 239, 246. 
49
 Raz, ‘The Rule of Law and its Virtue’ (n 2) 56.  
50
 Colleen Murphy, A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation (CUP, 2010) 62. 
51
 Ibid 54.  
52
 David Lubban, ‘The Rule of Law and Human Dignity: Reexamining Fuller’s Canons ‘ (2010) 2 
Hague J. on Rule of Law 29, 41.  
53
 Murphy, A Moral Theory of Political Reconciliation (n 50) 61-64. 
54
 Allan, Constitutional Justice (n 6) 55. 
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
221 
 
others to similarly act in accordance with a common scheme of rules.55 It also limits 
the ‘individual’s vulnerability to official direction on unfair or unpredictable grounds’.56 
Trevor Allan has suggested that a Fullerean judge will inevitably seek the full 
meaning of the rule of law in those values of dignity which explain adherence to the 
precepts of formal justice. In the practice of adjudication on the concept of the rule of 
law, a judge is ‘bound to have constant regard to its underlying rationale, and the 
values which that rationale implies.’57 According to Allan, these ‘values, in turn, will 
have important implications for the substantive content of law.’58 Thus, unlike Raz, 
there is an expanding outwards from the formal elements which are argued for on 
grounds of dignity to substantive elements that carry over to the ends of law.59 Riley 
has similarly criticised Raz for suggesting that the aspiration of the rule of law is 
successful government. He argues that, taking account of the conception of the 
person the rule-based conception of the rule of law seeks to protect, the true 
aspiration of the rule of law is that of justification, which means a concern with 
justifying the use of power to a responsible agent. In this respect, the rule of law is 
not only concerned with limiting a certain form of rules, but also with ensuring that 
the kind of rules are endorsed that are ‘consistent with human interests or agency 
and capable of being consented to…rule of law is the…self-constraint of those who 
could otherwise tyrannically impose a self-serving form of order without concern for 
the common good.’60  
The second potential criticism of the stability of rules is it emphasises on conflict as 
an aspect of the human condition.61 Each person may disagree, as a matter of 
opinion, about what is necessary for right action, including ideas about the content of 
dignity, which is resolved by rules that replace the moral considerations giving rise to 
conflict.62 This approach can be problematic in downplaying the co-operative and 
interdependent aspects of humanity, including the importance of common striving, 
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concerns and aspirations, even in a world characterised by differences. 63  More 
importantly, from the perspective of an investment concept of dignity, it is premised 
on a particular conception of power, as well as reasoning, which is disembodied and 
makes few distinctions between types of knowledge upon which people act. Power, 
for instance, is largely conceptualised by Gearty as the pursuit of authority, control, 
or influence over decision-making in the choice of ethical values to the loss of others. 
It is as if ‘power were a possession to be fought over.’64 This contrasts with a more 
productive and co-operative conception of power inherent in a Spinozist and 
Deleuzian image of the human subject at the heart of the investment concept of 
dignity.  
Power, on this account, entails a capacity to act, to affect and be affected, which is 
not about the successful control of one group over another. It is concerned with 
organising relations with others that compose, join and unite to mutually maintain 
and maximise affectivity and activity. Reason is not opposed to this concept of 
power, but concerns the development of common notions, which is the perception 
and comprehension of what is ‘common between my body and another that affects 
me with joy’.65  It is, on this account, the more passive aspects of our selfhood 
underpinned by inadequate ideas that drive us towards conflict, such as hatred, 
disgust, revenge and envy. This thereby requires us to be attentive to the way in 
which law is not just a command, replacing our reasons for acting, but embodies a 
kind of knowledge, which can be more or less adequate, depending on whether it 
enhances or diminishes the development of the capabilities of each person in a 
relational network.66  
Principled justification, in contrast to the stability of rules can be subject to the 
opposite criticism that it overemphasises the rationality of agents to converge on the 
best scheme of community principle. Individuals are trusted as moral agents capable 
of understanding the complete set of moral reasons that underlie the existing legal 
practices in the right way.67 Importantly, this employs a protestant conception of the 
morally autonomous agent who is capable of ‘imposing purpose on an object or 
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practice’.68 This approach can be criticised for conceptualising the moral capabilities 
of individuals at a very abstract level. In the pursuit of a coherent account of 
principles, a person is inevitably led away from an appraisal of lived experience, 
including the issues and problems faced by real people in a particular case, to a 
grand overarching scheme of principle that becomes increasingly more abstract. It 
assumes that those principles are simply there a priori to be understood and then 
applied, rather than being refined, deepened or corrected through application in the 
encounter.69  
The second model can also be challenged for undermining security on the grounds 
that people may have very different perceptions of the scheme of principle the law 
embodies.70 It focuses on the herculean man who independently seeks to identify 
and interpret the existing scheme of community principle. This contrasts with a view 
of reason that is understood not in the process of thinking separately from others, by 
finding the ‘goodness or badness in the object’, which for Dworkin is legal practice, 
but in our encounters with others, through the relations of mutual agreement and 
association.71 Reasoning, on this account, is very much an embodied experience 
that subverts a mind-body dualism. This is because reasoning to an idea is ‘not a 
picture or an image of things deposited “in the soul”; it is an action on the part of a 
thinking individual, who at the same time is affected by other individuals (human or 
not), or on the past of several individuals thinking together, that is, forming the same 
idea.’72 Ideas thus form not merely as abstract image in the mind, to be imposed on 
practice, but in reference to the particularities of the encounter with specific cases 
and individuals.73 
2.4. Conclusion 
It has been established that the stability of rules and principled justification concepts 
of the rule of law are subject to certain problems. The difficulties arise, in part, due to 
the way in which each of the models conceptualise the moral and reasoning 
capabilities of individuals as aspects of human dignity. Principled justification 
prioritises the rationality of humanity. Specifically, a Kantian variant of moral 
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autonomy in which individuals self-legislate the moral principles shared by the 
community and govern themselves by those principles. In contrast, the stability of 
rules places far less faith in the ability of individuals to morally agree on the 
appropriateness of conduct without recourse to clear and settled rules. One of the 
dangers of this approach is that it does not sufficiently differentiate between the 
passive and destructive ideas which legal rules may embody. There is, in both 
approaches, a rather narrow consideration of dimensions of our humanity to 
respected, as opposed to a holistic approach, which encompass both passive 
aspects that may lead to conflict, as well as active dimensions, which are found in 
composing relations with others and developing an adequate idea of how those 
relations lead to a joyful increase in the power to affect and be affected.  
3. Stability in the Promotion of Human Dignity 
3.2. Introduction 
There is, it is argued, a need to reconceptualise the idea of human dignity connected 
to the rule of law to accommodate both stability and justification. These are both 
needed on the basis that humanity is never entirely active or passive, reasonable or 
unreasonable. It is thus argued that a stable ‘plan of life’ is required in order ‘to 
render life and the state secure’ as well as protect individuals from the dangers or 
relationships based on the passive dimensions of our humanity.74 On the other hand, 
justification is needed in order to promote the active dimensions of our humanity, 
including enhanced understanding of those relationships and compositions that are 
destructive or productive.  This section therefore explains the manner in which 
stability and justification are connected with, as well as promote, investment dignity. 
3.3. Active Agency  
It was established in chapter two that individuals are in a process of becoming 
active. Individuals may begin with passive desires or knowledge, which over time 
can be replaced with more active ones as individuals understand why certain 
encounters are productive. This enables individuals to invest in ordering and 
selecting a set of productive encounters in a plurality of ways, with all individuals 
becoming unique in the process. 75  A productive encounter being defined, as 
discussed in chapter two, as those situations in which people compose relationships 
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with others that mutually enhance their power of acting and joyful passions. People, 
individually and collectively, can be subject to passive desires, in the form of harming 
other people, on the grounds of an irrational hatred or disgust based on an 
inadequate idea of the dignity of the other as a source of a productive encounter.76 
These inadequate ideas are based not on reason, but on imagination, entailing 
various illusions and superstitions that can lead to destructive tendencies.77 It is in 
light of this combination of rationality and passivity that stability is needed. Stability 
seeks to solidify the processes of becoming active, against the destructive power of 
passivity. The ‘overriding aim is the establishment and maintenance of relatively 
stable forms of interaction between different kinds of force.’78 The rule of law in 
emphasising stability recognises that those in power cannot be wholly trusted to use 
it reasonably, as they can be collectively drawn to passive desires in the same way 
as they individually can.79 
3.4. Insecurity Vulnerability  
The promotion of stability against destructive passion is closely related to protecting 
the individual against insecurity vulnerability. The establishment of stability protects 
individuals from the anxiety that they may experience about how state coercion will 
be applied in the future, or how other people might interact with them. In a society 
where individuals are overwhelmingly subject to the passive will of others, because 
of wide discretionary powers, or unclear obligations, it is likely to encourage fear 
about engaging in particular activities, because the individual may feel insecure 
about the consequences that might result.  
The ‘insecurity vulnerability’ that results from instability is a particular threat to 
investment dignity. Human dignity protects diverse channels of human activity for 
individuals who are always in the process of becoming, so that they can invest 
themselves in productive encounters that conform to their own desires. In being 
subject to the arbitrary will of others, an individual cannot feel secure in that process. 
The lack of sufficient stability has a potentially chilling effect in terms of creating fear 
of engaging in potentially productive, creative and experimental encounters, as 
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individuals cannot know whether others may punish them on the basis of passive 
desires. 
3.5. Active Striving 
It has been established that stability is an important means by which to protect 
individuals from destructive passion. On this account, the ‘State and rule of law [are] 
needed to prevent people harming one another.’80 The rule of law is a guarantee to 
ensure that we can ‘persevere in our being’, which encompasses our active striving 
in ‘seeking survival and well-being.’81 This conceptual connection to dignity does not 
mean that stability is important for its own sake, separate from a consideration of 
how it contributes to the security and development of the mental and physical 
capabilities of individuals. Investment dignity would thereby impose constraints on 
the possible content of law, specifically restricting legal norms that appear 
underpinned by passive desires in which people imagine that capturing, dominating, 
exploiting, or limiting the power of another is to their advantage.82 Not all power is, as 
was discussed above, concerned with conflict. In fact, the power of individuals is 
productive as creative and diverse potential, developed in the process of becoming.  
The investment conception recognises the value of encounters between individuals 
in increasing their powers of acting. The combination of different individuals is not 
always a clash of power, but rather it can promote potentiality. It is therefore rational 
that individuals join with other powers in productive encounters. This has an 
important consequence in recognising that a state or community is more powerful to 
the extent that it is based on compositions or relationships that allow each person to 
fully develop their power and capabilities.83 Stable structures are needed to ensure 
the process of becoming different and active can continue, whilst deterring harmful 
and destructive forces from interfering with that process. This therefore leads to a 
consideration of the other dimension of the rule of law, in the form of justification.  
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4. Justification as a Condition of Dignity  
4.2. Introduction 
This section highlights the ways in which justification is interconnected with an 
investment conception of dignity. It will be argued that the rule of law must ensure 
that it does not treat individuals as merely passive objects; law is ‘quite different from 
(say) herding cows with a cattle prod or directing a flock of sheep with a dog.’84 The 
rule of law recognises the active nature of agency; by attempting to ensure that 
people possess an adequate idea of their actions and the reasons behind the 
imposition of an obligation, or the failure to confer an opportunity. In this light, the law 
must be capable of justification by reference to some adequate idea about why it is 
productive in increasing powers of acting to those most affected.   
4.3. Active Agency  
In light of the fact that the investment conception of dignity recognises that humans 
are to some degree active beings, there is a commitment to the view that individuals 
are capable of developing adequate ideas about why some activity is productive, 
whilst other activities are destructive. Importantly, one of the main ways that the rule 
of law attempts to realise this dimension of dignity is through the way in which 
judicial hearings aim to justify a verdict to an individual. It is suggested that the point 
of a trial is to seek the co-operation and contribution of the citizen, whilst attempting 
to justify the verdict to the individual by eliciting their consent.85 This is reflected in 
the requirement that an individual should be heard in proceedings that apply to them. 
This means that individuals are recognised as having a ‘view of perspective of their 
own to present on the application of the norm to their conduct and situation.’86  
In light of the fact that justifying a decision on the basis of reason is developed in 
common compositions with others, a trial is the site of the development of reasons 
necessary in order for all parties to have an adequate idea of why certain action is 
prohibited, or why certain action is necessary. As was highlighted in chapter two, 
reason is based on the development of adequate ideas, which entails an 
understanding of what is common to different bodies, rendering the body more 
capable, whilst also entailing an understanding of destructive compositions.87 A trial 
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can justify law on the basis of reason if it formulates adequate ideas between the 
different parties about why a particular relationship is productive or destructive. The 
justification of law is therefore not based on abstractly imposing a purpose or value 
on an institution, but is rather developed in the encounter between different groups.  
The preceding account is a somewhat idyllic view of the legal process, for it 
envisages it to be a productive encounter that is important to the process of 
becoming-active of those affected by the system, but it not without support in terms 
of the rehabilitative and reason sharing dimensions of law. The individual, through 
cooperation, is educated in understanding the need for norms, which can in turn lead 
them to have more adequate ideas of why their activity was destructive and why they 
should become different into the future, or why the decisions of the authorities were 
necessary. This approach can fundamentally be connected to the becoming and 
unfolding nature of human personality that was directly connected to dignity as 
potentiality. The cooperative nature of the legal process can be a means to enable a 
person to construct a more productive future becoming in seeking to understand why 
it is to a person’s advantage to promote common productive compositions.  
4.4. Exclusion Vulnerability  
The forgoing analysis has recognised the importance of justification as a requirement 
of the rule of law. It is suggested that justification is not plausible where the norms 
themselves have a content that is destructive or oppressive, as it is not possible to 
impart adequate ideas of why a norm protects what is common to different bodies 
and our own, so that a person can become active into the future, if that norm is itself 
based on destructive passions. ‘Common notions’ being adequate ideas that 
properly capture the way in which relations between two bodies adapt themselves to 
one another to inspire each person with joy and an enhanced capability to affect and 
be affected.88  
This dimension of justification immediately rules out any law that is based on the 
belief that some groups are unworthy, useless, or unpopular. This links in to the 
protection of individuals from exclusion vulnerability. The second chapter explained 
that some people can be rendered vulnerable because of the way in which social 
structures exclude the needs or concerns of particular groups. This is because those 
structures are designed around a paradigm from which other groups fall short. In 
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many cases, those who fall outside of the paradigm are treated with various degrees 
and forms of indignation, ranging from pity and disgust, to pure hatred. These 
attitudes are incompatible with the idea of the equal potentiality of all and they cut off 
the creative nature of becoming different, in which potential unfolds in diverse ways, 
not merely towards a majoritarian norm.   
The amelioration of exclusion vulnerability cannot, however, purely be realised by 
justifying the imposition of burdens, or the assimilation of excluded into an existing 
majoritarian standard. It is argued that the inclusion of groups must go further than 
this, in that it requires the law be reconstructed to take account of the difference in 
the process of creative becoming. Thus, it is not just necessary to assimilate people 
into the current model, but also to change the very nature of public institutions in 
order to accept difference as valuable in itself. The amelioration of exclusion 
vulnerability therefore requires not only the absence of burdens, but also the positive 
action of the community to rectify institutional exclusion. There can be no passivity or 
indifference, specifically towards the needs of the most vulnerable. 
4.5. Conclusion 
The connections between the justification and stability dimensions of this 
construction of the rule of law are mutually supportive in their advancement of 
human dignity. Stability protects active agency against the dangers that come with 
the imposition of passive desires, whilst justification requires that the content of law 
is productive and based on adequate ideas, requiring that law be given a content 
that is premised on reason and common notions. The rule of law is therefore 
complete, in the realisation of its ideal, when it exists as a stable framework capable 
of protecting and promoting productive encounters, against the expression of 
passive indignation.  
5. The Rule of Law as a Productive Encounter 
5.2. Introduction  
The two dimensions of stability and justification have turned out to be equally 
important dimensions for the protection of investment dignity. It is now important to 
consider how these two dimensions can be mutually supportive. It will be argued that 
these two dimensions can work in tandem to protect investment dignity, if the rule of 
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law is re-imagined as an active encounter.89 It is neither an abstract set of principles, 
nor fully determinate set of rules. The law is a body of knowledge, which can be 
more or less adequate to the extent that it aids ‘an individual in the fullest 
development of his powers.’90 It is a body of knowledge that exists in a characteristic 
relationship of motion and rest between its component parts, which is an “open 
multiplicity.”91 The characteristic relationship of the law, as a body of knowledge, is 
creatively modified in the process of application, in other words in the encounter with 
those directly affected. In this way the law is reflective of dignity, for it is based in 
creative potentiality; it is a potential for transformation.  
It will be argued that the unfolding of potential occurs case by case; the rights of 
individuals being actualised in each case as a new event. In this light, the law is 
justified in the event of application or activity. At the same time, it will be argued that 
that, in light of the combination of passivity and rationality in all agents, there is a 
need for assurance that rights are firmly based on adequate ideas. Some degree of 
certainty is therefore to be expected about whether a legal encounter is productive, 
which will require ongoing dialogue with those affected.  
5.3. Law as Knowledge 
It is common to conceive of law, including as an aspect of the rule of law, as a set of 
clear commands or decrees laid down by the sovereign.92 The rule of law, in this 
regard, is sometimes purely conceptualised as making the law more efficient in 
serving the purposes of the sovereign.93 This approach to law, as Moira Gatens has 
argued, prepossesses a particular understanding of human personality that treats 
the intellect and will as separate faculties, so that a body can arbitrarily set down a 
particular rule without affirming any particular ideas or, in the act of willing a 
particular rule, replace those ideas upon which a person might act.94 This contrasts 
with a Spinozist conception of human personality, central to investment dignity, 
which ‘denies that intellect and will are separate faculties.’95 The will is not merely an 
expression of the desires of a person or body, but rather the ideas and concepts that 
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they affirm. Law thus operates more like a body of concepts and ideas about the 
‘good’ (productive) or ‘bad’ (destructive) ordering of different types of encounters, 
compositions and relationships.96  
This has a number of important consequences for understanding law. Firstly, it 
means that law can be more or less adequate, depending on whether it 
encompasses ideas that are based on reason, which entails composing relationships 
that aid the development of the powers of each person. In contrast, law can be 
inadequate when it is based on illusions or fictions that affirm forms of sociability 
based on capture, dominance or oppression, which can be absorbed by society and 
affect the character of the population.97 Secondly, understanding law as knowledge 
has a potential beneficial effect on the development of capacities of persons. 
Treating law as a system of commands, or independent rules, is not the same as 
knowledge. As Gatens argues, it can, ‘at best, only imitate knowledge.’98 A system of 
command acts more through guiding behaviour through passive aspects of 
personality, such as ‘fear of punishment or hope of reward.’99 An individual is more 
passive and less active in a society of law as command as it ‘encourages obedience 
without understanding’ which renders people ‘incapable of either acting or expanding 
their powers of acting.’100 A system of law, understood as knowledge, is more likely 
to lead to a strong form of sociability that increases and develops the capacities of 
individuals to act. Finally, as will be explored further below, treating law as a body of 
knowledge gives it a more dynamic quality than a system of commands.  
5.4. Law as an Encounter 
The model of legal judgment that characterises the stability of rules and principled 
justifications is that of subsumption, whereby a case is either decided in accordance 
with a clear rule or in accordance with a set of abstract principles.101 Subsumption is 
considered necessary if the law is to respect human dignity. What both these 
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accounts miss in connecting the rule of law to dignity, is that it is more than merely 
autonomy and it is not just a fixed ideal that needs only to be applied.102  
Dignity as investment, as has been seen, is a concept that is marked by the creative 
process of transformation that unfolds over time. As a direct result of this, it is not 
possible to predict a priori exactly what a person is capable of doing or being, as 
they engage over life in various experimental encounters, in ways that either 
increase or decrease their power of acting. Our understanding of dignity is only 
formed through the development of adequate ideas, which represent what is 
common to bodies in our encounter with others. This is quite unlike the stability of 
rules or principled justification framework, as dignity can be given further content 
through our common understanding of what promotes our potential in specific 
circumstances, which can be experimental and new. However, there can be relative 
certainty concerning what enhances or diminishes our dignity gained from lived 
experience. It is, as argued in chapter two, possible to gain knowledge about how 
particular combinations, encounters or assemblages may be destructive or 
productive, which is knowledge gained from human experience that enables an art of 
organising ‘good encounters’ as well as the prevention of ‘bad encounters’. It is 
clear, for instance, that torture is a universally prohibited practice that damages the 
dignity of both the victim and the torturer.103 However, even then, it is not possible to 
have a complete understanding of a practice, such as torture, in the abstract. It must 
always take account of individual experiences and the particular circumstances of 
the case, such as the state, age and health of the victim, as well as the surrounding 
social environment in the form of ‘present-day conditions’.104 On this account, an 
adequate understanding of what will enhance or diminish dignity is understood, 
modified and enriched with each new encounter or application to a case in a 
particular social milieu.     
This investment concept of dignity has some significant repercussions for the rule of 
law. It has a potentially transformative impact in terms of existing paradigms, in the 
way that law is no longer needed as subsumption in order to protect dignity. As 
Gadamer reminds us, understanding is ‘not merely a reproductive but always a 
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productive activity as well.’105 It is only possible to have a complete understanding of 
how the law protects (or should protect) dignity when rights are actualised in specific 
decisions in particular cases. The law is properly an activity that creates affects in 
particular circumstances through the way it assembles different forces, whereas 
rules or principles are merely ‘virtual singularities.’106  To have an adequate idea 
therefore requires an understanding of actual affects that can only be discerned in 
the event of application. 
This is not an entirely novel approach to the rule of law, for, as Gadamer long ago 
argued, there is no separate process by which it is possible to understand in the 
abstract a legal principle, which can then be merely applied to a case. Rather, 
application is part of understanding, so that a ‘case involves not merely applying the 
universal principle according to which it is judged, but co-determining, 
supplementing, and correcting that principle.’107 An understanding of a principle can 
thus actually be improved, shaped or discovered through the experience of applying 
it, rather than it being determined completely ‘independently of the situations in 
which they must be applied.’108 The authority of law, on this account, is found not in 
an abstract code of principles or rules, which are immoveable, but in the active 
dialogue that occurs between the need for stability or tradition and change or 
transformation in relation to a conversation with real people over time.  
This creation or modification of norms to deal with the particularities of the encounter 
collapses the traditional distinction between the justification of a norm and its 
application. The traditional distinction understands norms as relating to a number of 
scenarios that it needs only to be applied to. Application only makes the norm ‘more 
determinate.’109 In contrast, focusing on the encounter recognises that applications 
modify the ‘norm in a creative application.’110 The collapse between the stages of 
justification and application mean that the law is constituted through engagement 
with concrete situations. Alexandre Lefebvre, in his excellent commentary on the 
implications of Deleuze and Spinoza to legal thought, has provided a formalised 
image of this form of judicial enterprise.  He argues that for both writers the 
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encounter is the transcendental condition of thought, an ‘encounter imposes itself.’111 
The encounter cannot always be subsumed by a preconceived rule. This leads to the 
formulation of a problem ‘able to create concepts to adjudicate the encounter.’112 It is 
through the creation of the concept that a problem gains a deeper sense and 
determination. Importantly, however, the creation of a concept is realised through 
reciprocal engagement with the characteristic relationship of the existing parts of the 
law, or ideas, modifying them into a new assemblage in a way that it is actively 
capable of advancing the problem. In this regard, ‘various actualised elements of the 
pure past of law entertain new and creative relationships.’ 113  This model of 
adjudication, by focusing on the encounter, can advance dignity to the extent means 
that the law is not treated as fixed but capable of addressing the specific problems 
that unfold over time.  
5.5. The Becoming of Law  
It has been established that every new case or situation of application of law is an 
event that entails an encounter between various different actors. Notably, each event 
is not a pure repetition of identical facts, but rather a new encounter with particular 
circumstances and stakeholders. In reflecting this dimension of dignity, the 
movement between each case as an encounter is properly defined as the “pure 
movement evident in the changes between particular events. 114  The law as a 
characteristic assemblage of component parts has the potential to move through 
each case, adapting and changing its characteristic with each new encounter. This is 
the becoming of the law, in so far as the characteristic relationships of the 
components alter between encounters, making the law genuinely creative. However, 
the law can become more adequate, to the extent that it has a ‘greater or less 
appreciation and affirmation of its capacities.’115 This includes ‘allowing itself to be 
affected by those things that enhance its powers and encourage the formulation of 
common notions.’116  
It is suggested that this process of becoming is an immanent part of the legal 
process in its current form. A particularly useful example of the becoming of law is 
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demonstrable in the transition of the law on marital rape in the UK, culminating in the 
ECtHR decision in S.W. v United Kingdom. 117  In this case two men had been 
convicted of raping their wives. At the time of the act they thought there was a 
common law immunity protecting husbands against conviction. The issue before 
Strasbourg was whether the conviction was an illegitimate form of retrospective 
punishment as prohibited by Article 7 of the Convention. This Article is clearly 
underpinned by the principle nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege, which is 
understood to be a core element of the rule of law. In deciding whether Article 7 had 
been violated the Court - 
...[D]id not separate the question of strict lawfulness or 
legal certainty from substantive considerations. It 
recognised the interests of justice in having rules that are 
on the one hand accessible and clear and on the other fair 
and substantively just.118 
The Court held that Article 7 had not been violated on the basis that the punishment 
was not at odds with its object and purpose, which provides ‘effective safeguards 
against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment.’119 The requirements of 
accessibility and foreseeability were held to have been satisfied because – 
This was an area where the law had been subject to 
progressive development and there were strong 
indications that still wider interpretation by the courts of 
the inroads on the immunity was probable.  In particular, 
given the recognition of women's equality of status with 
men in marriage and outside it and of their autonomy over 
their own bodies, the adaptation of the ingredients of the 
offence of rape was reasonably foreseeable..120 
 
What is notable is that the law had progressively been changed over a period of 
time. Originally, judges had developed a legal principle that meant wives were 
recognised as having consented to intercourse through the covenant of marriage, a 
consent that could not be ‘unilaterally withdrawn.’121 In light of the consent to the 
unity of marriage with husbands as the head of the household, husbands were 
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believed to have a dominant property interest in their wives, who were likened to the 
‘subservient chattel’.122 However, with each new encounter with a marital rape case 
there was a gradual erosion of the immunity.123 This process of change concluded 
with the case of R v R that fully removed the immunity.124 The Court held that the 
image of a woman as having impliedly consented was a “common law fiction which 
has become anachronistic and offensive.” 125  The notion of implied consent was 
‘artificial because the legal consequences of marriage were not the result of the 
parties’ mutual agreement.’126 The existing artificial construction was replaced with a 
new juridical construction, one in which marriage was a ‘partnership of equals.’127 
This is representative of the way in which norms evolve according to their 
engagement with concrete situations. As was stated in R v R, the ‘law…is capable of 
evolving in light of changing social, economic and cultural developments.’128 
The law is a continuous unfolding through encounters with present problems and 
situations. Law is “placed in a constitutive relationship with its outside – with cases – 
which forces it into action and invention.” 129  This constitutive relationship was, 
importantly, clearly implicit in the decisions taken in S.W. by the ECrtHR. In this case 
there was no separate substantive consideration of the dignity of the women from a 
discussion of foreseeability of punishment. On the contrary, the continuing 
recognition and certainty about the interests of women was a part of the evidence 
given for claiming that a development of the law was foreseeable. 130 It was 
reasonably foreseeable that rape, as an offence designed to protect the dignity of 
women, should evolve so as to recognise that no distinctions can be made between 
women purely on the basis of the nature of the pre-existing relationship that exists 
between a rapist and his victim. The Court was clearly influenced by substantive 
considerations of the nature of the act as a component for the determination of 
whether the object and purpose of Article 7 had been violated.  
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The example of marital rape demonstrates how law moves through encounters with 
concrete situations, in an active and inventive form. This process is potentially 
capable of protecting dignity in the way that the law can develop adequate ideas of 
why certain encounters are destructive of life potential, or promote it. Additionally, it 
demonstrates the need to be vigilant in re-examining past decisions to consider 
whether they were based on destructive images or inadequate ideas, which are 
always a possible consequence of the passive dimension of personality. That is, 
superstitions or illusions that represent confused, partial or mutilated knowledge of 
persons and their interactions, relationships and connections to other bodies. 131 
Thus, marital rape is a destructive encounter based on inadequate ideas, which the 
law had for too long accepted. The encounter with the victim and her experience 
allowed for the erosion of this fictional and negative image of women as passive 
objects. It is, in light of the process of becoming in our understanding of the nature of 
the encounter with the victim, that the punishment of marital rape cannot be 
considered arbitrary.  
5.6. Stabilising the Becoming of Law 
The law as a process of becoming therefore offers the potential for productive 
metamorphosis, as rights move through a process of adaptation between their 
actualisation in specific cases.132 At the same time, it is important not to lose sight of 
the importance of stability to the rule of law. The process of the becoming of law is 
most certainly capable of being productive, but it also carries with it risks. Although 
experimenting with new compositions with others is potentially productive, it is not 
always possible to know the full effects of particular combinations. Some encounters 
may have potentially destructive and unknown effects. This requires on the part of 
the ‘experimenter’ a great deal of ‘patience and prudence.’133  
One of the dangers in law is the possibility that becoming can be directed in an 
arbitrary fashion according to passive desires that have destructive affect or without 
a degree of certainty about the potential consequences. This is the danger of the 
passivity which is inherent in human life, posing particular risks to individuals who 
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become subordinate to the passive will of another. Instability in becoming may also 
be dangerous where decision can have effects that cannot be fully known in advance 
and, in such circumstances, modifications of law carries important risks to the 
powers of acting of different stakeholders. This is an example of good intentions 
vulnerability. It is, perhaps, with this in mind, that judges have been cautious to 
extend the law to permit assisted dying or euthanasia, in part, due to the uncertainty 
about the consequences of such a decision for the treatment of the particularly 
vulnerable in terms of being constructive or destructive.134  
In light of the inherent dangers of a completely experimental becoming, the process 
must be marked by a degree of stability, so that change is not violent, arbitrary or 
unpredictable. What defines stability is not fixed rules or principles applied to each 
case, but rather the idea of laws characteristic relationship. Each component part of 
the law is in a characteristic relationship with other component parts, depending on 
their “movement, speed, and consistency”.135 This reflects dignity and treats the law 
as a social body, defined by the – 
 [R]elations of its parts (relations of relative motion and 
rest, speed and slowness) and by its actions and 
reactions with respect both to its environment or milieu 
and to its internal milieu.136  
 
The law is thus the characteristic relation of the speed/motion and slowness/rest 
between its parts in reaction to encounters with society. The stability of law 
fundamentally varies according to the pace with which changes and modifications of 
the characteristic relationship of norms take place in the unfolding between particular 
encounters and in relation to the social environment.137  
The way in which the characteristic relationship of the law determines the degree of 
stability is best understood by examining a practical example. Consider, for instance, 
the modification of rights of transsexuals under the ECHR. Originally, the 
construction of gender, in the form of ‘male’ and ‘female’ was interpreted as not 
encompassing the new sex of a post-operative transgender individual. An individual 
who had transgender surgery would continue to be classified according to their 
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sexual features at birth. The ECrtHR, in adjudicating on these cases, began by 
recognising the lack of scientific or social understanding of the issue, although 
recognised that developments over time might occur.138 With each new encounter 
there was a greater recognition of the distress suffered by transsexuals, alongside 
recognition of societal and scientific developments.139 Eventually the ECrtHR held in 
Goodwin that a failure to recognise the new sex of an individual resulted in a 
violation of the Convention. 140  Although it recognised the importance of legal 
certainty, it held that rights must be ‘practical and effective, not theoretical and 
illusory. A failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would 
indeed risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement.’141   
The transformation of law over time, culminating in Goodwin, represents a number of 
important commitments. This includes a commitment to the idea of creative 
transformation, effective protection by engagement with present day conditions and 
active improvement of social conditions. It is arguable that the law on transgender 
individuals was becoming different through the transition between encounters with 
individuals and social developments, leading to a greater understanding.142 At the 
same time, this becoming was not achieved haphazardly, but entailed time for 
reflection and consideration. The level of stability in the law was dependent on both 
the level and pace of modification in light of an understanding of the nature of the 
problem.143  
This is not to say that modification and creation of rights are determined by some 
fixed duration of time or fixed speed. Instead, the degree of stability required 
fundamentally depends on a return to the kinds of circumstances in which the law is 
actively transitioning. The level of prudence required in the process of becoming 
cannot therefore be established in the abstract. To actually gain an adequate idea of 
the level of prudence required, one must be attentive to the effects of modification or 
creation in each specific encounter, addressing the specific nature of the problem. In 
some fields, such as criminal law, any pace of change may need to be steadily 
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incremental, in light of the severe consequences of deprivation of liberty. The speed 
with which creation or adaption can progress in the process of becoming depends 
therefore on the kinds of circumstances in which the law is actively transitioning.144 
The becoming of law in each new encounter will depend on such factors as the 
nature of the parties, the content of the dispute, changes in circumstances in society, 
and the range of those potentially affected by any decision.145 
5.7. Dialogue with those Most Affected 
One of the most important consequences of the unfolding of law across different 
encounters is that it requires an understanding of an adequate idea of how that 
encounter is productive in respect of those affected. The event of application is an 
encounter between various actors, including the judge, the defendant, the claimant, 
victim or prosecutor, and in complex resource allocation cases, a public authority, 
and the wider public. It is not possible to have an adequate idea of the justification of 
the law apart from understanding its active effects in the encounter between the 
different stakeholders. This reflects dignity in the way in which it is only possible to 
know the extent to which an encounter will extend powers of acting by looking at 
what is common to persons in their specific encounters with various groups and 
people. This means that the law is justified only to the extent that each encounter is 
capable of being rationally justifiable as productive in the way that it promotes the 
different powers of acting of agents, whilst deterring destructive passions, discernible 
in the particularities of the case.  
The law is therefore importantly formed with those ‘people most directly affected.’146 
The role of the judge is not simply to be the wise man inventing rights in light of 
passive desires, but rather to adapt rights through the development of common 
notions with those most affected. 147 This treats those encountered as active agents, 
as they are enabled to communicate the effects of decisions and encounters with 
others in their process of becoming, shaping our understanding of how the law 
should be applied. This characterises the law in the process of unfolding as a form of 
dialogue with those affected.   
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5.8. Conclusion 
This Chapter has established that the rule of law is directly connected to the concept 
of dignity. This was highlighted through a consideration of the stability of rules and 
principled justification version of the rule of law, with each taking a different 
perspective of the source of dignity in the human condition. These two accounts 
were both rejected on the grounds that focusing on subsumption to pre-existing 
categories could not encompass the creative difference of dignity. It was argued that 
dignity can only be understood in the unfolding between different encounters, by 
understanding what would enhance powers of acting in the concrete case.  
In order for the rule of law to reflect this approach to dignity, law should be treated as 
a process of becoming between productive encounters. The law is in a process of 
transition as it attempts to deal with the particularities of each new case, becoming 
different in the process. This conception of the rule of law bypasses subsumption in 
favour of modification and creation. This approach is mutually supportive of both 
justification and stability. The former is accommodated by the development of 
adequate ideas about why a particular encounter is productive and stability is 
realised through the relative degree of speed and slowness in the modification of the 
characteristic relationship between norms in each encounter. This re-imagining of 
the rule of law establishes a potentially rich source of dignity protection. This is 
especially the case as there are existing pathways to its advancement. It also 
creates an important conceptual connection to the common law.  
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Chapter Six: Respecting Investment Dignity through Dialogic Democracy 
1. Introduction  
The discussion of the rule of law demonstrates that the protection of the concept of 
investment dignity is not something that can be realised in a vacuum or in isolation 
from other concepts. Nor, importantly, can an individual be considered separately 
from the power and ambit of the community or the collective body politic. One of the 
significant debates surrounding the growing use of human dignity is the proper 
relationship it requires between the individual and the state or community as a 
whole. 1  Does it require a limited or expansive role for the state? Should the 
community be paternalistic or liberal? Whatever the particular relationship, it is 
generally recognised that dignity is only compatible with, and may even provide the 
foundation for, a democratic model of governance. Indeed, in many jurisdictions 
around the world, dignity has been closely related to the concept of democracy.2  
Such connections are tentatively emerging in the UK where some judges have even 
suggested that a democratic society is ‘founded on’3 or ‘based on’4 human dignity. 
The difficulty, as Erin Daly has eloquently noted, is that the exact association 
between the concept of dignity and democracy has not always been fully explained. 
Indeed, different cases appear to reflect different theoretical assumptions, without 
‘distinguishing among them or evaluating the implications of the differences’ between 
them.5  Some discussions on human dignity, for instance, proceed by suggesting 
that the concept is sceptical of state power and sets up the relationship with the 
democratic community as one of potential conflict or antagonism. In contrast, some 
concepts of dignity are more favourable towards state power, demanding an 
‘expanded sphere for the state to respect what is inherent and to fulfil what is to be 
nurtured by providing public goods and services’.6 Despite the differences between 
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these approaches, in both cases dignity has a foundational role that informs the 
limits and direction of democratic governance, shaping the grounds of its legitimacy.  
It is the aim of this chapter to consider further the connections between the dignity of 
the individual and the concept of democracy.7 The concept of democracy is at the 
core of the existing form of community life in the UK and the backbone to 
parliamentary sovereignty. Discussions on the relationship between dignity and 
democracy will therefore have significant implications for the current structure of the 
relationship between the individual and the collective. In the first part of this chapter, 
existing conceptions of democracy are assessed in order to determine their 
connections to the concept of dignity and the extent to which these concepts can 
advance an investment concept of dignity. These include three main competing 
models of democracy that have been connected to dignity; majoritarian (Waldron, 
Gearty)8, partnership (Dworkin)9 and communicative concepts (Habermas).10  It is 
argued that, whilst these constructions of democracy advance some dimensions of 
an investment construction of dignity, this protection is limited to the extent that these 
models of democracy, in their focus on abstract reason, do not encompass the 
creative potentiality of life, which unfolds over time in concrete situations. These 
models of democracy create systems of representation, under which individuals and 
cases can be recognised according to rationally justifiable norms that may be agreed 
upon by ‘self-governing’ free and equal persons.11 This creates a closed and abstract 
form of dialogue, separate from the possibility of openness and responsiveness to 
discovering creative diversity, through encountering the particular needs of 
individuals in a specific case.12  
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In order to enhance protection of an investment concept of dignity, an alternative 
model of social dialogue is proposed, which is then connected to the concept of 
democracy and the institutions that embody it. Thus, rather than beginning with a 
focus on inter-institutional dialogue, which is a dominant focus on the concept in the 
legal literature, the chapter starts with a discussion of the inter-personal dialogue that 
exists between individuals, and between individuals and the community. This is in 
line with judicial developments in other jurisdictions that conceive of the democratic 
relationship between the individual and the state as dialogic in nature.13 The issue of 
inter-institutional dialogue is a secondary concern, which should be structured, it is 
argued, in such a way as to best promote and facilitate a constructive inter-personal 
dialogue. Inter-personal dialogue is recognised as a key consequence of the 
interrelationality and interdependence of human life, so that capability of our bodies 
and minds to affect and be affected are always relational to other beings in the world. 
It is argued that this dialogue enhances dignity, as it entails openness to the 
discovery of uniqueness and diversity, by being responsive to the ‘other’ and 
openness to the disruption of repetition, so that law does not just repeat itself, but is 
creatively modified to address the particular needs of an individual in a case. It is 
argued that this form of dialogue is inherently respectful of human dignity, as it 
depends on the idea that  a person is to be valued in terms of contributing to defining 
the problems that affect them and responsiveness to addressing the needs of those 
most directly affected by a decision.  
2. Democratic Theory and Human Dignity 
2.1. Introduction  
The concept of democracy has, as noted above, been connected to the concept of 
dignity. The relationship between these concepts varies according to the meaning 
given to the concept of dignity and democracy, although a variation in the meaning of 
either necessarily has consequences for the other. In this regard, three main 
concepts of democracy demonstrate very different relationships to human dignity. In 
the beginning of this section, the majoritarian concept of democracy is considered in 
order to determine the connections that are made to the concept of dignity and more 
specifically to consider its ability to advance some dimensions of an investment 
concept of dignity. It is argued that the concept of majoritarian democracy, an 
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underlying justification for the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, gives 
expression to hostile desires and views humanity in perpetual conflict over power, in 
contrast to the view that (rational) encounters between individuals entail productive 
combinations that increase and secure the capabilities of all, as well as increasing 
knowledge about the potentiality of different persons.   
2.2. Majoritarian Democracy 
The concept of majoritarian democracy is largely a procedural concept of democracy 
that seeks to ensure an equal impact or influence of ordinary citizens over areas of 
controversy.14 Conor Gearty, amongst contemporary legal theorists, has set out the 
case for a majoritarian concept of democracy. As elucidated in the rule of law 
chapter, according to Gearty, concepts like dignity, equality and justice lack a 
consensus or objective meaning.15 In this light, inevitably there are conflicts in claims 
over rights, with individuals competing for power over claims about the proper 
balance between rights.16 Democracy therefore becomes a ‘struggle for power’.17  
Majoritarian democracy settles the conflict and justification of rights at the legislative 
stage by creating a system of stable rules capable of regulating conduct.  
The connections between this concept of democracy and dignity are largely based 
on the idea that the former solves the problem of the latter. The problem of 
conflicting conceptions is solved by ensuring that individuals have an equal influence 
over decisions through the right to vote. Importantly, the majoritarian model of 
democracy does not discriminate between the different types of reason that may be 
used to determine the balance or compromise between conflicting claims, treating 
humans as mere containers of preferences, without regard to their content. This 
leads to a problem that has long been recognised by Ronald Dworkin, in the form of 
giving official recognition to hostility and contempt.18  Thus, the majority might prefer 
to deny homosexuals the right to succeed to a tenancy and can democratically do 
so.19 The problem with this decision is that it may be premised on an attitude that 
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certain groups have less value or are unworthy of protection.20 It can give expression 
to the passive dimension of human personhood, in the sense of indifference or 
indignation to other people on the grounds of their difference, leading to vulnerability 
through oppression and subordination. This is the antithesis of a rational view that 
recognises that it is to the mutually reinforce the capabilities of all, not to engage in 
destructive activity, by ignoring or diminishing the capabilities of other people, 
imagining the destructive activity to be to individual advantage.21  
In ultimately treating the preferences or opinions of the majority as a basis for 
selecting and balancing conflicting claims, the majoritarian concept of democracy 
lacks a critical standpoint from which to assess those preferences. This is 
problematic for two reasons. Firstly, people’s preferences are highly adaptive to the 
social environment.22 Preferences can be shaped through historical subordination, 
so that individuals come to expect the status quo. The second problem with 
preferences is that they are often reason based, so a preference will often, as Raz 
argues, depend on a reason for thinking something is good or bad.23 
On this view, considering preferences in themselves are not a good measure of what 
is the right action to take, as it does not take account of the fact that ‘[w]e take 
pleasure in something, and the pleasure we take is mostly contingent on thinking 
that it is good’.24 It would be an oversimplification of the majoritarian concept of 
democracy to suggest that a supposed lack of consensus on dignity is the only 
connection to that concept. The concept of majoritarian democracy has been 
connected to the concept of dignity on the grounds that majority rule is the only fair 
method of ensuring the settlement of a dispute, as it is the only method that enables 
individuals to determine themselves the distribution of rights. Jeremy Waldron is a 
prominent advocate of this aspect of majoritarian democracy and has argued that 
participation in the majoritarian democratic procedure is the ‘right of rights’.25 The 
contribution of individuals in the process leads to what Waldron has called the 
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‘dignity of legislation’.26 Importantly, Waldron has connected this to his rank-based 
concept of dignity, in the sense that one of the greatest historical rights of the nobility 
was to be heard in disputes and contribute to decision-making. 27  According to 
Waldron, controversy must ultimately be decided by an individual as an equal in the 
decision-making process. The difficulty with this justification of majoritarian 
democracy concerns an inconsistency. On the one hand values such as dignity, 
equality and liberty are inherently contentious, requiring a procedure to settle conflict, 
whereas, on the other hand, democracy is objectively a fair procedure based on 
equal self-government (equal positive liberty).28 The difficulty, as Dworkin notes, is 
that the justification of majoritarianism contradicts itself by firstly beginning with a 
sceptical claim that values, upon which rights are based, are controversial and 
inherently contestable, but in the end majoritarian democracy adopts those same 
values to argue that it is objectively the fairest procedure.29 Its claim to fairness is 
unconvincing, particularly in light of the fact that it establishes an asymmetry of 
power, between a dominant majority group which determines the content of rights, 
and can adapt social structures to their own benefit, with a subordinate group, who 
may be a ‘identified and disliked minority’.30  
2.3. Partnership Democracy  
A very different account of the concept of democracy to the majoritarian democracy 
is the partnership concept of democracy, or constitutional democracy. The leading 
legal theorist on this form of democracy is Ronald Dworkin, who argues that a true 
democracy is an ideal, which entails that in - 
Politics [members]…must act with equal concern and respect 
for all the other partners. It can be a partnership, that is…if 
each accepts a standing obligation not only to obey the 
community’s law but to try to make that law consistent with 
his good faith understanding of what every citizen’s dignity 
requires.31 
In contrast to a procedural account of democracy, the partnership concept of 
democracy is substantive in the sense that a political community must be legitimate if 
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it is to be democratic.32 This has a notable advantage over the majoritarian concept 
of democracy in that it rules out any decision that would deny rights to individuals on 
the grounds that they are unworthy or unpopular, an attitude wholly incompatible with 
the idea of equal dignity. The partnership concept of democracy therefore attempts 
to be intrinsically connected to the concept of dignity, for it seeks to value every 
individual equally, even if the majority do not. It also entails a great deal more 
cooperation between members of the political community, who are  recognised as 
members of a ‘fraternity’. 33  The extent to which this concept of democracy can 
advance the protection of an investment concept of dignity, however, depends 
fundamentally on the meaning given by Dworkin to the claim that the community 
must act with ‘equal respect and concern’ and make law consistent with a ‘good faith 
understanding of human dignity’.34 Importantly, as has been seen, Dworkin proposes 
a fixed concept of dignity, alongside equal concern and respect that is based on 
‘luck’.35 This means that, rather than seeking to transform the majority norm, or the 
social structures that exclude particular groups, in order to recognise diversity, 
individuals are compensated on the grounds that they are ‘unlucky’ because they 
differ from the norm. Elizabeth Anderson has argued that, as a model of democratic 
equality, Dworkin’s approach is not particularly convincing, in that it locates injustice 
and unfairness in the deficiencies in individual’s innate talents or skills. Individuals 
therefore ‘lay claim to the resources of egalitarian distribution in virtue of their 
inferiority to others’.36 It is significant that Dworkin, in developing the idea of the 
disabled as unlucky or innately deficient, proposes a form of democratic equality that 
preconditions our attitude and understanding of certain groups..  
2.4. Communicative Democracy 
An alternative concept of democracy to the partnership concept, which recognises 
the importance of decisions being agreed upon by those affected, is the 
‘communicative’ concept of democracy. This concept of democracy is most 
prominently advocated by Jürgen Habermas.37 According to Habermas a democracy 
involves individuals establishing communicatively generated norms, which entails 
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that law is valid only if it has been dialogically agreed upon by all those affected.38 
This communicative model is thoroughly Kantian in spirit in its connection to moral 
autonomy, recognising that the ‘addresses of legal norms may at the same time 
understand themselves, taken as a whole, as the rational authors of those norms’.39 
Legal norms are ‘human in the strongly Kantian sense of respecting the humanity – 
the communicative reason – of all those affected by the norm’.40 Citizens are thus 
seen as both the rational authors and the recipients of a legal norm, once the norms 
have been agreed upon by free and equal persons operating in rational discourses. 
This entails the protection of both basic rights, which are rights to engage in the 
democratic process, as well as derivative rights, in the sense of the rights that could 
be accepted by those engaged in the communicative process.41   
The communicative concept of democracy can be connected to an investment 
concept of democracy to the extent that it recognises the need in the legal process to 
justify decisions to those most affected. The difficulty is the Kantian model of 
‘dialogue’ that is at the core of Habermas’ communicative concept of democracy. At 
the core of this model is a closed concept of dialogue based on creating categories 
of recognition and meaning, which do not always encompass the creative potentiality 
of life. In Habermas’ account, law is fixed and justified at the stage of its creation in 
the democratic process, so long as it complies with basic rights that formalise the 
conditions of ‘discursive processes of opinion and will formation in which the 
sovereignty of the people assumes a binding character’.42  
This has a number of implications that Alexandre Lefebvre has noted. Firstly, it 
entails a non-creative image of law, whereby all is given from the outset, entailing 
little room for the creative modification of norms to address particular situations.43 
According to Habermas, application of a norm cannot ‘modify the norm in any 
substantial way’.44 Secondly, Habermas’ form of dialogue is invariably kept separate 
from concrete situations, so that the exchange of opinions is ‘pitched at a necessarily 
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high or indeterminate level of abstractness’.45 In this light, rights are created on an 
abstract plane separate from concrete problems arising in specific situations. 46 
Discussion thus begins to dissipate the ‘singularity of that problem and its solutions 
in favour of communicable generality’.47 Thirdly, and most importantly for dignity, 
Habermas’ form of communication seeks to inscribe modes of recognition. Dialogue 
creates norms that enable us to recognise and anticipate all cases, but this cuts off 
the potential for uniqueness, difference and otherness. This is problematic for the 
investment concept of dignity which has been defined as functionally open to 
respond to diversity and holistic personality, recognising that adequate ideas about 
what is good for a person is developed in ‘encounters’ between individuals, which 
unfold over time in concrete situations.48 
2.5. Conclusion 
The concepts of majoritarian, partnership and communicative democracy would 
provide variable degrees of protection of investment concept of human dignity. The 
majoritarian concept of democracy would provide protection of an investment 
concept on a purely contingent basis, to the extent that the majority prefer to protect 
that concept. The partnership concept of democracy provides better protection for 
the dignity of minority groups, but is problematic in the way that it connected to a 
fixed concept of dignity based on abstract rationality, which is formulated in advance 
of encountering people in the world. A similar problem was experienced with the 
communicative concept of democracy.  
In Habermas’ theory, for instance, dialogue appears to take the form of the exchange 
of opinion, which pre-exists action, so that ideas or knowledge are developed a priori 
to action. The actions of a person therefore take on a meaning in so far as they 
correspond to the norms created communicatively. This differs fundamentally from 
the form of knowledge that has been advocated so far in reference to Spinoza, who 
argued that adequate ideas or knowledge about what a person is capable of being 
and doing is only ever formed inductively through activity and exploration. 
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Knowledge of the meaning or value of an act, is not merely an abstract idea agreed 
upon in advance, but develops through activity; in which different persons encounter 
one another in ever new and different combinations. This approach, according to 
Balibar, offers an alternative politics of communication.49 This is because knowledge 
of a person’s powers of acting and rest are always relational to others and in this 
sense there exists a continuous dialogue between persons, as individuals become 
active through being open to mutually reinforcing the capabilities of each other.50   
3. Democratisation and Dialogue 
3.1. Introduction 
This section explores some of those potential implications of investment dignity for 
theories of democracy. It is argued that investment dignity requires a particular form 
of dialogue for its realisation, which could entail important implications for the 
majoritarian, partnership and communicative conceptions of democracy. This is a 
holistic and open conception of dialogue, whereby the powers of the mind and body 
are relational to others and dependent on certain forms of interaction for their 
development. This conception of dialogue requires attentiveness to difference and 
disruption of repetition.  
3.2. Communication and Interrelationality  
The investment concept of dignity is understood to require investment into the 
creativity potentiality of a person, which is expanded by increasing the powers of 
acting and rest of the individual by enhancing what the body is capable of doing and 
the mind capable of thinking. Significantly, this concept of dignity is fundamentally 
premised on an inter-relational and interdependent view of humanity. This is 
because the powers of the body to act and the mind to think are dependent on 
interactions with the external world.51 
The power of a person to simultaneously act and think is therefore always a matter 
of interactions with forces in the world; the capability of a person to affect and be 
affected is essentially relational to other forces. A person can increase their power of 
acting when they combine with things that increase its ability to act and a person can 
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increase their power of thinking when they develop adequate ideas or knowledge 
about why a particular combination enhances what they are capable of being and 
doing. This essentially means that ‘[p]assion and reason are both, in the final 
analysis, modes of communication between bodies and between ideas of bodies (the 
mind)’.52 The activity of the mind and body are therefore enhanced or diminished in 
the way that people communicate with one another, when they combine together 
and interact. 53  Most importantly, productive communication occurs when bodies 
combine to mutually reinforce, secure and enhance the powers of each person to 
act, whilst at the same time developing adequate ideas by reasoning with those 
affected about how those combinations enhance what the body is capable of doing.  
This model of dialogue that is inherent in investment dignity has some potentially 
significant implications for the idea of democracy. The first is that dialogue is not 
limited to the exchange of opinion through speech, but also entails the interactions 
between bodies, which necessarily have meaning in the correlative formulation of 
ideas in the mind. This means that democratic dialogue cannot be merely concerned 
with the creation of equal impact on decision-making, but must also be concerned 
with the creation of equal relations of power by abolishing ‘oppression—that is, forms 
of social relationship by which some people dominate, exploit, marginalize, demean, 
and inflict violence upon others’.54  
The second consequence for democracy that arises from the need to create equal 
relations of power is that dignity is enhanced through interactions with others in 
society, which requires increasing inclusion and engagement with others.55 This is 
because a person enhances their dignity by increasing their powers of acting through 
combining with others and increasing their powers of thinking by developing 
adequate ideas with others about why some combinations are good. It is therefore 
the case that a person’s dignity is promoted to the extent there exist more 
possibilities to interact with them and developing or acting on ideas about why 
particular combinations are good. This, significantly, means that the promotion of 
dialogue entails not only the ability of individuals to participate in the political 
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process, but the removal of physical and social barriers that prevent individuals from 
engaging or interacting with others.56  
The nature of the concept of dialogue that is inherent in the investment concept of 
dignity is one that is notably pervasive in character. Dialogue between persons 
occurs between persons constantly, including within, but not limited to, a certain 
legal framework. This has a significant repercussion for democracy in that it is not 
possible to limit the idea of dialogue to a particular zone of conduct. One of the 
hallmarks of many liberal concepts of democracy is the division between the public 
and the private.57 This division has historically been, and continues to be, the subject 
of much feminist criticism for the way in which the private is often treated as a natural 
and unregulated space and the public a constructed space based on power 
relations.58  The model of dialogue that arises from investment dignity could not 
maintain such a distinction and would suggest that democracy be concerned with 
creating equal relations of power in all domains of human activity.59 
3.3. Openness to Difference 
The concept of dialogue inherent in an investment concept of dignity is not only 
pervasive in character, but is also open and responsive to difference. Importantly, it 
has been argued that each person has creative, diverse and transformative potential, 
which unfolds in the process of becoming.60 This does not entail separateness, but 
essentially depends on the interactions with other forces in the world, by being 
dependent on combining with others, whilst at the same time asserting individuality 
and identity.61 It is also the case that, in light of the creative potential of human life, it 
is not possible to know fully ahead of time and before interaction with others, exactly 
what the body is capable of being and doing, or the mind capable of thinking.62 t is 
therefore essential to be open to the possibility of discovering the unknown and 
unrecognised in the encounter with an individual. In this light, as persons interact 
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with one another, not all is given, so that dialogue with others can cause us to create 
new ways of thinking and new ways of actively accommodating diversity. 
The nature of dialogue inherent in the investment concept of human dignity is not 
only open to the possibility of difference, but also actively embraces it. This is 
significant in that it recognises the importance of difference not only to the individual, 
but also to the community. This is because, as was outlined in chapter two, to desire 
the good of others is treated ‘as a function of my own good’.63 It is rational to desire 
that other persons ‘develop their own powers and know what is of use to them more 
and more adequately.’64 This does not entail a desire for the person to be the same, 
but that they should develop their own potential as it unfolds in unique, creative and 
diverse ways in relation to others, which open up new possibilities for future dialogue 
between persons that have not as yet been envisaged or imagined. The possibility 
for exploring our own becoming is maximised to the degree to which we live in a 
community where others’ capacities to affect and be affected are as open as 
possible, which correlates to activity and joy.65 
3.4. Disruption of Repetition  
The open and responsive nature of dialogue that is at the core of an investment 
concept of human dignity entails a further consequence in the form of disrupting the 
repetition of particular practices. One of the difficulties with some norms is that they 
become fixed, repeating the same stereotypical representations of particular groups 
in a manner that can be oppressive. An example of this can be drawn from the 
previous chapter on the issue of marital rape based on the idea that women through 
the doctrine of coverture were chattel in the protection of the husband. 66  Open 
dialogue entails the possibility of ultimately recognising the injustice of norms based 
on repression or subordination, which can be disrupted through a willingness to 
rethink ones position by addressing the experience of those affected. 
The ability of an open dialogue inherent in an investment concept of dignity also has 
the implication of democracy in the form of disrupting the repetition of norms or 
practices in ways that are exclusive in focus. Some norms can entail narrow systems 
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of recognition or representation, whereby only a limited set of experiences are 
addressed in the protection of the law. As an example, a system of lifting regulations 
that permit only mechanical lifting for disabled people may not be suited to the needs 
of all disabled people.67 Dialogue therefore entails the possibility of disrupting the 
existing norms in a way that allows the creative adaptation of norms in order to 
address difference.  
The open dialogue inherent in dignity also prevents the disruption of repetition of 
norms that are premised on problems that were formulated in a very different context 
from the present. If legal judgment is to protect dignity; it must itself be capable of 
creative adaptation, in which the encounter forces the establishment of a problem.. 
An encounter, the formulation of a problem and the construction of concepts to 
adjudicate a problem will all take place within the ‘shifting exigencies of the present 
milieu’.68 The nature of dialogue enables the possibility of being open to addressing 
new problems in present day conditions with those most affected, disrupting the 
repeated use of concepts in a way that is premised on irrelevant problems.  
3.5. Conclusion 
The investment concept of dignity has a number of important implications for 
democracy in the form of openness to addressing difference and the new in the 
encounters with individuals as they unfold over time, developing new problems with 
those most affected. It secondly entails the disruption of repetition of norms that are 
oppressive or exclusive in scope, allowing a break from the past by asserting the 
need for creative and transformative change. Democracy is not therefore a fixed idea 
instantiated in a particular institutional form, but is rather an ‘immanent event or 
process that is ongoing in the present’. 69  Democracy therefore represents a 
developing culture of democratisation, entailing an ongoing process of cultivating 
openness to discovering difference and uniqueness in the interaction between 
persons.  
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4. Enhancing Dignity through Democratic Dialogue 
4.1. Introduction 
The nature of dialogue that results from the investment concept of dignity through 
being open to difference and the new, as well as disrupting repetition, entails the 
important possibility for ‘transformation or metamorphosis.’ 70  This entails the 
potential of the positive becoming of human person in the development of their 
personality and in the relationship between persons in three significant ways. The 
first is the becoming-active of the individual, in ensuring a right to participate in the 
formulation of the issues or problems that most directly affect a person. This ensures 
that a person is not simply passive to having norms applied to them in a way that 
addresses problems as they are formulated by others, without reference to the 
individual’s experiences or needs. The second potential for transformation entails the 
potential of becoming-minor of those who fall outside the qualitative majority norm 
and even the potential for transforming or disrupting that norm, providing the 
‘impulse for change at the level of social and political institutions’. 71  The final 
potential positive becoming that results from the transformative nature of dialogue is 
the becoming-other of a person in the way that a person in encountering others 
becomes different to what they were through recognition of the position of the other 
in the encounter. Dialogue entails the need for a person to attempt take on the 
perspective of the other who is in a different position and has different experiences.  
4.2. Becoming-Active 
The becoming-active of the individual is the first way in which dialogue promotes the 
development of activity and rationality. As was discussed in previous chapters, 
drawing on the work of Spinoza, humans are to a degree passive and active, 
irrational and rational. Dignity is enhanced to the extent that the active powers of the 
body are increased and the mind develops adequate knowledge about why some 
combinations with persons or forces are constructive and others are destructive.72 In 
contrast, it is bad for a body to be merely acted upon, or the mind to be acted upon 
by inadequate ideas. One of the notable implications of a dialogic approach to 
democracy is that it offers the potential for enhanced activity on the part of a person 
in the legal process.73 Individuals are instead encouraged to be active in articulating 
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the issues and problems that affect them, in a way that treats them as agents who 
have a ‘good sense of their own interests’.74 In this way, the becoming-active of the 
applicant accords with the key democratic idea that ‘decisions ought to be taken in 
consultation with those most affected by them’.75 This ensures that the law does not 
attempt to impose general or presumed characterisations on the basis of imagined 
experiences of those it affects, without hearing the actual experiences of those 
affected.  
The ability to share actual lived experiences in community with others is perhaps of 
particular importance to those who are the most vulnerable because they are subject 
to the greatest potential disadvantage. It was argued in previous chapters that 
vulnerability includes power-vulnerability, whereby society is constructed around a 
norm that excludes the experiences of many groups to the advantage of a 
majoritarian norm. Rather than being active in determining the experiences or 
problems that others are reasonably expected to accommodate in their own lives. 
This means that, in the dialogic process, significant weight must be placed on the 
voices of the most vulnerable that are subject to the most circumscribed conditions 
of life, granting them an active role in the process of maximising their potential and 
reversing their significant disadvantage. This grants a legitimate role to courts within 
the democratic process, particularly in regards to social or economic conditions of 
life, as a ‘channel of participation for the vulnerable and marginalised, who are most 
likely to be excluded from the normal channels of democratic participation’.76  
The becoming-active of a legal subject is not only promoted by entitling them to a 
right to participate in the formulation of issues or problems that affect them, but also 
the justification of the application of norms to the applicant in light of the wider dignity 
needs of others in society. The applicant is treated as an active being in so far as 
they are recognised as part of a wider community and are capable of developing 
adequate knowledge about the need for norms in relation to other persons in society. 
Legal subjects are encouraged to respond to the decision with a deeper 
understanding of the priority needs of others, or of the implications of their conduct 
on others, in a way that entails a future becoming directed towards actively seeking 
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or accepting the good of others as a dimension of one’s own good.77  Significantly, 
this dimension of dialogue encourages an outward looking perspective on behalf of 
the legal subject towards others. This ‘outwardness’ is representative of the 
interconnected nature of humanity, as individuals are encouraged to understand how 
their powers of mind and body for activity and rest are relational to others. 
4.3. Becoming-Minoritarian 
 The concept of becoming-minor or becoming-minoritarian is a key concept 
developed in the work of Gilles Deleuze and represents the idea that each individual 
exists in a ‘process of continuous variation’. 78  This means that the concept of 
becoming is ‘intimately linked to the concept of the minoritarian’.79 Inherent in the 
concept of becoming-minoritarian, is the idea of creative difference, the view that 
potential can be channelled in unique ways not captured by a majoritarian ideology. 
This means that the aim of the minority is not to acquire the quantitative 
characteristics of the majoritarian image, which represent the autonomous, 
independent, self-sufficient, rational person.80   In this regard, the majoritarian norm 
represents an unrealistic image of life, but more importantly it suppresses the 
potential for transformation in respect of new or different ways of living.  The concept 
of becoming-minor is therefore treated as a positive force towards creativity, 
experimentation, and diversity.81  
Significantly, becoming-minor does not only represent the idea that alternative 
possibilities to the majoritarian norm must be tolerated, but also the potential for 
corroding and transforming the majoritarian image in positive ways directed towards 
new possibilities for creative and experimental combinations. Thus, as an example, 
granting the right to homosexuals to marry may possess the potential for a creative 
change in the very institution of marriage or family, away from a view of it based on 
reproduction, to one based on more important factors, such as ‘mutual support and 
companionship’.82 This can therefore have a positive impact on existing patriarchal 
images of marriage. The concept of becoming-minor is therefore a force that is 
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capable of creatively transforming the existing norms of society in ways that can 
enhance the capabilities of all.     
4.4. Becoming-Other 
The final way in which dialogue promotes the positive development of personhood 
and human dignity is through the concept of becoming-other.  The concept of 
becoming-other arises from the idea that a person is in a continuous state of change, 
as capabilities are modified through interactions, or compositions with other 
persons.83 Becoming thus occurs through ‘relations composing, decomposing, or 
modifying an individual...augmenting or diminishing its power to act’.84 In this process 
the concept of dialogue encourages individuals when encountering others in the 
world, through a transformative process, to understand the perspective of the other 
person encountered, in a way that entails empathy and deeper understanding. A 
useful explanation of the concept of becoming-other is provided by Paul Patton.85 
Patton gives the example of a real life pedagogic encounter, in which a student 
confronts a teacher after receiving a bad grade on a paper and challenges the 
teacher to go through it with him. 86  The outcome of this long process is an 
enhancement of the powers and capabilities of the teacher to positively affect others 
in a ‘manner and to a degree she had never done before’.87 The positive effect was 
reflected in the change in the student, through a ‘distinct improvement in the 
student’s powers as a writer’.88 This encounter entailed a becoming-student on the 
part of the teacher, who in the encounter was ‘forced to come to terms with [the 
student’s]...version of what he had wanted to say in the paper’.89 At the same time, it 
entailed a becoming-teacher on the behalf of the student who was ‘forced to see his 
own text through the eyes of a more experienced reader’.90 Each person in the 
encounter was engaged in a symbiotic relationship, whereby they reinforced or 
enhanced their own powers through their dialogic interaction.91 This is not a matter of 
literally becoming the other, for the student does not become the actual teacher, but 
rather of ‘enhancing the powers one has or of acquiring new powers by entering into 
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a proximity’ with the other’.92 It is also not a one-sided relationship of domination 
exercised by the teacher over the student. It is a ‘double-becoming’ in the sense that 
the interaction entails a mutual modification or augmentation of the powers and 
capacities of the teacher and student through understanding the experiences, as well 
as good of the other.93  
The becoming-other through dialogic interaction has an important role to play in the 
field of law, as it entails a mutual empathy and understanding in the way that 
decisions are related to particular situations. Thus, for example, in the case of 
Bernard discussed in previous chapters, the judge, Sullivan J was in encountering 
the disabled mother forced to come to terms with her experiences in relation to the 
effects of the unsuitable accommodation, including the social, physical, recreational 
and psychological impact. In Bernard Sullivan J was affected by the situation of Mrs 
Bernard, in such a way that increased his capabilities and powers as a judge, by 
being open to creatively relating the norms to the individual situation.  
It is necessary for the judge to be wary of the dangers of assessing the perspective 
of the other.94 First, a judge should be cautious about presuming to know everything 
about how the ‘differently embodied experience themselves or their situation’. In this 
regard, the notion of becoming-other does not absolve us of the need to ensure that 
the experiences of the marginalised are ‘represented at all levels of legal, social and 
ethical life’.95 Second, there is a danger of the judge projecting how they would have 
felt if they were in a similar situation to the ‘other’. This is indeed a danger, but the 
cases that have been considered throughout the thesis, where human dignity has 
been successfully argued by the victim, demonstrate that it is possible for the 
judiciary to be appropriately in tune with the narratives and experiences of the ‘other’ 
in the specific case.96 Becoming-other, in this regard, represents an attentiveness 
and responsiveness on the part of the judge to the singularity of the other, drawing 
the experiences of the other into their circle of concern, and allowing those 
experiences to shape the legal concept of dignity.  
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The becoming-other of the judge and law-maker is mirrored in the becoming-other of 
the citizen in legal cases, who are required to see their own conduct or interests 
through the eyes of an experienced judge and through the eyes of other 
stakeholders affected by a decision. Thus, as an example, in the case of R v R the 
husband through encountering the judge in the legal case was forced to see the 
nature of his debasing conduct through the eyes of his wife. This entailed the 
potential of becoming-victim of the husband, who through the process could have 
increased his powers of understanding in a way that would entail changing his 
attitudes and future behaviour in a positive manner. Notably, the increase in the 
capabilities of individuals through the process of becoming-other is ‘not always a 
pleasurable experience’.97 This is because reflection on others experiences requires 
a degree of humility in accepting error in past conduct, or judgments, which can be a 
difficult experience, but one that can have a transformative effect on the creative 
potentiality of those open to being affected by it. In conclusion, the concept of 
becoming-other recognises that the dialogic interaction between minds and bodies 
entails a degree of empathy and mutual understanding in democracy, which gives 
rise to the possibility of transformation in the future possible combinations and 
interactions between persons in society in a way that enhances the capabilities of all.  
5. Conclusion 
This concept of dialogue inherent in the investment concept of human dignity entails 
a number of important challenges to existing conceptions of democracy. In place of a 
procedural and closed democracy, the concept of dialogue embodies a way of life, 
an ongoing culture of democratisation across a fuller range of human activity. This 
culture embraces and promotes the idea of increasing connections between 
individuals, both mind (speech) and body (action), in ways that entail openness to 
difference and diversity. Furthermore, it is possible through dialogue to disrupt 
oppressive or exclusive norms. This inter-personal dialogue that should structure the 
relationship between the individual and others in the community has been the main 
focus of this chapter.  
To conclude, it is possible to sketch some potential implications it might have for the 
current inter-institutional balance and constitutional culture in the UK. One such 
implication that has been implicit throughout the chapter is the claim that a 
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strengthening of the powers of a Court is not necessarily an undemocratic practice. 
The adjudicatory space should be re-envisaged as a ‘place for dialogue with parties’ 
where ‘localised individual interventions’ may take place.98 Courts are better placed 
to possess an adequate understanding of the particular situation and experience of 
the individual affected by a legal decision, properly supported by expert evidence 
and a wide-body of dignity materials, as well as the individual testimonies and 
narratives of the victim. 99  They can potentially afford a further avenue for the 
participation of those who are marginalised and excluded.  In this regard, the 
judiciary are envisaged as having an important and limited role in realising the 
inclusion and participation of particularly vulnerable people in the community who, 
without intervention, may be at significant risk of living isolated and highly 
circumscribed lives, which strengthens, rather than weakens the legitimacy of the 
community. 
The second potential implication of the concept of dialogue is the formation of a 
cooperative dynamic between the judiciary and legislature in the protection of human 
dignity. The recognition that individuals are part of a complex web of relations may 
make it difficult, in respect of certain decisions, to make an assessment of the 
implications of a decision only in an individual case. This is particularly true of the 
formation of complex systems of care and welfare provision. In this respect, whilst 
the judiciary may be able to assess the implications of a decision in an individual 
case, they are unlikely to always be best placed to understand or construct a 
complex solution to a multifaceted problem that impacts upon a large range of 
people. There may well be alternative means of addressing certain problems, which 
may need to be considered or evaluated against each other, requiring a certain level 
of expertise, resources, and wider perspective on social conditions.  
A duty to invest in conditions that sustain or promote the development of the 
capabilities of an individual may be met by alternative (suitable) means or methods, 
a choice that will no doubt affect or have implications for other systems of social 
support in terms of resources and co-ordination. In these areas, it is likely to be the 
executive and legislative branches of government that are best placed to implement 
complex systems of social support and care, although, as noted above, it may be 
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permissible for the judiciary to make localised adaptations in response to the specific 
needs of a highly vulnerable person. However, whilst it is not a court that is always 
best placed to adopt the relevant implementation methods, it may be for the Court to 
insist that implementing action be taken where there is currently insufficient 
investment that realises the needs of the individual. This has been the experience of 
some other jurisdictions, with a more sophisticated system of human dignity 
jurisprudence, which provide a model for a relationship between the judiciary and 
legislature that is built on inter-institutional dialogue and cooperation. The Courts in 
these jurisdictions, such as Germany, South Africa and India, are able to insist that 
action be taken to protect dignity, including the provision of social or economic 
needs, whilst leaving it the political branches of government to determine the precise 
forms, methods and programs that put that investment into practice. 100  In this 
respect, dignity does not always ‘determine the outcome – it does not establish how 
much money should be given to each person – but it does ensure that the legislative 
determination respects the equal worth of each person.’101 The adoption of a similar 
approach in the UK would entail a re-imagining of the relationship that currently 
exists between the different branches of government. It would see each branch as 
part of a joint project, engaged in mutual cooperation and dialogue, for the purposes 
of promoting and protecting human dignity.   
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Conclusion  
As this study draws to a close, the conclusion highlights two main contributions to 
the understanding of human dignity. The first concerns the issue of methodology and 
the use of constructivism to establish an investment concept of dignity, which moves 
beyond a narrow focus on autonomy or rationality, to encompass a far richer and 
more holistic conception of human personality. The second concerns the 
connections between the concept of dignity and various associated or related 
concepts, particularly those that structure the relationship between the individual and 
the community.  
1. Constructing Human Dignity 
Approaches to understanding human dignity typically proceed by a process of 
seeking to accurately represent or discover the existing content of the concept within 
and across different disciplines. This can sometimes lead to a paralysing search for 
the shared meaning of the concept by, for instance, uncovering a consensus 
definition adopted by judges across different jurisdictions. 1  Constructivism has 
entailed a distinctive methodological approach to understanding the concept that, it 
is hoped, will take the current debate surrounding the meaning of the concept in a 
more fruitful direction by focusing on developing, refining and modifying the concept 
to address the changing problems that emerge over time. Understanding dignity 
should not simply be a process of uncovering the content of a fixed concept, but also 
about constructing it in order to open up new legal pathways and extend others in a 
way that realises possibilities for more active, joyous and life-affirming modes of 
being. The value of a concept of dignity is thus not assessed by how accurately it 
signifies or repeats the past, but how successfully it changes and acts on the present 
arrangements to improve the future.2 Much less focus should therefore be placed on 
addressing formal issues of consistency, coherence and continuity in the use of 
dignity, and much greater focus should be placed on substantive issues, developing 
the concept to respond to the concerns of disadvantaged, excluded or 
disempowered people, who may themselves appeal to dignity in order to realise 
progress in their social or living conditions.  
 
                                                          
1
 Christopher McCrudden ‘Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights’ (2008) 19 EJIL 
655.   
2
 Paul Patton, Deleuze and the Political (Routledge, 2000) 133.  
Daniel Bedford  31/10/2015 
 
265 
 
This approach to dignity will likely be objected to on the basis that it stipulates the 
content and, in addition, licenses judicial creativity. 3  However, the move to 
constructivism seeks to progress the question beyond whether the concept should 
be modified, to instead recognise the invariable necessity of such modification. The 
concept of dignity needs to be adapted to address the seeming justice of the case or 
recognise new problems, experiences and differences that emerge in life. 4 
Constructivism seeks to foster ‘more effective ways of working with inevitable 
change.’5 This is not to say that constructivism is a boundless process without the 
need for certain anchor points or constraints. Any construction will need to provide a 
definition within the constraints of the triadic nature of the concept (humanity, value 
and respect) in a way that at least makes some connections to existing social and 
legal developments, advancing our understanding of them and taking them further. 
Moreover, any development should test whether the concept performs a distinctive 
role that differentiates it from more familiar legal concepts. 
 
One potential contribution that has been identified is in terms of developing dignity to 
encapsulate, as well as respond to, vulnerability and the experiences or needs of 
groups that are disadvantaged or rendered ‘other’ by the priority given in the law to 
the protection of a majoritarian norm.6 This has provided an important basis for 
constructing human dignity by tying the development of the concept to the 
experiences, needs and interests of those most affected by being excluded from the 
protection of existing legal and ethical concepts, whose voices are therefore most 
likely to go unheard. In this way, dignity can open up space in which marginalised 
people can engage directly in informing the content of that concept. 
 
This has been the aim of constructing investment dignity. This construction draws 
people who are at the boundaries of existing concepts in to the centre of the concept 
of dignity and the protection of the law. Not only to provide better protection for 
disadvantaged groups, but to challenge the central case as an obscure reflection of 
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actual lived experience.7  In terms of substance, the concept of investment dignity 
assembles the three core components of human dignity (value, respect and 
humanity) in a distinctive way that encompasses collective and personal investment 
(respect) into conditions that promote the creative potentiality (value) of each person 
by protecting their power of acting and rest for mind and body that is joyful rather 
than sad (humanity). Each of these concepts is a further multiplicity of sub-
components. The concept of humanity encompasses, for instance, the concept of 
interdependence and interconnectedness, recognizing that capacities of mind-body 
are always relational to and dependent on other forces or people in the world.  
 
According to investment dignity, humans are vulnerable beings whose openness is 
necessary to their composition, development, and activity. On the other hand, it is 
that very same openness that exposes us to risks of deterioration, destruction, 
passivity and sadness.. Vulnerability, on this account, shares much in common with 
the work of Martha Fineman, who wishes to reclaim some of the positive aspects of 
vulnerability from those who argue it is an exclusively negative concept associated 
with pity.8 Rather than conceiving of vulnerability as being exclusively associated 
with stigmatised subjects, Fineman argues that vulnerability is ‘generative and 
presents opportunities for innovation and growth, as well as creativity and 
fulfillment’.9 It is this vulnerability that enables us to ‘experience feelings such as 
love, respect, curiosity, amusement, and desire that make us reach out to others, 
form relationships, and build institutions.’10 Vulnerability is not only the source of 
harm and pain, but also the source of our connectedness, development and joy. It is, 
as argued in Chapter Two, intrinsic to the very kind of dignity that we possess as 
human beings. Moreover, this thesis has argued that vulnerability should not be 
perceived as a concept that always requires positive intervention.  It may not be 
possible, or desirable, to eradicate vulnerability without rendering life miserable or 
highly circumscribed, thus diminishing the dignity of the individual. In this way, 
vulnerability might do some of the same work as autonomy, but through a more 
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balanced and nuanced approach, which supports both positive and negative 
obligations.    
  
The emphasis on concepts of vulnerability and interdependence mean that 
investment dignity is based on a theoretical framework that goes beyond the limited 
Kantian concept of the human subject which still informs much of the debate on 
human dignity and human rights discourse. The philosophies of Spinoza and 
Deleuze have provided a different theoretical basis by which to construct human 
dignity that challenges some of the dualisms that have historically limited the concept 
and shaped the development of law. The mind-body, independent-dependent, 
productivity-rest, individual-social, and emotion-reason dualisms, which give priority 
to particular aspects of our humanity over others, and create dichotomies between 
categories of people in which some are perceived as a deviation from the norm, 
have been replaced with a strong form of holism. Not only does this rehabilitate 
some of the neglected dimensions of human personality, but takes the concept in the 
direction of recognising that each dimension of our personality is connected and 
affected by each of the others (physical, social, emotional/psychological and 
recreational), as well as restructures the relationship between the idea of the norm 
and the deviation inherent in the dualist approach to personality.  
 
Rather than conceiving the relationship between a dependent person (deviation) and 
independent person (norm) as discontinuous, investment dignity treats the distinction 
as continuous, in which all people are dependent to a lesser or greater degree due to 
the universal feature of vulnerability.  The 'deviation' is placed at the centre and the 
'norm' is challenged as an obscure reflection of lived experience. This has some 
important implications for our understanding of the legal subject and the approach of 
the law to human relationships. As seen in chapter three, treating people as part of a 
complex network of interdependence fundamentally shifts the focus of law, which is 
preoccupied with asking whether a relationship has been created between two 
independent and rational parties, in which a legal obligation may or may not be 
assumed, to the question of how to structure the relationships of which we always 
form a part and from which we cannot be extracted. Responsibility arises within this 
network of power relationships on the basis of the degree of vulnerability of the 
individual and the degree of control of the more dominant party to safeguard, protect 
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and promote the dignity interests of the ‘other’. In this regard, investment dignity may 
require rethinking those fields of law, such as public authority liability, which 
sometime place the image of man as a separate, independent, personally 
responsible and atomistic individual at the centre.    
 
This construction not only provides a theoretical justification for the use of human 
dignity as a holistic concept, capturing some of the work that the concept already 
does in law, but carves out a distinctive role that distinguishes it from other legal 
concepts, something that has proved elusive in the literature.11 Other concepts, such 
as physical integrity, selectively focus on one dimension of human personality, 
whereas human dignity is the concept best able to ensure that the law encompasses 
a fuller or more complete picture of the relationship between those dimensions, 
directing the judiciary to see the implications of a decision on one dimension of 
personality for all of the others. The judiciary will therefore have to be even more 
attentive, for instance, to how unsuitable accommodation or forced incontinence, as 
discussed in chapter four, may limit or reduce the activity of the body, which may 
simultaneously render the mind more passive to sad emotions in light of the parallel 
ideas that the mind forms of the increased passivity of the body. In turn, it will have 
to consider the implications of the increased mind-body passivity on the social 
dimension of personality. Restricting the power of the body to act may entail 
limitations on the ability of a person to make those connections to others that sustain 
or develop their creative capacities and through those connections enhance their 
own enjoyment in life. The increased passivity of the mind, associated with feelings 
of worthlessness, shame, anxiety, humiliation and isolation, may also dampen the 
capacity or willingness of a person to actively seek out and invest in encounters with 
others that affects them with joy.  
 
A strong form of holism recognizes that different dimensions of human life are 
interconnected, affecting and reflecting one another. The concept of becoming, 
central to investment dignity, further requires a consideration of how these 
interconnecting dimensions are affected over time, as they unfold and develop in 
relation to others in the community. This moves beyond a limited focus on the 
concept of (human) being, as the central focus for dignity, which can be associated 
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with a fixed sense of either physical or psychological identity at one particular 
moment. Human becoming requires a consideration of the implications of a decision 
for the future, deconstruction of past forces to create a more productive or stable 
becoming, appreciation of the impact of gradual processes on the continuous 
formation of personality and recognition of the need to prevent premature 
deterioration.12  Use of this concept will undeniably make the legal picture more 
complex, for it is not possible on this account to look at one dimension of personality 
in isolation or to exclude features not covered by a narrower concept, but it will, it is 
hoped, make the legal picture more satisfactory in terms of reflecting something of 
the complex (and multilayered) nature of human lives.  
 
2. Creating Connections 
Overall this study of human dignity has brought to light a number of connections 
between that concept and others. Dignity has been closely associated with, even 
treated as integral to, the rule of law, democracy, human rights, and, more 
controversially, the common law. In light of these connections, constructing human 
dignity in law is not a task that should, or can be, undertaken in isolation from a 
consideration of the impact of the concept on surrounding and connected legal 
concepts (and vice versa). Constructivism recognises that changes in a concept like 
dignity will reverberate and have transformative implications for related concepts. 
The potential implications of an investment construction of dignity are briefly outlined 
further below, with a particular focus on the concept of dialogue, which has an 
important role in defining dignity, as well as the relationship between the individual 
and the collective.  
2.1. Promoting Constructive Dialogue  
Connecting investment dignity to democracy13, as well as the rule of law14, has 
contributed to drawing out a concept of dialogue that was inherent from the start. 
The connection between dignity and dialogue is not novel. Academic scholars, such 
as Trevor Allan15 and Paulo Carozza16 have, for instance, argued that dialogue is 
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inherently a dignity respecting practice, a trend that has been reflected in the case 
law of a number of courts across the world.17  
This thesis has taken the notion of dialogue one step further, treating it as a 
pervasive, ongoing and grounded concept. Dialogue is not limited to the political 
sphere based on the exchange of detached and abstract ideas, which cases are 
then subsumed under, It characterises the relationship between human beings in 
their encounters with one another (as well as potentially nonhuman others and the 
environment) as a mode of communication or relation that simultaneously 
encompasses a mental and bodily experience, which stems from the strongly holistic 
nature of investment dignity. Thus, rather than seeing dialogue as simply the 
exchange of words or opinions, aimed at seeking agreement or consensus, it 
encompasses the manner in which the physical and mental capabilities of a person 
to affect and be affected communicate with others that they come in to contact 
with. 18  Dialogue is promoted where the capabilities to affect and be affected 
communicate in such a way that they join to mutually sustain or enhance activity, 
power and joy. The emphasis is on relations of agreement in which, by joining 
together, people can enhance their activity or capacities. Dialogue is essential to the 
preservation and the development of the capabilities of the individual which are in 
turn connected to the capabilities of the community.  
2.2. Developing Capabilities in a Relational Framework 
This definition of dialogue makes a number of important contributions to our 
understanding of the development and role of the law, as well as bridges different 
strands of argument addressed throughout the thesis. The first contribution is that 
law should protect, promote and respect those constructive relationships that enable 
people to mutually sustain or develop their capabiliies., Law is to be considered or 
evaluated in terms of how it structures relationships, whether it enables people to 
develop their creative potentiality in relation to each other, or leads to mutual 
destruction. The concept of dignity that has been constructed in this thesis is 
therefore in line with emerging feminist legal scholarship that seeks to address legal 
rights in relational terms and which, in turn, explores the impact of the structure of 
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those relationships on core values.19 The reliance on a strong conception of holism, 
as central to dignity, makes an important contribution to this relational approach by 
recognising that social or legal relationships are ‘both ideological relationships (in 
mind) and physical relationships (in bodies) that are exactly correlated with each 
other.’20  
A clear consequence of this relational turn is that law must not support destructive 
relationships, which may correspond to the hostile emotions of people (even a 
majority). Moreover, law should not endorse, or otherwise construct, legal fictions 
that correlate to associations which establish systems of isolation or domination, 
which obstruct the capacity for creative interaction. The treatment of women as 
chattel, disabled people as ‘unlucky individuals’ in need of pity, individuals as self-
reliant or separate atomistic beings are examples of fictions or ideas that reinforce 
relations in which the ‘other’ is obstructed or limited in their ability to develop their 
personality. In turn, this is damaging to the democratic community as a whole. The 
law should embody and reflect, as far as possible, adequate knowledge that 
correlates to relationships based on agreement where people can join with others to 
increase or sustain their power of acting. This concept of dialogue grants a much 
stronger role to the democratic polity than majority democracy requires. It requires 
the conversion and transformation of types of human association, with the aim of 
ensuring that, as argued by Spinoza, individuals can ‘develop their mental and 
physical faculties in safety, to use their reason without restraint and refrain from the 
vicious mutual abuse that are prompted by hatred, anger or deceit.’ 21  The 
relationship between the collective and the individual is not treated as oppositional or 
antagonistic, but envisaged as mutually supportive. This is a substantive ideal of 
democratisation that should be embodied in the everyday encounters and relations 
between individuals, informing, potentially, the fields of family, work and social care.  
2.3. Openness to Otherness and Difference 
The second contribution that is made to the understanding of the role of law entails a 
positive requirement of the law to be responsive to difference, individuality and 
otherness. Democratic dialogue entails a continuous and open process of 
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communication with uniquely forming and creative beings. It has been reaffirmed 
throughout the course of this thesis that humans are always exploring new identities, 
capacities, modes of being and forms of sociability. They also possess an embodied 
experience that is unique to them and informed, in part, by their distinct position in 
the network of relationships of which they are a part. This requires a form of 
responsiveness and receptivity to the experiences of those with which the law 
interacts, as well as a willingness to re-shape or alter an existing pattern of relating 
to people. Therefore there is always a possibility of discovering something novel in 
the creative encounter with the ‘other’ which may prompt the formation of new and 
more constructive forms of engagement. This aspect of dialogue establishes a 
bridge to the case law on human dignity at common law and under the Human 
Rights Act. In regards to both, the use of human dignity was connected to an 
openness and responsiveness to the person-specific needs of those excluded from 
legal protection because of their difference.  
One of the important contributions that this makes to the current discussion on 
human dignity is the refusal to treat conceptual openness as a necessarily negative 
attribute of dignity, and, instead, argues that there must be some degree of 
openness if the law is to adapt to address the emerging differences and problems 
that inevitably unfold in life. Indeed, there are undeniable limits on the extent to 
which a legislative body can know or address every eventuality, particularity or 
becoming, especially of those who are disadvantaged or excluded. In this light, the 
ability of the judiciary to adapt the law to address person-specific needs, as was the 
case in East Sussex County Council, Napier and Bernard, is not necessarily an 
undemocratic practice, as it provides a necessary pathway by which the interests of 
the most vulnerable can be reflected in law, as well as participate in shaping the law 
which most affects them. Nor is it necessarily contrary to the rule of law, as the law is 
only fully understood and justified in the process of application in relation to the 
particularity or specificity of the case. Appeals to dignity in this process of adaptation, 
as seen in chapter four, have not rendered legal decision-making by judges more 
arbitrary, and without limits, but have in fact improved the judicial reasoning 
process.22  
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2.4. Co-Operation and Interdependence 
Although dialogue entails responsiveness on the part of the community to the 
person-specific needs of uniquely forming subjects, it is not simply a one way 
process in which the community addresses the concerns or desires of the individual. 
An element added to dialogue in chapters three and four, and developed further in 
chapters five and six, is the concept of co-operation expected from the individual. 
The third contribution to the understanding of the role of law is that it must seek to 
garner the co-operation of the individual by attempting to justify an outcome to them, 
so they can understand and accept the reason for a particular legal measure. This 
links in with some of the mainstream theories on the rule of law, such as those of 
Trevor Allan, as well as builds on the reasoning of Baroness Hale in McDonald, but 
makes a distinctive contribution by arguing that co-operation stems from the fact that 
dignity requires individuals to recognise that their own good is invested in the good of 
others. Individuals should accommodate and respect the interests of others within 
their own lives, especially those who are more vulnerable. Once the needs of a 
person have been properly identified, they should be expected to cooperate with 
authorities by selecting those means which are most cost-effective to realise those 
needs.23 The further implication of this concept of co-operation is transformative. It 
seeks through justification to transform individuals from a passive state to an active 
state. The aim is to expand the limited sphere of self-concern, which can so often be 
related to autonomy, to valuing others as part of one’s own sphere of concern.   
2.5. Stability and Creativity 
This concept of dialogue is, at least in part, an aspirational concept and therefore 
differs from procedural notions which are easier to realise in law. It is unlikely that 
social relations and holistic communication between people will constantly be based 
on agreement and reason. Human beings are always passive to a degree and are 
therefore, to some extent, likely to communicate on the basis of destructive (and 
passive) emotions that cause isolation or oppression. Such forms of sociability will 
never be entirely eliminated. Law is required in this regard to stabilize relationships, 
one of the twin dimensions of the rule of law (the other being justification), limiting 
the arbitrary exercise of power and as a basis for keeping individuals within the 
bounds of reason. However, even law is likely to reflect aspects of the passive 
dimensions of human personality.  The most that can be expected from law is that it 
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is open to re-assessment in light of new knowledge or better understanding that 
challenges those engrained destructive relations. Continuous reflection should be 
the consequence of ongoing dialogue. This reflective attitude to the past should be 
mirrored by a cautious and careful attitude towards the future.  
The capacity for creativity and experimentation brings with it certain dangers. The 
exercise of creativity does not always produce positive change. The first danger 
arises from the fact that it is not always possible to know in advance the outcome of 
experimenting with new relationships, changing institutions, creating identities and 
exploring new technologies. A boundless process of experimentation can mean that 
life unfolds in an entirely unpredictable manner or becomes ‘destructive to the 
experimenter and to others.’24  In this respect, law is needed to provide stability, 
ensuring that change and evolution can occur, within stable boundaries that carefully 
restrain the possibility for future destruction, breakdown or harm to the individual or 
others. Law should allow creativity, development and experimentation in 
relationships to be undertaken with prudence, patience and care. The second danger 
arises from the formation of new legal concepts, which might have unforeseen or 
unexpected destructive consequences for the legal subject. In this regard, the 
implications of using concepts to change the dynamics of existing relationships, 
institutions or structures may be hazardous. This is especially the case in respect to 
the formation of concepts that might have an impact on others within the wider 
network of relationships. As such, the exercise of creativity now, in order to alter the 
terms of legal relationships, may reduce, rather than enhance, the potential for future 
creativity, experimentation and difference.25  
3. Investing in the Future 
This thesis has explored inter alia the connections between human dignity and 
vulnerability, interdependence and creativity, but an exploration of the implication of 
these connections for law is certainly not complete. Nor, according to constructivism, 
can an exploration of those implications ever be complete, for life is a continuous 
process of change, giving rise to new problems and issues, which may open up new 
lines of inquiry. Addressing these problems will not merely entail repeating the 
concept by applying it to numerous issues, but, importantly, developing and 
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modifying it in response to the differences and ‘specificity of the encounter’. 
However, briefly discussed below by way of suggestion of the further implications of 
the concept constructed in this thesis, is its potential for changing the way we 
conceive of the relationship between the individual and their environmental 
surroundings, future generations or the wider human species. At present, very little 
work has been undertaken to explore the implications of dignity for the relationship 
between human beings and their environmental surroundings. 26  This is not 
unsurprising, in light of the historical focus on autonomy-as-dignity, which prioritizes 
notions of separateness, independence, and control of resources. The shift towards 
dependence, as a consequence of vulnerability, may provide an important 
foundation for exploring the appropriate relationship of humanity to the environment 
as a whole, in which our activity and future development is so heavily invested.  
 
Dignity might be developed in such a way as to create a more caring outlook and 
relationship to the world then one that treats it as the subordinate subject of human 
will. A closely related, but somewhat distinct issue, concerns the relationship 
between different generations of humanity, recognising their continuity and 
interconnectedness in the process of becoming.27 Each generation may, importantly, 
be invested in, and dependent upon, the manner in which the previous generation 
has respected the world. The most obvious area for considering these potential 
implications of investment dignity is in the field of the third generation of human 
rights for which there is no clear foundation or system of protection.28  
 
A number of dimensions of investment dignity might cast light on, as well as enrich, 
existing theoretical explanations of this developing legal field.  It is envisaged, for 
instance, that the concept of vulnerability, as a core dimension of dignity, might be 
explored in temporal terms, addressing how a member of each generation is 
dependent on their predecessors and on their successors for sustaining and fulfilling 
their creative potentiality. A member of each generation is dependent for the 
development of their creative potentiality not only on the investment of their 
contemporaries, but also their predecessors, whose actions inform the social, 
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physical and emotional environments that sustain and affect us. It may even be that 
the realisation of our own creative projects and aspirations, which began in life, will 
depend on the investment of a successor generation in order to see them to fruition 
or completion in death.29 This might require a reimagining of the self as part of the 
continuity of time and existence, perhaps best captured by the idea of personality as 
a dynamic process of becoming, as opposed to that of being, which suggests a more 
fixed subjectivity that exists in a self-enclosed segment of time.30 This thesis has laid 
the foundation for future work that explores the relational and temporal dimensions of 
dignity.    
 
This thesis has ultimately sought to develop a different approach to understanding 
human dignity that moves the current debate on the meaning of the concept in a 
more productive direction. Constructivism seeks to respond to inevitable change, 
whilst building a better future for the most disadvantaged. This entails very different 
expectations of the concept compared to approaches that seek to find a singular 
determinate concept that is there to be applied. In this regard, the openness of 
dignity has been re-envisaged as part of its usefulness, enabling responsiveness to 
difference and attentiveness to singularity.  The concept of human dignity that has 
been constructed entails a move towards a more dynamic, vulnerable, relational and 
holistic image of the human being, which is more in tune with the rich complexity of 
lived experience.  
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